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Party Cohesion (party + cohesion)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences50%

Selected Abstracts

More power to the European Parliament?

ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 35 2002
Abdul G. Noury
SUMMARY Many observers have expressed scepticism about granting more power to the European Parliament. The sceptics believe that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) do not vote in a disciplined way and that they vote more often with their country group than with their European Party. Using a unique database consisting of all roll call votes by each individual MEP between 1989 and 1999 (over 6000 votes by over 1000 different MEPs), we show that the sceptics are wrong. Our data shows clearly that MEPs vote more along party lines than along country lines. Party cohesion is comparable to that of the US Congress and is increasing over time whereas country cohesion is low and declining. In short, politics in the European Parliament generally follows the traditional left,right divide that one finds in all European nations. These findings are valid across issues, even on issues like the structural and cohesion funds where one would expect country rather than party cohesion. In votes where the EP has the most power , those held under the so-called co-decision procedure , MEPs participate more and are more party-cohesive. In our opinion, this unique empirical analysis provides grounds for justifying a generalization of the co-decision procedure. [source]

Divided Government and Democratic Presidents: Truman and Clinton Compared

PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2000
RICHARD S. CONLEY
This article compares the experiences of President Truman in the 80th Congress and President Clinton in the 104th Congress. The impact of divided government is measured by examining presidential involvement on significant legislation in the two periods, presidential floor success rates, and congressional support for the president on domestic policy and veto override attempts. The article concludes that innovative legislation in both periods was largely congressionally driven, while voting alignments in Congress ultimately affected each president's ability to control policy outcomes through the use of the veto. Regional fragmentation in the Democratic Party and Republican unity combined to undercut Truman's ability to marshal strong support on his legislative stands or on veto override attempts, contributing to a series of successful anti,New Deal measures. Democratic Party cohesion in the 104th Congress allowed Clinton to ward off veto override attempts and stifle much of the Republican agenda outlined in the Contract with America. [source]

More power to the European Parliament?

ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 35 2002
Abdul G. Noury
SUMMARY Many observers have expressed scepticism about granting more power to the European Parliament. The sceptics believe that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) do not vote in a disciplined way and that they vote more often with their country group than with their European Party. Using a unique database consisting of all roll call votes by each individual MEP between 1989 and 1999 (over 6000 votes by over 1000 different MEPs), we show that the sceptics are wrong. Our data shows clearly that MEPs vote more along party lines than along country lines. Party cohesion is comparable to that of the US Congress and is increasing over time whereas country cohesion is low and declining. In short, politics in the European Parliament generally follows the traditional left,right divide that one finds in all European nations. These findings are valid across issues, even on issues like the structural and cohesion funds where one would expect country rather than party cohesion. In votes where the EP has the most power , those held under the so-called co-decision procedure , MEPs participate more and are more party-cohesive. In our opinion, this unique empirical analysis provides grounds for justifying a generalization of the co-decision procedure. [source]

The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2004
Pieter Bouwen
This article is an attempt to test empirically a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the lobbying behaviour of business interests in the European Parliament. The theoretical framework tries to explain the degree of access of different organizational forms of business interest representation (companies, associations and consultants) to the supranational assembly in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of ,access goods'. On the basis of 14 exploratory and 27 semi-structured interviews, the hypotheses are checked in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament. Surprisingly, European and national associations enjoy a similar degree of access to the Parliament. Individual companies and consultants have a much lower degree of access than the two collective forms of interest representation. In the conclusion, these results are analysed in the light of the existing literature on party cohesion and coalition formation in the European Parliament. [source]