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Opposing Party (opposing + party)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	75%

Selected Abstracts

Compliance in small claims court: Exploring the factors associated with defendants' level of compliance with mediated and adjudicated outcomes

CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2003
Jennie J. Long
This study explores how defendants in small claims cases, settled in either mediation or adjudication, react to case outcomes that require them to make some form of payment to the opposing party. Of particular interest was the relationship between dispute resolution forum and the reasons given for compliant behavior. Data were drawn from thirty-nine structured interviews in small claims cases filed in a local justice court. In mediated cases, defendants tended to comply with case outcomes from a sense of personal responsibility and obligation to fulfill a promise made to complainants, while defendants in adjudicated cases reported that they complied with the judgment in their case because of their duty to obey the law. [source]

Semi-presidentialism, Cohabitation and the Collapse of Electoral Democracies, 1990,2008

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 1 2010
Robert Elgie
Semi-presidentialism is the situation where a constitution makes provision for both a directly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to the legislature. A common argument against the adoption of a semi-presidential constitution by a new democracy is the problem of cohabitation , where a president from one party holds power at the same time as a prime minister from an opposing party and where the president's party is not represented in the cabinet. The concern is that cohabitation creates competing power centres within the executive that are dangerous for young democracies. This article shows that cohabitation has been directly associated with the collapse of a young democracy in only one case. Moreover, by specifying the conditions under which cohabitation can occur, we also show that the threat of cohabitation has been associated with collapse in only one further case. We suggest that this is so because cohabitation refers to a very specific situation that can only occur under a certain combination of circumstances that can often be avoided. Overall, we show that there is little evidence to support one of the most well-known and long-standing arguments against semi-presidentialism. Thus, while semi-presidentialism may indeed be perilous for new democracies, we conclude that it is perilous for reasons other than the problem of cohabitation. [source]

"Divided Government" in State Executive Branches

POLITICS & POLICY, Issue 2 2003
Fred Monardi
The study of "divided government" has focused on the split partisan control of executive and legislative branches. The concept of divided government can also be applied to the study of state executive branches. There is no plausible reason for state electorates to prefer one party for governor and the opposing party for other state executive branch officials, yet many states have a governor of one party, while several of the state executive branch officers are of the opposing party. This study examines the extent of divided executive branches in state politics. Incumbency, state partisanship, and the changing nature of Southern politics affect levels of divisiveness in state executive branches. Electoral features do not affect levels of divisiveness. The data comprises states that have separately elected state executive officers between the years 1968 and 1993. [source]

Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789,2000

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2007
Matthew J. Lebo
Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we find strong links between party behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes: an increase in partisan influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while winning contested votes has electoral benefits. [source]