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Objective Truth (objective + truth)
Selected AbstractsVIII,Cognitive Expressivism, Faultless Disagreement, and Absolute but Non -Objective TruthPROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 2pt2 2010Stephen Barker I offer a new theory of faultless disagreement, according to which truth is absolute (non-relative) but can still be non-objective. What's relative is truth-aptness: a sentence like ,Vegemite is tasty' (V) can be truth-accessible and bivalent in one context but not in another. Within a context in which V fails to be bivalent, we can affirm that there is no issue of truth or falsity about V, still disputants, affirming and denying V, were not at fault, since, in their context of assertion V was bivalent. This theory requires a theory of assertion that is a form of cognitive expressivism. [source] Liberalism, Fundamentalism and TruthJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2006MATT SLEAT abstract One way in which we may be tempted to understand the distinction we make in practice between liberals and fundamentalists is via the issue of truth. Liberals are generally more sceptical about truth while fundamentalists tend to be more objectivist, believing not only that objective truth exists but also that they know it. I call this interpretation the ,truth interpretation'. In this paper I attempt to undermine the ,truth interpretation' by showing that it does not map on adequately to the sorts of distinctions that we actually make in practice. We will see that thinking that the distinction between liberals and fundamentalists revolves around the philosophical issue of truth, such that the ,good guys' are sceptics and the ,bad guys' objectivists, fails to connect with our practical distinctions. The second half of the paper then addresses the question of what role, if any, truth does play in distinguishing between liberals and fundamentalists, arguing that if truth does play a role we should see it as a very narrow and political, rather, than philosophical one. [source] Emotivism and Deflationary TruthPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2002Kyle S. Swan The paper investigates different ways to understand the claim that non,cognitivists theories of morality are incoherent. According to the claim, this is so because, on one theory of truth, non,cognitivists are not able to deny objective truth to moral judgments without taking a substantive normative position. I argue that emotivism is not self,defeating in this way. The charge of incoherence actually only amounts to a claim that emotivism is incompatible with deflationary truth, but this claim is based upon a mistake. It relies upon a problematic understanding of both emotivism and the deflationary theory of truth. [source] Sociopolitical Activist or Conversational Partner?FAMILY PROCESS, Issue 1 2003Collaborative Therapies, Distinguishing the Position of the Therapist in Narrative In this article, we explore the similarities and differences of two contemporary family therapy approaches: narrative and collaborative therapies. These therapies are contrasted by describing positioning of the narrative practitioner as sociopolitical activist and the collaborative practitioner as conversational partner. The article begins with a brief overview of the two therapies. Subsequently, we outline their epistemological genealogies and the practice similarities that arise from the theoretical assumptions underpinning these therapies. The remainder of the article addresses the theoretical and therapeutic differences in narrative and collaborative approaches reflected in the positioning of therapist as either sociopolitical activist or conversational partner. While narrative and collaborative approaches share more similarities than differences in relation to their emphasis on the constitutive characteristics of language, focus on socio,elational contexts, and critique of singular objective truths, prominence is given to the starker contrasts in narrative and collaborative understandings of politics, power, dialogue, and discourse. It is proposed that by outlining some provocative contrasts between narrative and collaborative approaches, new conversations and generative practices will emerge in the therapy room. [source] | ||||||||||