			Home About us Contact

Ordinary Practice (ordinary + practice)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	50%

Selected Abstracts

To whom, and for whom, must I respond?

GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER SERIES B: HUMAN GEOGRAPHY, Issue 1 2002
Negotiating responsibility during the last years of East German state socialism
This paper reconsiders the practice of responsibility during the last years of East German state socialism. It treats the matter of responsibility as a kind of dialogue, attending to the various ways in which people were called upon to respond to and account for their actions and those of others across a range of circumstances and predicaments. It addresses several basic questions, among them: What did the ordinary practice of responsibility look like in the East? How did this requirement to respond to and for others affect the arrangements of ordinary living? More specifically, how did the practice of responsibility work out geographically? The approach taken here is both practical and analytic. It attends to the practical and constitutive aspects of dilemmas of responsibility across a range of situations. It is also historical and ethnographic, based on the city and district of Rostock, and drawing upon a range of primary source materials, from security reports to interviews to sermons delivered during the 1980s. The paper shows some of the ways in which the practice of responsibility played itself out in relation to place. For example, residents themselves invoked a rhetoric of responsibility, criticizing local officials for being unresponsive or indifferent to their concerns. Others found ways to generate ambiguity about how the rules of the state were to be applied in particular circumstances. Finally, some residents simply refused to socialize and otherwise assume responsibility for certain others both at work and at home. [source]

Development of a registry for monitoring psychotropic drug prescriptions: aims, methods and implications for ordinary practice and research

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF METHODS IN PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH, Issue 3 2005
Dr Corrado Barbui
Abstract In psychiatry, individual-based registries have provided key information on risks and benefits associated with the use of psychotropic drugs but they have rarely been employed for monitoring and evaluating the everyday prescribing of psychopharmacological treatments. This article describes the cultural background that gave impetus to the idea of registering all prescriptions of psychotropic drugs dispensed by physicians working in the South Verona community mental health service, and presents the methodology employed to develop such a registry in a community psychiatric service where a psychiatric case register (PCR) has been operating since 1978. We developed a registry including every patient receiving psychotropic medications in ordinary practice. This registry is linked to the PCR in order to obtain data on social and demographic characteristics, clinical symptoms, diagnosis, use of services, and outcomes. No exclusion criteria are allowed , anyone receiving treatment is automatically included. This system, which can link drug and service-use data with hard outcome indicators, can generate information on the proportion of subjects discontinuing treatment, switching medication because of side-effects, recovery or inefficacy, as well as on the proportion of subjects failing to return to the physician, and the proportion of patients who improve. The innovative aspect of this approach is that this registry is developed, organized and used by physicians interested in monitoring their clinical practice and in providing patients, relatives and the public with accurate information on drug use in their specific context of care. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 215 2004
Adam Leite
A familiar form of scepticism supposes that knowledge requires infallibility. Although that requirement plays no role in our ordinary epistemic practices, Barry Stroud has argued that this is not a good reason for rejecting a sceptical argument: our ordinary practices do not correctly reflect the requirements for knowledge because the appropriateness-conditions for knowledge attribution are pragmatic. Recent fashion in contextualist semantics for ,knowledge' agrees with this view of our practice, but incorrectly. Ordinary epistemic evaluations are guided by our conception of a person's standing with regard to the reasons that there are for and against the truth of a belief. Thus the objection from our ordinary practices is sound: fallibility is not an epistemological shortcoming, and a convincing sceptical argument must use only requirements which figure in ordinary epistemic practice. [source]