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Output Decision (output + decision)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting60%

Selected Abstracts

Relation of apical dendritic spikes to output decision in CA1 pyramidal cells during synchronous activation: a computational study

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF NEUROSCIENCE, Issue 5 2006
José M. Ibarz
Abstract Recent studies on the initiation and propagation of dendritic spikes have modified the classical view of postsynaptic integration. Earlier we reported that subthreshold currents and spikes recruited by synaptic currents play a critical role in defining outputs following synchronous activation. Experimental factors strongly condition these currents due to their nonlinear behaviour. Hence, we have performed a detailed parametric study in a CA1 pyramidal cell model to explore how different variables interact and initiate dendritic spiking, and how they influence cell output. The input pattern, the relative excitability of axon and dendrites, the presence/modulation of voltage-dependent channels, and inhibition were cross analysed. Subthreshold currents and spikes on synaptically excited branches fired spikes in other branches to jointly produce different modalities of apical shaft spiking with a variable impact on cell output. Synchronous activation initiated a varying number and temporal scatter of firing branches that produced in the apical shaft-soma axis nonpropagating spikes, pseudosaltatory or continuous forward conduction, or backpropagation. As few as 6,10 local spikes within a time window of 2 ms ensure cell output. However, the activation mode varied extremely when two or more variables were cross-analysed, becoming rather unpredictable when all the variables were considered. Spatially clustered inputs and upper modulation of dendritic Na+ or Ca2+ electrogenesis favour apical decision. In contrast, inhibition biased the output decision toward the axon and switched between dendritic firing modes. We propose that dendrites can discriminate input patterns and decide immediate cell output depending on the particular state of a variety of endogenous parameters. [source]

Low-Price Low-Capacity Traps and Government Intervention in the Québec Hog Market

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2004
Bruno Larue
This paper investigates the marketing of a primary commodity produced by competitive producers that sell to a single downstream processor. There is a significant lag between production and marketing decisions made by producers. If a credible price commitment cannot be made before producers make their output decision, it is a dominant strategy for the processor to buy producers' output at the world price adjusted for transportation costs. Producers fully anticipate this partial holdup ex ante and adjust production accordingly. When the processor's capacity is binding ex post, the equilibrium is described as a low-price, low-capacity trap. Under a specific condition, the processor finds it advantageous to credibly commit to a price increment before producers make their output decision. The ensuing equilibrium is Pareto-superior to the no-commitment equilibrium. We argue that the Québec hog/pork industry has experienced such a situation in the past few years. Government intervention is justified even if the processor has committed to a price increment. The modeling of strategic interactions between the government and the processor reveals that their price increments are strategic substitutes. However, given that the processor's (government's) payoff is increasing with the government's (processor's) price increment, the first-mover advantage entails committing early to a low-price increment to force one's rival to offer a high-price increment. Cet article analyse la mise en marché d'un produit primaire vendu par des producteurs preneurs de prix à un seul et unique transformateur. Les décisions de production et de mise en marché sont séparées dans le temps. Si le transformateur ne peut pas s'engager à payer un certain prix avant que les producteurs prennent leur décision de production, alors la stratégie dominante du transformateur est d'offrir aux producteurs le prix mondial diminué par les coûts de transport. Les producteurs anticipant ce hold-up partiel et réduisent leur production en conséquence. Lorsque le transformateur est confrontéà une contrainte de capacité ex post, les producteurs et le transformateur sont piégés dans un équilibre de « petit prix et petit volume ». Si une condition est respectée, il peut être avantageux pour le transformateur d'offrir un supplément aux producteurs avant leur décision de production. L'équilibre qui s'en suit constitue alors une amélioration au sens de Pareto. Nous soumettons que l'industrie porcine québécoise a vécu pareille expérience durant les dernières années. L'intervention du gouvernement demeure justifiée même si le transformateur s'est commis à payer un supplément. En fait, les interventions du transformateur et du gouvernement sont des substituts stratégiques. Puisque le gain du transformateur (gouvernement) croit avec le supplément offert par le gouvernement (transformateur), il y a un avantage àêtre le premier à se commettre à payer un faible supplément, tant pour le transformateur que pour le gouvernement, pour ainsi forcer l'autre partie à offrir un supplément plus généreux. [source]

Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 8 2005
Michel Cavagnac
We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner,manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade-off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity-lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant-strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low-cost manager and output control for a high-cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

DO OLIGOPOLISTS POLLUTE LESS?

THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2007
EVIDENCE FROM A RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKET
Electricity restructuring has created the opportunity for producers to exercise market power. Oligopolists increase price by distorting output decisions, causing cross-firm production inefficiencies. This study estimates the environmental implications of production inefficiencies attributed to market power in the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland electricity market. Air pollution fell substantially during 1999, the year in which both electricity restructuring and new environmental regulation took effect. I find that strategic firms reduced their emissions by approximately 20% relative to other firms and their own historic emissions. Next, I compare observed behavior with estimates of production, and therefore emissions, in a competitive market. According to a model of competitive behavior, changing costs explain approximately two-thirds of the observed pollution reductions. The remaining third can be attributed to firms exercising market power. [source]