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Opportunistic Behavior (opportunistic + behavior)
Selected AbstractsThe Effects of Perceived Fairness on Opportunistic Behavior,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2007Jeffrey R. Cohen First page of article [source] How Green Was My Valley?LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, Issue 4 2003An Examination of Tournament Theory as a Governance Mechanism in Silicon Valley Law Firms The tournament model is a widely used mechanism to control opportunistic behavior by associates in law firms. However, this mechanism can only operate in certain economic (and social) circumstances. When those circumstances do not exist, the model breaks down, and with it the ability to control opportunism in the absence of some alternative mechanism. Prior research has not investigated whether the utilization of a tournament model prevents the opportunistic behaviors identified as grabbing, leaving, and shirking. In order to test the limits of the tournament model, it is necessary to find particular historical moments when the economic environment radically challenges assumptions/premises of the model. The dot-com bubble in Silicon Valley provides precisely such a time and place. This article demonstrates limits to the applicability of tournament theory. Those limits are to be found in the economic environment in circumstances in which: (1) exogenous reward structures offer many multiples of internal rewards; (2) demonstrably high short-term rewards outside the firm starkly contrast with the delayed long-term rewards inside the firm; (3) the managerial strata reduce their emphasis on long-term recruiting of potential partners in favor of short-term productivity by young associates; and (4) firms develop departmental leverage ratios in excess of their capacity to monitor, mentor, and train recruits. [source] Preliminary evidence on the appointment of institutional solutions to franchisor moral hazard,the case of franchisee councils,MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2007Olivier Cochet Besides franchisee opportunistic behavior, franchisor moral hazard is a central concern in franchise chains. Economic literature thus far focused on the sharing of franchisee revenues as an incentive for curbing franchisor malfeasance. In this paper, we ask whether and how the obligations of chains may be enforced through institutional arrangements like franchisee councils. Consistent with expectations, the appointment of a council empirically turned out to be more likely as decision rights,a proxy for the scope of moral hazard,were increasingly allocated to companies' management. We found this relationship to be negatively moderated by the contractual share parameter. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Strategically Managing Negotiation Linkage DynamicsNEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT RESEARCH, Issue 1 2010Larry Crump Abstract Negotiation linkage (the way in which one negotiation influences the process or outcome of another) presents challenges that are complex and real. Based on field research, this qualitative study examines four linked-bilateral trade treaty negotiations conducted by Australia, Chile, the European Union, Singapore, and the United States to establish theoretical understanding about the strategic management of negotiation linkage dynamics. Several outcomes are achieved through case analysis. This study (a) introduces "degree of linkage dynamics" (robust, moderate, or modest) as a concept and concludes that it is determined by structural and contextual factors, (b) develops a framework of linked party action, (c) establishes guidance for managing opportunistic behavior in linked negotiations, (d) builds a six-part typology of strategic techniques that can produce tangible gains in linked negotiations, and (e) examines research opportunities to further extend negotiation linkage theory. Research methodology developed in this study serves as a model for investigating negotiation linkage dynamics. [source] From Cooperative to Opportunistic Federalism: Reflections on the Half-Century Anniversary of the Commission on Intergovernmental RelationsPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 5 2006Tim Conlan In 1955, the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,the Kestnbaum Commission,embellished the intellectual framework of cooperative federalism and laid out a policy agenda for promoting it. Since then, our intergovernmental system has evolved from a predominantly cooperative federal,state,local system to one characterized by corrosive opportunistic behavior, greater policy prescriptiveness, eroding institutional capacity for intergovernmental analysis, and shifting paradigms of public management. These trends threaten to undermine effective intergovernmental relations and management. Recent developments, however, offer some promise for building new institutions of intergovernmental analysis, more effective paradigms of intergovernmental public management, and greater horizontal cooperation. [source] Strategic Alliance Outcomes: a Transaction-Cost Economics PerspectiveBRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2006William Q. Judge Empirical research on strategic alliances has been limited because previous studies examined alliance outcomes, and the factors associated with them, from a single partner in a manufacturing alliance. Furthermore, many of these studies have been done from a transaction cost perspective and researchers have inferred opportunistic behavior, rather than directly measuring it and observing its actual relationship with alliance performance. Building on previous transaction cost theory and research, this study seeks to address these gaps by analyzing factors associated with both opportunistic behavior and alliance performance within a major service sector, namely the US healthcare industry. After controlling for asset specificity and alliance age, we found that partner trustworthiness and contractual safeguards were negatively related to opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, opportunistic behavior was negatively related to alliance performance, as hypothesized. Interestingly, mutual equity investments were found to be unrelated to opportunistic behavior, counter to transaction-cost logic. These findings refine and extend the transaction-cost economics perspective regarding our understanding of strategic alliance behavior and outcomes, and offer executives in service-based industries some practical ideas for assuring favorable strategic alliance outcomes. [source] How Green Was My Valley?LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, Issue 4 2003An Examination of Tournament Theory as a Governance Mechanism in Silicon Valley Law Firms The tournament model is a widely used mechanism to control opportunistic behavior by associates in law firms. However, this mechanism can only operate in certain economic (and social) circumstances. When those circumstances do not exist, the model breaks down, and with it the ability to control opportunism in the absence of some alternative mechanism. Prior research has not investigated whether the utilization of a tournament model prevents the opportunistic behaviors identified as grabbing, leaving, and shirking. In order to test the limits of the tournament model, it is necessary to find particular historical moments when the economic environment radically challenges assumptions/premises of the model. The dot-com bubble in Silicon Valley provides precisely such a time and place. This article demonstrates limits to the applicability of tournament theory. Those limits are to be found in the economic environment in circumstances in which: (1) exogenous reward structures offer many multiples of internal rewards; (2) demonstrably high short-term rewards outside the firm starkly contrast with the delayed long-term rewards inside the firm; (3) the managerial strata reduce their emphasis on long-term recruiting of potential partners in favor of short-term productivity by young associates; and (4) firms develop departmental leverage ratios in excess of their capacity to monitor, mentor, and train recruits. [source] | ||||||||||