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Own Account (own + account)
Selected AbstractsRamsey on Judgment: The Theory of "Facts and Propositions"DIALECTICA, Issue 4 2004John M. Vickers Ramsey's "Facts and Propositions" is terse, allusive, and dense. The paper is far from easy to understand. The present essay is an effort, largely following Brian Loar's account,1 to say what Ramsey's goal is, to spell out what he took to be the means to accomplish it, and to show how those means, at least in the terms of F&P, cannot accomplish that end. I also contrast Loar's own account of judgment, explicitly modeled on Ramsey's view, with the latter. The exercise is not at all academic. Loar makes clear the striking depth and originality of Ramsey's insights. [source] Counterfactuals and roles: mock victims' and perpetrators' accounts of judicial casesEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 3 2001Patrizia Catellani Three studies assessed the influence of differential perspective taking on counterfactual thinking. In Study 1 male and female subjects were asked to play the role of, respectively, perpetrator and victim in a rape case, and to give their own account of the event. Analysis of spontaneous counterfactuals showed a main tendency to focus on actions more than inactions and on controllable more than uncontrollable elements. However, this tendency was moderated by the subject's role and the counterfactual target. While victims focused on perpetrators' controllable actions more than on their own, perpetrators did not focus on victims' controllable actions more than on their own; they focused on victims' controllable inactions instead. In Study 2, where males and females were asked to reverse their roles, and where prompted as well as spontaneous counterfactuals were analysed, the same results were found. Further evidence for generality of these results was found in Study 3, where an assault case instead of a rape case was taken into account. These findings support the view that counterfactual mutability may be influenced by role-based motivations, as well as by role-based expectations regarding how active a party is supposed to have been in an event. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Philosophy of Education and the Gigantic Affront of UniversalismJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 1 2009PENNY ENSLIN Universalism in philosophy, argue Penny Enslin and Mary Tjiattas, tends to be regarded as an affront to particular affiliations, an act of injustice by misrecognition. While agreeing with criticisms of some expressions of universalism, they take the view that anti-universalism has become an orthodoxy that deflects attention from pressing issues of global injustice in education. In different ways, recent reformulations of universalism accommodate particularity and claims for recognition. Defending a qualified universalism, they argue, through a discussion of the Education for All campaign, that the present focus on recognition should be widened to address redistribution and representation as elements of global justice in education. In her response to Enslin and Tjiattas, Sharon Todd expresses sympathy for their aspiration towards a ,qualified universalism', but she seeks to go beyond the dichotomy of universalism versus anti-universalism by way of a discussion of aspects of the work of Judith Butler. Butler's emphasis on cultural translation offers a way, it is claimed, to think about the universal that transcends the oppositional relation between culture and commitment to universals. In the light of this she advocates an approach that involves neither universalism nor anti-universalism but ,critique of universality'. Thus, the task of translation, on Butler's account, prevents universality from being a standard or home-base from which we can judge the world and turns it instead into an ongoing struggle for intelligibility. In their rejoinder, Enslin and Tjiattas reject any charge that their own account has fallen into a simple dichotomisation of universalism and anti-universalism, and reaffirm their commitment to a form of universalism in which (a) partial or contextual considerations count in ethical deliberations, and (b) values and principles are subject to reflexive renegotiation in democratic deliberations, which provides the means of their justification and the source of their legitimacy. This yields, they claim, a non-standard form of contractualism that is both culturally sensitive and open-ended. They suggest in conclusion that the debate between themselves and Todd raises questions about whether the analytical and continental traditions can concede one another's place in the philosophy of education. [source] NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF'S JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS: AN INTRODUCTIONJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 2 2009Paul Weithman ABSTRACT This introduction sets the stage for four papers on Nicholas Wolterstorff's Justice: Rights and Wrongs, written by Harold Attridge, Oliver O'Donovan, Richard Bernstein, and myself. In his book, Wolterstorff defends an account of human rights. The first section of this introduction distinguishes Wolterstorff's account of rights from the alternative account of rights against which he contends. The alternative account draws much of its power from a historical narrative according to which theory and politics supplanted earlier ways of thinking about justice. The second section sketches that narrative and Wolterstorff's counter-narrative. The third section draws together the main points of Wolterstorff's own account. [source] Reasonably Traditional: Self,Contradiction and Self,Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre's Account of Tradition,Based RationalityJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 3 2002Micah Lott Alasdair MacIntyre's account of tradition,based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre's account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre's account of tradition,based rationality presents a picture of rationality with inconsistent internal elements, and (2) that MacIntyre, in the act of presenting his picture of rationality, makes the sort of claims to which his own account of rationality denies legitimacy, and thus MacIntyre's account is self,referentially incoherent. In response to criticisms of the first sort, it is argued that MacIntyre can further clarify or develop his position to take the current criticisms into account without altering the fundamental aspects of his picture of rationality. In response to the charge of self,referential incoherence, it is argued that the charge rests on a mistaken understanding of MacIntyre's position and of the nature of justification. In dealing with these arguments, the author hopes to not only vindicate MacIntyre's account of rationality against the charges of some of its recent critics, but also to shed some light on the nature of arguments both for and against relativism and historicism. [source] Language and the Measure of MindMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 4 2010ELI DRESNER In his recent book The Measure of Mind Robert Matthews presents the most elaborate and convincing attempt to date to account for the propositional attitudes in measurement theoretic terms. In the first section of this paper I review earlier applications of measurement-theoretic conceptualization to the discussion of the mind, I outline Matthews' own account, and I raise two questions concerning it. Then, in the second section of the paper, I present a unified measurement-theoretic account of both linguistic meaning and the propositional attitudes, in which a variant of Matthews' position is embedded. Such a unified account, I argue, yields satisfactory answers to the questions raised with respect to Matthews' original view, and demonstrates other advantages. [source] Meaning-making in the aftermath of sudden infant death syndromeNURSING INQUIRY, Issue 3 2006Guenther Krueger The reconstruction of meaning in the aftermath of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) is part of the grieving process but has to date been poorly understood. Earlier theorists including Freud, Bowlby and Kübler-Ross provided a foundation for what occurs during this time using stage theories. More recent researchers, often using qualitative techniques, have provided a more complex and expanded view that enhances our knowledge of meaning reconstruction following infant loss. This overview of representative contemporary authors compares and contrasts them with the longstanding models that are being supplanted within the emerging field of thanatology. Understanding parental reactions within this new framework can help healthcare professionals in dealing with those affected by SIDS and provide a more empathic and sensitive approach to individual differences. Parents' own accounts of their post-SIDS experience are consistent with these newer theories. Comprehending how parents cope and reconstruct their lives is an important element in providing appropriate psychological support services. [source] | ||||||||||