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Parliamentary Institutions (parliamentary + institution)
Selected AbstractsAppointing and Censuring the European Commission: The Adaptation of Parliamentary Institutions to the Community ContextEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2001Paul Magnette The parliamentary model at the heart of European civic cultures has deeply influenced ,Constitutional reforms' in the European Community. But the EC is not a Parliamentary state and the transplant of national institutions in its own political context gives rise to hybrid practices. This paper examines this process of hybridation, and shows that new practices of appointment and censure are emerging in the Community, mixing classic parliamentary institutions with the crucial features of the EC itself. Focusing on recent tensions between the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament, it shows that they are governed by national divisions, technocratic and legal reasoning rather than by classic majoritarian attitudes. It concludes that, while this new model of accountability might prove efficient in terms of inter-institutional controls, it remains symbolically inefficient, because it does not help citizens understand and accept the Community institutional model. [source] Personifying the State: Consequences for Attitude FormationPOLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 3 2007Kathleen M. McGraw Because states are abstract entities, they often require embodiment for mass publics and elites to understand them. This embodiment often occurs as personification, where the state is associated with the most salient figure in the political system, but embodiment can also occur through political institutions and social groups. Surprisingly, there is virtually no systematic empirical work on the political and psychological consequences of state personification, or other forms of embodiment. In this experiment, we investigate how various ways of embodying the state influence attitude formation processes. Drawing on the on-line/memory-based processing and entitativity literatures, we hypothesize that personification of the state should facilitate on-line processing and stronger attitudes, whereas embodying the state as a parliamentary institution should produce weaker attitudes that are formed in a memory-based fashion. The results support these hypotheses. Embodiment as a social group produced inconsistent results. This study provides the first systematic evidence that the widespread practice of personification of the state has robust and potentially far-reaching attitudinal consequences that have meaningful implications for strategic interaction, perception and learning, and attitude change in the international realm. [source] Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation, and Democracy in the EU1EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 6 2006Richard Bellamy Recently two groups of theorists have argued neither deficit need prove problematic. The first group adopts a rights-based view of democracy and claims that a European consensus on rights, as represented by the Charter of Fundamental European Rights, can offer the basis of citizen allegiance to EU wide democracy, thereby overcoming the demos deficit. The second group adopts a public-interest view of democracy and argues that so long as delegated authorities enact policies that are ,for' the people, then the absence of institutional forms that facilitate democracy ,by' the people are likewise unnecessary,indeed, in certain areas they may be positively harmful. This article argues that both views are normatively and empirically flawed. This is because there is no consensus on rights or the public interest apart from the majority view of a demos secured through parliamentary institutions. To the extent that these remain absent at the EU level, a democratic deficit continues to exist. [source] Appointing and Censuring the European Commission: The Adaptation of Parliamentary Institutions to the Community ContextEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2001Paul Magnette The parliamentary model at the heart of European civic cultures has deeply influenced ,Constitutional reforms' in the European Community. But the EC is not a Parliamentary state and the transplant of national institutions in its own political context gives rise to hybrid practices. This paper examines this process of hybridation, and shows that new practices of appointment and censure are emerging in the Community, mixing classic parliamentary institutions with the crucial features of the EC itself. Focusing on recent tensions between the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament, it shows that they are governed by national divisions, technocratic and legal reasoning rather than by classic majoritarian attitudes. It concludes that, while this new model of accountability might prove efficient in terms of inter-institutional controls, it remains symbolically inefficient, because it does not help citizens understand and accept the Community institutional model. [source] Analyzing Roll Calls with Perfect Spatial Voting: France 1946,1958AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2004Howard Rosenthal A recent methodological advance in legislative roll-call analysis is especially relevant to the study of legislative behavior outside the setting of the United States Congress. We argue that Poole's (2000) optimal classification method for roll-call analysis is preferable to parametric methods for studying many legislatures. This is because the nature of party discipline, near-perfect spatial voting, and parliamentary institutions that provides incentives for strategic behavior lead to severe violations of the error assumptions underlying parametric methods. The robustness of the nonparametric method to the stochastic nature of the data makes it an ideal candidate for studying strategic behavior in legislatures. We illustrate these points with an analysis of data from the French Fourth Republic (1946,1958). [source] |