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Ownership Concentration (ownership + concentration)
Selected AbstractsOwnership Concentration and Corporate Performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: do too many cooks spoil the goulash?CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2005John S. Earle We examine the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance using panel data for firms listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange, where ownership tends to be highly concentrated and frequently involves multiple blocks. Fixed-effects estimates imply that the size of the largest block increases profitability and efficiency strongly and monotonically, but the effects of total blockholdings are much smaller and statistically insignificant. Controlling for the size of the largest block, point estimates of the marginal effects of additional blocks are negative. The results suggest that the marginal costs of concentration may outweigh the benefits when the increased concentration involves "too many cooks". [source] Ownership Concentration in Privatized Firms: The Role of Disclosure Standards, Auditor Choice, and Auditing InfrastructureJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 5 2006OMRANE GUEDHAMI ABSTRACT We rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor-related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries. Accounting transparency can help alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders, which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration, since the expropriation of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden. After controlling for other country-level and firm-level determinants, we find weak (no) evidence that extensive disclosure standards (auditor choice) reduce ownership concentration. In contrast, we report strong, robust evidence that ownership concentration is lower in countries with securities laws that specify a lower burden of proof in civil and criminal litigation against auditors, consistent with Ball's [2001] predictions. Collectively, our research implies that minority investors worldwide value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both the presence of a Big 5 auditor and better disclosure standards. Re-estimating our regressions on a broad sample of western European public firms provides similar evidence on all of our predictions. [source] CORRUPTION AND CORPORATE FINANCE PATTERNS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVEPACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2008Julan Du Corruption contributes to a more prevalent and higher degree of corporate equity ownership concentration and more reliance on bank financing in raising external finance. It argues that corporate governance under corrupt governments is particularly poor. Firm management, taking advantage of political capital acquired through bribery, is especially powerful in expropriating from outside investors. Ownership concentration and reliance on bank financing are means of mitigating the corporate governance problem under a corrupt government. [source] Antecedents of Shareholder Activism in Target Firms: Evidence from a Multi-Country StudyCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2010William Q. Judge ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study seeks to better understand the antecedents of shareholder activism targeted at firms located in three common law countries (i.e., USA, UK, and Australia) and three civil law countries (Japan, Germany, and South Korea) during the 2003,07 time period. Research Findings/Insights: Our findings suggest that the antecedents of shareholder activism vary by the motivation of the activist. We demonstrate that activists target firms with two motives (a) to improve the financial performance, and (b) to improve the social performance of the firm. With respect to the target firm level antecedents, we find that firm size is unrelated to financial activism, but positively related to social activism; ownership concentration is negatively related to both financial and social activism; and prior profitability is negatively related to financial activism, but positively related to social activism. Further, these relationships in the case of financial activism are generally stronger in common law legal systems, whereas those in the case of social activism are generally stronger in environments with a greater level of income inequality. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our findings suggest that future research should differentiate between the motivations of the activism event. Further, we find that while agency logic works well for financial activism, institutional theory provides stronger explanations for social activism. Overall, we demonstrate the complementary nature of these two theories in explaining shareholder activism. Practitioner/Policy Implications: We found that the "exposure" to shareholder activism varies by the motivation of the activist, and the nature of the firm and its national context. An understanding of these issues would help firms develop proper response strategies to activism events. [source] Business Group Affiliation, Firm Governance, and Firm Performance: Evidence from China and IndiaCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2009Deeksha A. Singh ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study seeks to understand how business group affiliation, within firm governance and external governance environment affect firm performance in emerging economies. We examine two aspects of within firm governance , ownership concentration and board independence. Research Findings/Insights: Using archival data on the top 500 Indian and Chinese firms from multiple data sources for 2007, we found that group affiliated firms performed worse than unaffiliated firms, and the negative relationship was stronger in the case of Indian firms than for Chinese firms. We also found that ownership concentration had a positive effect on firm performance, while board independence had a negative effect on firm performance. Further, we found that group affiliation , firm performance relationship in a given country context was moderated by ownership concentration. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study utilizes an integration of agency theory with an institutional perspective, providing a more comprehensive framework to analyze the CG problems, particularly in the emerging economy firms. Empirically, our findings support, as well as contradict, some of the conventional wisdom, and suggest useful avenues for future research. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study shows that reforms in general and CG reforms in particular are effective in emerging economies, which is an encouraging sign for policy makers. However, our research also suggests that it may be time for India and China to stop the encouragement for the empire building through group formation in the corporate world. For practioners, our findings suggest that firms need to balance the need for oversight with the need for advice, while selecting independent directors. [source] Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: do too many cooks spoil the goulash?CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2005John S. Earle We examine the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance using panel data for firms listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange, where ownership tends to be highly concentrated and frequently involves multiple blocks. Fixed-effects estimates imply that the size of the largest block increases profitability and efficiency strongly and monotonically, but the effects of total blockholdings are much smaller and statistically insignificant. Controlling for the size of the largest block, point estimates of the marginal effects of additional blocks are negative. The results suggest that the marginal costs of concentration may outweigh the benefits when the increased concentration involves "too many cooks". [source] Corporate Governance and Financial Distress: evidence from TaiwanCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2004Tsun-Siou Lee Prior empirical evidence supports the wealth expropriation hypothesis that weak corporate governance induced by certain types of ownership structures and board composition tends to result in minority interest expropriation. This in turn reduces corporate value. However, it is still unclear whether corporate financial distress is related to these corporate governance characteristics. To answer this question, we adopt three variables to proxy for corporate governance risk, namely, the percentage of directors occupied by the controlling shareholder, the percentage the controlling shareholders shareholding pledged for bank loans (pledge ratio), and the deviation in control away from the cash flow rights. Binary logistic regressions are then fitted to generate dichotomous prediction models. Taiwanese listed firms, characterised by a high degree of ownership concentration, similar to that in most countries, are used as our empirical samples. The evidence suggests that the three variables mentioned above are positively related to the risk for financial distress in the following year. Generally speaking, firms with weak corporate governance are vulnerable to economic downturns and the probability of falling into financial distress increases. [source] Corporate governance in Germany: the role of banks and ownership concentrationECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 31 2000Jeremy Edwards The German system of corporate governance is often thought to be effective at addressing problems arising in large firms. In addition to the usual emphasis on the role of German banks, it is increasingly recognized that the German system also involves a high concentration of the ownership of large firms. We analyse the relative significance of these two features of the German system and conclude that high ownership concentration is more important. Although banks may influence corporate governance via their control of proxy votes, positions on supervisory boards, and provision of loan finance, in practice they do not play a role in the governance of large German firms which is distinct from that of other types of large shareholders. Any case for the superiority of German corporate governance of large firms must therefore be based on high ownership concentration rather than a special role of banks, and must consider the costs of ownership concentration as well as the benefits. [source] Rights Offerings and Corporate Financial ConditionFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2006Nancy D. Ursel Certain American industrial firms still use equity rights offerings. Most of these offerings are uninsured. I examine firms' financing decisions, and develop the explanation that rights offerings are used by firms in financial distress with difficulty accessing underwriting services. These firms have little to lose from the costs of adverse selection that accompany the lack of underwriter certification of uninsured rights offerings. Probit analysis of 660 seasoned NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq equity issues between 1983,1999 yields results consistent with my explanation. There is no evidence that variables previously linked to rights usage (e.g., ownership concentration) continue to be relevant to the issue method choice. [source] Wealth Effects of Private Equity Placements: Evidence from SingaporeFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 2 2002Sheng-Syan Chen We examine institutional characteristics and the wealth effects of private equity placements in Singapore. Our findings show that private placements in Singapore generally result in a negative wealth effect and a reduction in ownership concentration. We find that at high levels of ownership concentration, the relation between abnormal returns and changes in ownership concentration is significantly negative. We also show that the market reacts less favorably to placements in which management ownership falls below 50%, but more favorably to issues to single investors. We do not find evidence suggesting that our results are due to an information effect. [source] Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firmsACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2010Jesper Banghøj M52; Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects Abstract We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Our findings indicate that the pay-to-performance relation is weak. Board size and ownership concentration are the only corporate governance characteristics that explain variations in executive compensation. Executive characteristics like skills, title and educational attainment all explain variations in executive compensation. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find a stronger pay-to-performance relation in firms with better designed bonus plans. [source] Investor Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the NetherlandsGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2004Robert Chirinko Corporate governance; legal approach; the Netherlands Abstract. The Berle,Means problem , information and incentive asymmetries disrupting relations between knowledgeable managers and remote investors , has remained a durable issue engaging researchers since the 1930s. However, the Berle,Means paradigm , widely dispersed, helpless investors facing strong, entrenched managers , is under stress in the wake of the cross-country evidence presented by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, and their legal approach to corporate control. This paper continues to investigate the roles of investor protections and concentrated ownership by examining firm behaviour in the Netherlands. Our within-country analysis generates two key results. First, the role of investor protections emphasized in the legal approach is not sustained. Rather, firm performance is enhanced when the firm is freed of equity market constraints. Second, ownership concentration does not have a discernible impact on firm performance, which may reflect large shareholders' dual role in lowering the costs of managerial agency problems but raising the agency costs of expropriation. [source] Ownership Concentration in Privatized Firms: The Role of Disclosure Standards, Auditor Choice, and Auditing InfrastructureJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 5 2006OMRANE GUEDHAMI ABSTRACT We rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor-related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries. Accounting transparency can help alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders, which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration, since the expropriation of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden. After controlling for other country-level and firm-level determinants, we find weak (no) evidence that extensive disclosure standards (auditor choice) reduce ownership concentration. In contrast, we report strong, robust evidence that ownership concentration is lower in countries with securities laws that specify a lower burden of proof in civil and criminal litigation against auditors, consistent with Ball's [2001] predictions. Collectively, our research implies that minority investors worldwide value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both the presence of a Big 5 auditor and better disclosure standards. Re-estimating our regressions on a broad sample of western European public firms provides similar evidence on all of our predictions. [source] Principal,Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public CorporationMANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION REVIEW, Issue 1 2008Yiyi Su abstract By examining the level of ownership concentration across firms, we determine how principal,principal conflict, defined as the incongruence of ownership goals among shareholder groups in a corporation, impacts agency costs of Chinese boards of directors. Based on data from Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 1999,2003, we found that ownership concentration had a U-shaped relationship with board compensation, board size and the presence of independent directors. These results provide corroborating evidence that principal,principal conflict can lead to high agency costs. [source] A comparison of ownership structures and innovations of US and Japanese firmsMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2005Peggy M. Lee This study analyzes the impact of ownership structure on innovation in the US and Japan. Agency theory is used to develop links between the distinct patterns of ownership in the US and Japan to differences in innovation. Empirical evidence shows that ownership concentration and the identity of the investors with large ownership positions affects innovation. This relationship differs across the two countries. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] CORRUPTION AND CORPORATE FINANCE PATTERNS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVEPACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2008Julan Du Corruption contributes to a more prevalent and higher degree of corporate equity ownership concentration and more reliance on bank financing in raising external finance. It argues that corporate governance under corrupt governments is particularly poor. Firm management, taking advantage of political capital acquired through bribery, is especially powerful in expropriating from outside investors. Ownership concentration and reliance on bank financing are means of mitigating the corporate governance problem under a corrupt government. [source] DO MARKETS PENALIZE AGENCY CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONTROLLING AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS?THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, Issue 3 2007EVIDENCE FROM CHILE G32; G34; O16 Using a sample of Chilean listed firms with widespread presence of economic conglomerates that use pyramid structures to control affiliated companies, we find that firms where controlling shareholders have higher coincidence between cash and control rights are persistently more valued by the market. We carefully check that our results are not driven by omitted variable biases and control for reverse causation using a feature of Chilean Corporations Law that provides an exogenous instrument for ownership concentration. [source] Institutional Investors and Executive CompensationTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2003Jay C. Hartzell We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm size, industry, investment opportunities, and performance. These results suggest that the institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Additionally, we find that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms with certain compensation structures, suggesting that institutions also influence compensation structures through their preferences. [source] Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the Cellular IndustryTHE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2000David Reiffen One concern about regulated monopolies entering unregulated vertically-related markets is that they will discriminate against competitors of their unregulated affiliates. However, prohibiting regulated monopolies from offering related goods may preclude production by the most efficient provider. We take advantage of variation across geographic cellular phone markets in the US to examine the effect of integration on output, quality and prices. We find some evidence consistent with efficiencies (greater concentration of lines to users is associated with greater output and higher quality) and some consistent with discrimination (greater interconnection facility ownership concentration is associated with lower output and quality). [source] Corporate Diversification, Relatedness, and Firm Value: Evidence from Korean Firms,ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 6 2008Sung C. Bae Abstract We examine the valuation effects of diversification activities for Korean firms by diversification type and the occasion of the Korean financial crisis. Employing a unique dataset of 2,894 firm-years for the entire manufacturing industries, we find that diversification by Korean firms on average decreases firm value but its effect varies by the type of diversification. While unrelated diversification erodes firm value, related diversification is associated with a non-negative effect on firm value. These valuation effects are more pronounced before the crisis than after the crisis. Our results also show an important role of a firm's affiliation to a large business group, known as chaebols, that related diversification by chaebol-affiliated firms comes with a significant value gain. We further find that the different valuation effects of unrelated and related diversification are closely related to a firm's ownership concentration and financial leverage. Our results are robust to different samples and regression model specifications. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||