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Kinds of Of Directors Selected AbstractsCONFLICTS OF INTEREST ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS: THEORY AND EVIDENCEANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009Keldon Bauer ABSTRACT,:,Non-profit hospitals are overseen by a board of directors that is charged with representing the interests of the communities they serve. Theoretically, society is interested in maximizing both the quality and quantity of medical services available to it through the hospital. But other groups may also want to use the hospital to maximize their own wealth. This paper examines the effect of increasing the proportion of physicians on the board of directors. We show theoretically and empirically that with even one physician on the board, society's optimal quality/quantity vector is compromised. [source] National Culture and the Composition and Leadership Structure of Boards of DirectorsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2008Jiatao Li ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: How and to what extent does national culture influence the composition and leadership structure of the boards of directors of multinational firms? Research Findings/Insights: Societal norms about corporate structure are treated as components of national culture. Hofstede's measures of national culture were shown to predict the board composition and leadership structure of firms based in that culture. The hypotheses were tested with data on 399 multinational manufacturing firms based in 15 industrial countries. The results suggest that national culture can have strong effects on corporate governance and should be considered in any transnational study. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The predictive accuracy of the culture variables provides strong support for the argument that norms embedded in a society's culture affect organizational structure, at least at the board level. The results of the study contribute to our understanding of institutional theory in explaining observed variations in corporate board composition and leadership structure across countries. By linking board composition to the cultural environment, institutional theory provides an explicit framework for analyzing variations in board structure across national boundaries. Practitioner/Policy Implications: When considering board composition and leadership structure, it is important to consider national culture norms. The findings of the study also have important implications for multinational firms setting up boards for their subsidiaries in different countries. [source] A Framework for Determining the Influence of the Corporate Board of Directors in Accounting StudiesCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2001Karen Cravens Accounting, auditing, and tax professionals constantly evaluate the integrity, competence, and financial performance of clients as factors in practice that influence both client acceptance decisions and the manner in which professional services are rendered. Yet, from an accounting perspective, previous research investigating the corporate board of directors as a governance mechanism has focused only on the representational role of board members. Moreover, many of these studies resulted in conflicting findings according to these attributes. Other disciplines address the particular influence of the board with respect to overall corporate performance, but arrive at little agreement on either the effect of or the most critical of board attributes. This literature review synthesizes the existing research to provide a framework in which to evaluate the effect of the board of directors in accounting settings and, in particular, when conducting future research that employs elements of corporate governance as dependent or independent variables in accounting studies. [source] WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST AWARD FOR JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE ADDRESSFAMILY COURT REVIEW, Issue 2 2009Hon. Jonathan Lippman The William H. Rehnquist Award is one of the most celebrated judicial honors in the country. It is given each year to a state court judge who demonstrates the "highest level of judicial excellence, integrity, fairness, and professional ethics." The 2008 recipient, Jonathan Lippman, was recently appointed and confirmed as Chief Judge of the State of New York. Chief Judge Lippman was previously the Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division of the First Judicial Department of the New York State Supreme Court. He was appointed New York's Chief Administrative Judge by Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye and served from January 1996 to May 2007 and was responsible for the operation of a court system with a $2.4 billion budget, 1300 state-paid judges, 2300 town and village judges, and 16,000 nonjudicial personnel. Among his numerous professional activities, Chief Judge Lippman served as president of the Conference of State Court Administrators from 2005 to 2006 and was the vice-chair of the National Center for State Courts from 2005 to 2006, where he was a member of the Board of Directors from 2003 to 2007. During his tenure, Chief Judge Lippman has been the recipient of numerous awards and recognitions, including the 2006 Fund For Modern Courts Cyrus R. Vance Tribute for Vision, Integrity and Dedication to the Fair Administration of Justice Personified by Cyrus R. Vance (November 27, 2006); the New York County Lawyers' Association Conspicuous Service Award in Recognition of Many Years of Outstanding Public Service (September 28, 2006); and the Award for Excellence in Public Service of the New York State Bar Association's Committee on Attorneys in Public Service (January 24, 2006). Chief Judge Lippman received a Bachelor of Arts in Government and International Relations from New York University, Washington Square College, where he graduated cum laude in 1965. He also received his J.D. from New York University in 1968. Below is the speech he delivered after accepting the William H. Rehnquist Award from U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. Roberts. [source] The End of an Era: Lyman Wynne Leaves the Family Process Board of DirectorsFAMILY PROCESS, Issue 1 2000Robert G. Ryder President No abstract is available for this article. [source] International Society of Dermatology 2001,02 Board of Directors and Officer ListINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DERMATOLOGY, Issue 1 2002Article first published online: 12 MAR 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] International Society of Dermatology 2001,02 Board of Directors and Officer ListINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DERMATOLOGY, Issue 12 2001Article first published online: 11 JAN 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] International Society of Dermatology 2001,02 Board of Directors and Officer ListINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DERMATOLOGY, Issue 10 2001Article first published online: 7 JUL 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] The importance of volunteers in a capital campaignINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR MARKETING, Issue 4 2002Article first published online: 12 JUL 200, Linda Lysakowski One of the most significant factors in the success of any capital campaign is the number, quality and commitment of volunteers used to guide, implement and promote the campaign. This paper will discuss the importance of using volunteers and the critical roles they play within the campaign. The volunteer as giver, asker and motivator will be explained. An example of a typical campaign organisational chart is provided to help the reader identify the number and types of volunteers necessary to implement a successful campaign. Volunteers have many roles to play, and getting the right person to fill each of these roles is essential to success. Methods for recruiting volunteers and the materials that are needed to implement a successful recruitment strategy are included in this discussion. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of the campaign chair as the leader of the campaign effort. The unique role of the Board of Directors as volunteers during a capital campaign is addressed in this paper. Strategies for keeping volunteers involved and motivated are discussed, along with tips to make the volunteer campaign experience a satisfying one for both staff and volunteer. In summary, the author contends that the use of volunteers in a capital campaign is essential to the success of the campaign. Copyright © 2002 Henry Stewart Publications [source] Interview with a Quality Leader,Karen Davis, Executive Director of The Commonwealth FundJOURNAL FOR HEALTHCARE QUALITY, Issue 2 2009Lecia A. Albright Dr. Davis is a nationally recognized economist, with a distinguished career in public policy and research. Before joining the Fund, she served as chairman of the Department of Health Policy and Management at The Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, where she also held an appointment as professor of economics. She served as deputy assistant secretary for health policy in the Department of Health and Human Services from 1977 to 1980, and was the first woman to head a U.S. Public Health Service agency. Before her government career, Ms. Davis was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC; a visiting lecturer at Harvard University; and an assistant professor of economics at Rice University. A native of Oklahoma, she received her PhD in economics from Rice University, which recognized her achievements with a Distinguished Alumna Award in 1991. Ms. Davis is the recipient of the 2000 Baxter-Allegiance Foundation Prize for Health Services Research. In the spring of 2001, Ms. Davis received an honorary doctorate in human letters from John Hopkins University. In 2006, she was selected for the Academy Health Distinguished Investigator Award for significant and lasting contributions to the field of health services research in addition to the Picker Award for Excellence in the Advancement of Patient Centered Care. Ms. Davis has published a number of significant books, monographs, and articles on health and social policy issues, including the landmark books HealthCare Cost Containment, Medicare Policy, National Health Insurance: Benefits, Costs, and Consequences, and Health and the War on Poverty. She serves on the Board of Visitors of Columbia University, School of Nursing, and is on the Board of Directors of the Geisinger Health System. She was elected to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in 1975; has served two terms on the IOM governing Council (1986,90 and 1997,2000); was a member of the IOM Committee on Redesigning Health Insurance Benefits, Payment and Performance Improvement Programs; and was awarded the Adam Yarmolinsky medal in 2007 for her contributions to the mission of the Institute of Medicine. She is a past president of the Academy Health (formerly AHSRHP) and an Academy Health distinguished fellow, a member of the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, and a former member of the Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research National Advisory Committee. She also serves on the Panel of Health Advisors for the Congressional Budget Office. [source] Board of Directors and Membership BenefitsJOURNAL OF CLINICAL HYPERTENSION, Issue 6 2010Article first published online: 2 JUN 2010 No abstract is available for this article. [source] Board of Directors and Membership BenefitsJOURNAL OF CLINICAL HYPERTENSION, Issue 5 2010Article first published online: 3 MAY 2010 No abstract is available for this article. [source] Board of Directors and Membership BenefitsJOURNAL OF CLINICAL HYPERTENSION, Issue 3 2010Article first published online: 19 FEB 2010 No abstract is available for this article. [source] Board of Directors and Membership BenefitsJOURNAL OF CLINICAL HYPERTENSION, Issue 10 2009Article first published online: 6 OCT 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] Board of Directors and Membership BenefitsJOURNAL OF CLINICAL HYPERTENSION, Issue 9 2009Article first published online: 9 SEP 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] Board of Directors and Membership BenefitsJOURNAL OF CLINICAL HYPERTENSION, Issue 8 2009Article first published online: 6 AUG 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] Board of Directors and Membership BenefitsJOURNAL OF CLINICAL HYPERTENSION, Issue 6 2009Article first published online: 9 JUN 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] Board of Directors and Membership BenefitsJOURNAL OF CLINICAL HYPERTENSION, Issue 5 2009Article first published online: 22 MAY 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] Social Capital and Social Influence on the Board of DirectorsJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 1 2009William B. Stevenson abstract It is often assumed that directors with human capital such as prior management experience or independence from the company are the most influential board members. By contrast, in a survey of all the board members in 14 companies we found that ties to others in a network of strong ties among those who meet outside of board meetings were more important predictors of social influence than human capital or ties across boards. These ties within the board represent the social capital of members in the form of prior relationships with other directors, ties to others on the board, and membership in cliques within the board's network of ties. These results support a social capital perspective on influence that emphasizes relationships with others on the board as important factors in the social dynamics of board decision-making. [source] Boards of Directors and Shark Repellents:Assessing the Value of an Agency Theory PerspectiveJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 3 2000Steven A. Frankforter Because shark repellents decrease the vulnerability of firms (and their incumbent managers) to the market for corporate control, the decision to adopt these devices represents an excellent test of agency theory. In this empirical study, we examined the relationships between the adoption of shark repellents and several mechanisms that, according to agency theory, should align the interests of corporate board members and shareholders and/or make directors more effective monitors of management behaviour. Of the variables included, only board stock ownership (especially by employee directors) was linked to a reduced propensity to adopt shark repellents in the predicted manner. Two variables not immediately as- sociated with agency theory , the proportion of inside directors appointed by the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO) and a lower ratio of CEO compensation to the compensation of other top executives , were linked to higher rates of shark repellent adoption. Given that agency theory explains relatively little of the variance in shark repellent adoption, we advocate serious consideration of other theoretical formulations for corporate governance, including two approaches , stewardship theory and agent morality , that take the moral (,other regarding') obligations of directors seriously. [source] Training Policy Governance in Nonprofit Boards of Directors: The Views of Trainer-ConsultantsNONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 4 2002Jeffrey L. Brudney Although scholars widely discuss John Carver's (1990) Policy Governance model for nonprofit organizations, they have conducted little formal research on the implementation of the model. For this study, the researchers surveyed ninety-two trainer-consultants who graduated from Carver's Policy Governance Academy. The goal was to learn three things from their experiences: (1) whether trainer-consultants maintain the model as a coherent whole or teach only parts of it; (2) what they perceive as the major challenges for nonprofit boards in implementing the Policy Governance model; and (3) what contextual factors, if any, they feel affect implementation of the model across nonprofit boards with different characteristics. Survey responses indicated that (1) consultants predominantly teach the model as a whole, (2) particular policy areas appear to be problematic for nonprofit boards of directors that implement the model, and (3) two contextual factors may negatively affect the ability of a board of directors to successfully implement Policy Governance boards larger than fifteen members, and organizations with no hierarchy, where the board also functions as staff. Overall, consultants' responses indicated that they feel Policy Governance is far superior to other models, but they recognize the problems and challenges that boards face in trying to implement it. [source] 2005 Board of Directors AnnouncedNURSING FOR WOMENS HEALTH, Issue 5 2004Article first published online: 9 MAR 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] Sexual Medicine Society of North America, Inc. Board of Directors 2008,2009THE JOURNAL OF SEXUAL MEDICINE, Issue 2009Article first published online: 5 JAN 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] Industry Relations With Emergency Medicine Graduate Medical Education ProgramsACADEMIC EMERGENCY MEDICINE, Issue 10 2009Terry Kowalenko MD Abstract A panel of physicians from the Society for Academic Emergency Medicine (SAEM) Graduate Medical Education (GME), Ethics, and Industry Relations Committees were asked by the SAEM Board of Directors to write a position paper on the relationship of emergency medicine (EM) GME with industry. Using multiple sources as references, the team derived a set of guidelines that all EM GME training programs can use when interacting with industry representatives. In addition, the team used a question,answer format to provide educators and residents with a practical approach to these interactions. The SAEM Board of Directors endorsed the guidelines in June 2009. [source] Recommendations from the Society for Academic Emergency Medicine (SAEM) Taskforce on Women in Academic Emergency MedicineACADEMIC EMERGENCY MEDICINE, Issue 8 2008Gloria J. Kuhn DO Abstract The Society for Academic Emergency Medicine (SAEM) convened a taskforce to study issues pertaining to women in academic emergency medicine (EM). The charge to the Taskforce was to "Create a document for the SAEM Board of Directors that defines and describes the unique recruitment, retention, and advancement needs for women in academic emergency medicine." To this end, the Taskforce and authors reviewed the literature to highlight key data points in understanding this issue and made recommendations for individuals at four levels of leadership and accountability: leadership of national EM organizations, medical school deans, department chairs, and individual women faculty members. The broad range of individuals targeted for recommendations reflects the interdependent and shared responsibility required to address changes in the culture of academic EM. The following method was used to determine the recommendations: 1) Taskforce members discussed career barriers and potential solutions that could improve the recruitment, retention, and advancement of women in academic EM; 2) the authors reviewed recommendations in the literature by national consensus groups and experts in the field to validate the recommendations of Taskforce members and the authors; and 3) final recommendations were sent to all Taskforce members to obtain and incorporate additional comments and ensure a consensus. This article contains those recommendations and cites the relevant literature addressing this topic. [source] Taking (and Sharing Power): How Boards of Directors Can Bring About Greater Fairness for Dependent StakeholdersBUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW, Issue 2 2010HARRY J. VAN BUREN III ABSTRACT One of the ways in which scholars have sought to broaden the discussion of the social responsibilities of corporations and their managers is through the development of the stakeholder concept. The primacy of shareholder interests in corporate-governance processes and managerial action is, however, a myth that justifies all sorts of managerial self-interest seeking and exploitation of particular stakeholder groups. What makes this myth particularly problematic,from the standpoint of fairness and corporate governance,is that not all nonshareholder stakeholders are equally situated with regard to their ability to secure fair treatment. In this article, I explore the ethical dimensions of board responsibilities to dependent stakeholder groups by first describing the differences between shareholders and nonshareholder stakeholders with regard to risk, examining why dependent stakeholders (stakeholders with legitimate and urgent claims, but no power) are particularly important from the standpoint of stakeholder risk, and discussing how stakeholder consultation might provide a partial fix to such problems. I will conclude with proposals for how boards can more faithfully discharge their ethical responsibilities to dependent stakeholder groups, and in so doing facilitate stakeholder involvement in corporate governance in ways that promote fairness in organization,stakeholder relationships. [source] Board Monitoring, Regulation, and Performance in the Banking Industry: Evidence from the Market for Corporate ControlCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2010Jens Hagendorff ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: The specific monitoring effect of boards of directors versus industry regulation is unclear. In this paper, we examine how the interaction between bank-level monitoring and regulatory regimes influences the announcement period returns of acquiring banks in the US and twelve European economies. Research Findings/Insights: We study three board monitoring mechanisms , independence, CEO-chair duality, and diversity , and analyze their effectiveness in preventing underperforming merger strategies under bank regulators of varying strictness. Only under strict banking regulation regimes, do board independence and diversity improve acquisition performance. In less strict regulatory environments, corporate governance is virtually irrelevant in improving the performance outcomes of merger activities. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results indicate a complementary role between monitoring by boards and bank regulation. This study is the first to report evidence consistent with complementarity by investigating the effectiveness (rather than the prevalence) of governance arrangements across regulatory regimes. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our work offers insights to policymakers charged with improving the quality of decision-making at financial institutions. Attempts to improve the ability of bank boards to critically assess managerial initiatives are most likely to be successful if internal governance is accompanied by strict industry regulation. [source] National Culture and the Composition and Leadership Structure of Boards of DirectorsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2008Jiatao Li ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: How and to what extent does national culture influence the composition and leadership structure of the boards of directors of multinational firms? Research Findings/Insights: Societal norms about corporate structure are treated as components of national culture. Hofstede's measures of national culture were shown to predict the board composition and leadership structure of firms based in that culture. The hypotheses were tested with data on 399 multinational manufacturing firms based in 15 industrial countries. The results suggest that national culture can have strong effects on corporate governance and should be considered in any transnational study. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The predictive accuracy of the culture variables provides strong support for the argument that norms embedded in a society's culture affect organizational structure, at least at the board level. The results of the study contribute to our understanding of institutional theory in explaining observed variations in corporate board composition and leadership structure across countries. By linking board composition to the cultural environment, institutional theory provides an explicit framework for analyzing variations in board structure across national boundaries. Practitioner/Policy Implications: When considering board composition and leadership structure, it is important to consider national culture norms. The findings of the study also have important implications for multinational firms setting up boards for their subsidiaries in different countries. [source] Beyond the Black Box of Demography: board processes and task effectiveness within Italian firmsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2007Fabio Zona In this paper we analyse boards of directors as workgroups, i.e. groups of people that perform one or more tasks within an organisational context. Building on previous studies, we developed a model that relates group's social-psychological processes to three different board tasks: service, monitoring and networking. We tested our model through a survey on 301 large manufacturing firms in Italy. Our findings support the idea that (a) process variables and, to a limited extent, demographic variables significantly influence board task performance; (b) board processes have a different impact on each specific board task; (c) board task performance varies depending upon firm and industry characteristics. [source] Evaluating the Characteristics of Corporate Boards Associated with Layoff DecisionsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2006Alfred Yawson The paper evaluates the characteristics of corporate boards associated with layoff decisions using a large sample of UK firms suffering performance declines over the period 1994,2003. The results show that firms are less likely to respond to performance declines with employee layoffs when they have large boards. Further analysis shows that layoff decisions are positively associated with the proportion of outside directors and directors' remuneration. The findings provide some support to the recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992) and Higgs Review (2003) on the importance of the structure and composition of board of directors in the corporate governance process. [source] |