Organizational Design (organizational + design)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Collusion and Organization Design

ECONOMICA, Issue 285 2005
Kouroche Vafaï
This paper investigates how the possibility of collusion between members of an organization affects the choice of organizational design. We consider a moral hazard environment in which a principal chooses the organizational structure before designing contracts. The principal has the choice between a principal,agent organization, where it monitors the output produced by the agent itself, and a principal,supervisor,agent hierarchy, where monitoring is delegated. We identify the conditions under which the possibility of collusion in a principal,supervisor,agent hierarchy entails the superiority of a principal,agent organization. The results suggest that the possibility of collusion may set a limit to the size of organizations. [source]


CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ETHICS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2003
James A. Brickley
Effective corporate leadership involves more than developing a good strategic plan and setting high ethical standards. It also means coming up with an organizational design that encourages the company's managers and employees to carry out its business plan and maintain its ethical standards. In this article, the authors use the term organizational architecture to refer to three key elements of a company's design: ,the assignment of decision-making authority,who gets to make what decisions; ,performance evaluation,the key measures of performance for evaluating business units and individual employees; and ,compensation structure,how employees are rewarded for meeting performance goals. In well-designed companies, each of these elements is mutually reinforcing and supportive of the company's overall business strategy. Decision-making authority is assigned to managers and employees who have the knowledge and experience needed to make the best investment and operating decisions. And to ensure that those decision makers have the incentive as well as the knowledge to make the best decisions, the corporate systems used to evaluate and reward their performance are based on measures that are linked as directly as possible to the corporate goal of creating value. Some of the most popular management techniques of the past two decades, such as reengineering, TQM, and the Balanced Scorecard, have often had disappointing results because they address only one or two elements of organizational architecture, leaving the overall structure out of balance. What's more, a flawed organizational design can lead to far worse than missed opportunities to create value. As the authors note, the recent corporate scandals involved not just improper behavior by senior executives, but corporate structures that, far from safeguarding against such behavior, in some ways encouraged it. In the case of Enron, for example, top management's near-total focus on boosting reported earnings (a questionable corporate goal to begin with) combined with decentralized decision making and loose oversight at all levels of the company to produce an enormously risky high-leverage strategy that ended up bringing down the firm. [source]


Modernism and the Machine Farmer

JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY, Issue 2 2000
Rod Bantjes
In this paper I apply recent theoretical discussions of the spatial character of modernity to a ,rural' context. I argue that neither modernity nor ,modernism' has been an exclusively ,urban' phenomenon in the twentieth century, and that attention to modernism in the countryside yields insights into the modernist project. From the beginning of the twentieth century, the apparently ,rural' spaces of the prairie west were already integrated into modern trans-local structures. Wheat farmers were ahead of their contemporaries in their appreciation of the nature and scale of modern distanciated relationships. They were ,modernist' in embracing and celebrating the technologies, particularly organizational technologies, for dominating space and time. They were also innovators in modern organizational design, seeking creatively to control the modern "machine" and to bridge the local and the ,global.' Their progressive experimentation culminated in a surprising proposal for ,co-operative farms' not unlike Soviet collective farms. [source]


Independent foundations, public money and public accountability: Whither ministerial responsibility as democratic governance?

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 1 2003
Peter Aucoin
The democratic control that is meant to obtain under the Constitution is not present in the design of these foundations. This article examines the ways in which their organizational design is contrary to the principles of responsible government as well as to the government's own policy on so-called alternative service-delivery structures. The article also discusses how the designers of these foundations relied primarily on results-based reporting instead of the traditional system of ministerial responsibility. The author concludes that these organizational designs are beyond the pale of the Constitution's requirements for democratic control over public administration and suggests measures that may correct these deficiences. Sommaire: Au cours de la demière décennie, le gouvernement fédéeral a mis sur pied un certain nombre de fondations indépendantes visant à consacrer des fonds publics aux affaires publiques. Ces fondations ne comportent pas dans leur conception le contrôle démocratique prévu par la Constitution. Le présent article examine comment leur conception organisationnelle va à l'encontre des principes de gouvemement responsable ainsi que la politique même du gouvernement sur ce qu'on appelle les modes altematifs de prestation de services. L'article examine également la manière dont les concepteurs de ces fondations se sont fiés essentiellement à la reddition de comptes axés sur les résultats plutôt qu'au système traditionnel de respon-sabilité ministérielle. L'auteur conclut que ces conceptions organisationnelles ne repondent pas aux exigences de la Constitution pour ce qui est du contrôle démocratique de l'administration publique et propose des mesures qui pourraient pallier à ces insuffisances. [source]


Revisiting the Emergence of the Modern Business Enterprise: Entrepreneurship and the Singer Global Distribution System

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 7 2007
Mark Casson
abstract This paper approaches the question of why entrepreneurial firms exist from a broad business historical perspective. It observes that the original development of the modern business enterprise was very strongly associated with entrepreneurial innovation rather than an extension of managerial routine. The widely-used theory of the entrepreneur as a specialist in judgmental decision making is applied to the particular point in time when entrepreneurs had to develop novel organizational designs in what Chandler described as the prelude to the ,managerial revolution'. The paper illustrates how the theory of entrepreneurship then best explains the rise of the modern corporation by focusing on the case study of vertical integration par excellence, Singer. [source]


Independent foundations, public money and public accountability: Whither ministerial responsibility as democratic governance?

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 1 2003
Peter Aucoin
The democratic control that is meant to obtain under the Constitution is not present in the design of these foundations. This article examines the ways in which their organizational design is contrary to the principles of responsible government as well as to the government's own policy on so-called alternative service-delivery structures. The article also discusses how the designers of these foundations relied primarily on results-based reporting instead of the traditional system of ministerial responsibility. The author concludes that these organizational designs are beyond the pale of the Constitution's requirements for democratic control over public administration and suggests measures that may correct these deficiences. Sommaire: Au cours de la demière décennie, le gouvernement fédéeral a mis sur pied un certain nombre de fondations indépendantes visant à consacrer des fonds publics aux affaires publiques. Ces fondations ne comportent pas dans leur conception le contrôle démocratique prévu par la Constitution. Le présent article examine comment leur conception organisationnelle va à l'encontre des principes de gouvemement responsable ainsi que la politique même du gouvernement sur ce qu'on appelle les modes altematifs de prestation de services. L'article examine également la manière dont les concepteurs de ces fondations se sont fiés essentiellement à la reddition de comptes axés sur les résultats plutôt qu'au système traditionnel de respon-sabilité ministérielle. L'auteur conclut que ces conceptions organisationnelles ne repondent pas aux exigences de la Constitution pour ce qui est du contrôle démocratique de l'administration publique et propose des mesures qui pourraient pallier à ces insuffisances. [source]