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Party Government (party + government)
Selected AbstractsParty Government and the "Cohesive Power of Public Plunder"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2010Royce Carroll We argue that party government in the U.S. House of Representatives rests on two pillars: the pursuit of policy goals and the disbursement of particularistic benefits. Existing theories of party government argue that the majority party in the House is often successful in biasing policy outcomes in its favor. In the process, it creates "policy losers" among its own members who nevertheless support their party on procedural votes. We posit that the majority party creates an incentive for even the policy losers to support a procedural coalition through judicious distribution of particularistic benefits that compensates policy losers at a rate commensurate with the policy losses that they suffer. We evaluate our theory empirically using the concept of "roll rates" in conjunction with federal domestic outlays data for the period 1983,96. We find that, within the majority party, policy losers are favored in the distribution of "pork barrel" spending throughout this period. [source] Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789,2000AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2007Matthew J. Lebo Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits. [source] Output of the Spanish Cortes (1979,2000): A case of adaptation to party governmentEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2006MANUEL SANCHEZ DE DIOS It mainly examines the output of the lower chamber due to the asymmetrical bicameralism and weak status of the Senate. In Spain, the legislative output has been dependent on different situations of party government. In general terms, the Cortes have been always very active in controlling the executive and its participation in law-making was highly relevant when there was a minority government. Because parties are central actors in parliament and due to the strong party discipline in the Spanish case, the author mainly studied parliament output from the viewpoint of strategies of opposition parties. Sometimes parties behaved in parliament procedures in a competitive way, while in others they behave cooperatively. There was a great variety of patterns of strategic behaviour on account of the different situations of party government and the diverse opposition parties. Half of the parliaments had minority governments in which minority parties played a very important role by supporting the government in parliament; however, the main opposition party was never the same since there were two changes of government. [source] Studying the Polarized PresidencyPRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2002Charles M. Cameron For reasons that political scientists do not fully understand, American political elites are now more ideologically polarized than they have been since the end of World War I. This polarization,in combination with the rise of divided party government,has sweeping implications for the presidency. No aspect of executive-legislative relations is untouched. But also deeply affected are relations with the media, with thejudiciary, with the bureaucracy, and even the organization of the president's own staff. Presidential scholars are just beginning to grasp these changes. We face an enormous challenge but also a remarkable opportunity. The polarized presidency makes us confront a broader range of the institution's possibilities,and those of American democracy. [source] Party Government and the "Cohesive Power of Public Plunder"AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2010Royce Carroll We argue that party government in the U.S. House of Representatives rests on two pillars: the pursuit of policy goals and the disbursement of particularistic benefits. Existing theories of party government argue that the majority party in the House is often successful in biasing policy outcomes in its favor. In the process, it creates "policy losers" among its own members who nevertheless support their party on procedural votes. We posit that the majority party creates an incentive for even the policy losers to support a procedural coalition through judicious distribution of particularistic benefits that compensates policy losers at a rate commensurate with the policy losses that they suffer. We evaluate our theory empirically using the concept of "roll rates" in conjunction with federal domestic outlays data for the period 1983,96. We find that, within the majority party, policy losers are favored in the distribution of "pork barrel" spending throughout this period. [source] The Mexican Presidential and Congressional Elections of 2000 and Democratic TransitionBULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH, Issue 3 2001Darren Wallis The article examines the presidential and congressional elections of July 2000 in Mexico. The elections brought to an end more than 70 years of single party government and the culmination of a gradual democratisation process stretching back at least a decade. The long term decline in the bases of support for the regime and the changing institutional rules for elections and parties are described by way of contextualising the campaign itself and its leading protagonists. While the new rules of the game guaranteed free and fair elections, issues of internal party democracy and negative, personality-based campaigning do not paint a universally rosy democratic picture. Analysis of the election results demonstrates how the opposition was able to move beyond its traditional geographic confines and challenge across the country. However, voters did not give an unambiguous victory to Vicente Fox; his alliance does not possess a majority in either house of congress. Divided government and developments in the party system are considered as two key issues that will shape Mexico's democratic future. [source] Responsible, Representative and Accountable GovernmentAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 1 2001Malcolm Aldons As an evaluation of the health of Australia's political system, this article offers a perspective different from the lament over the loss of responsible government. It finds that responsible government is not compatible with representative democracy. Peculiar to Australia is conflict between ,responsible party government' and ,responsible parliamentary government'. Nevertheless, the system is healthy. A parliament-as-a-whole approach identifies key holistic functions of manifest and latent legitimation and accountability that bolster legitimacy. Political accountability is enhanced by the watchdog role of the media. Public accountability is enriched by the links between citizens and administrative review. Critical changes include the guarantee of senate independence and the removal of senate power over supply. These changes would confine the theory and practice of responsible government to the House of Representatives, promote accountability, and thus increase the legitimacy of Australian parliamentary democracy. [source] National and Partisan Contexts of Europeanization: The Case of the French SocialistsJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 1 2001Alistair Cole This article affirms the usefulness of thinking of Europeanization and European policy change in terms of national, party and European contexts and their interrelationships. Through a case study of the French Socialists in office, the article seeks to establish that national, party and European policy contexts matter in different ways and in varying degrees. National context provides a set of institutions, interests and referential paradigms which help to make sense of a complex external environment. Party provides a distinctive partisan lens and an enduring political community. Europeanization poses a series of direct and indirect policy challenges and opportunities for nation-states and party governments. The article considers national and Europeanized pressures to be more significant than partisan processes. [source] | ||||||||||