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Partial Ownership (partial + ownership)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Bargaining, Bonding, and Partial Ownership

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2000
Sudipto Dasgupta
This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of investment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can use or general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When the benefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity participation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take-or-pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the downstream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power. [source]

Partial Ownership For The Public Firm And Competition

THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2003
Sang-Ho Lee
This paper investigates the issue of partial ownership (partial privatization) of a state-owned public enterprise. We elaborate on the framework of Matsumura (1998) by allowing for managerial inefficiency, and show that under moderate conditions partial ownership is a reasonable choice of government in a monopoly market as well as in a mixed duopoly market, where a public firm competes with a profit-maximizing private firm. We also provide some economic rationale on the result that neither full privatization nor full nation-alization is optimum. [source]

Bargaining, Bonding, and Partial Ownership

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2000
Sudipto Dasgupta
This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of investment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can use or general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When the benefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity participation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take-or-pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the downstream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power. [source]

Partial Ownership For The Public Firm And Competition

THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2003
Sang-Ho Lee
This paper investigates the issue of partial ownership (partial privatization) of a state-owned public enterprise. We elaborate on the framework of Matsumura (1998) by allowing for managerial inefficiency, and show that under moderate conditions partial ownership is a reasonable choice of government in a monopoly market as well as in a mixed duopoly market, where a public firm competes with a profit-maximizing private firm. We also provide some economic rationale on the result that neither full privatization nor full nation-alization is optimum. [source]