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Nuclear Weapons (nuclear + weapons)
Selected AbstractsNuclear Weapons: The Global and Popular Context of PolicyDIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 2 2005Charles Chatfield Book reviewed: Lawrence S. Wittner. Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971to the Present. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. 491 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $75.00 (cloth), $32.95 (paper). [source] Israel's Nuclear Weapons: The White House FactorMIDDLE EAST POLICY, Issue 3 2010Jeremy Salt First page of article [source] Curing the Atomic Bomb Within: The Relationship of American Social Scientists to Nuclear Weapons in the Early Cold WarPEACE & CHANGE, Issue 3 2010Robert A. Jacobs This article looks at the initial response of the social science community to the advent of nuclear weapons and their use on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The idea that human society as a whole was not sophisticated enough to responsibly steward nuclear weapons was widespread among American sociologists and psychologists: if society needed to change, many social scientists felt compelled to engineer that transformation. Fundamental to this effort was an analysis of the roots of human violence. I argue that this was a fundamental misdiagnosis that placed the blame in individuated human violence rather than in the organized social violence of militarism. The final section of the article explores the role of social scientists in planning for nuclear war and in creating and assessing the indoctrination of U.S. troops participating in nuclear weapons testing. This indoctrination would form the model for later indoctrinations aimed at easing general public distress over nuclear weapons testing. [source] Attempts to Reduce and Eliminate Nuclear Weapons through the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty and the Creation of Nuclear -Weapon -Free ZonesPEACE & CHANGE, Issue 4 2008Paul J. Magnarella Nuclear weapons remain the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction threatening our lives and planet. To date, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most comprehensive international agreement aimed at limiting these weapons. In response to some of NPT's shortcomings, a large number of nonnuclear weapon states have joined together to create nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). By doing so, they emphatically rejected nuclear weapons on their soil, in their territorial waters, and in their air space. In addition, they ask nuclear weapon states to solemnly promise not to use nuclear weapons against zone members and to do nothing to promote nuclear weapons in their zones. Currently, much of the Southern Hemisphere is covered by NWFZs. An NWFZ has been newly created in Central Asia, and the League of Arab States is considering one in the Middle East. [source] The Correlates of Antinuclear Activism: Attitudes, Subjective Norms, and EfficacyJOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 3 2000LEE FOX-CARDAMONE Ajzen's (1988) theory of planned behavior was modified and used to examine antinuclear behavior. Subjects completed a questionnaire measuring their antinuclear attitudes, their perceptions of support for taking antinuclear action, and their perceptions of efficacy in this arena. Then, an antinuclear behavioral intentions questionnaire was presented, as well as several opportunities to engage in various antinuclear actions. Regression analyses indicated that Ajzen's model was supported to the extent that attitude emerged as a significant predictor of antinuclear intentions and behaviors. Subjective norms and efficacy were not significant predictors of either intentions or behaviors. Models incorporating behavior-specific attitude measures accounted for more variance than did models using more general attitude measures toward nuclear war/weapons. [source] Nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-useINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2009DAVID JAMES GILL The two books under review, The tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons, by T. V. Paul and Deterrence: from Cold War to long war. Lessons from six decades of RAND research, by Austin Long, highlight the continued interest in the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Long traces the RAND Corporation's research on the subject, exploring the role that nuclear deterrence has played as a strategy of the Cold War. The author goes on to argue for the relevance of nuclear deterrence to the future strategic environment, considering threats from peer-competitors to non-state actors. By contrast Paul considers the rise and persistence of a tradition, or informal social norm, of non-use which has encouraged self-deterrence. Employing a series of examples, Paul argues that this tradition best explains why, since 1945, nuclear states have not used nuclear weapons against non-nuclear opponents. Taken together, these books encourage further consideration of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the two practices can successfully coexist if non-nuclear states have, as Paul suggests, already begun to exploit the existence of a tradition of non-use. Such deterrence failures, real or perceived, have profound implications for relationships between nuclear and non-nuclear states. [source] A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear CrisisINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2003Roland Bleiker Two nuclear crises recently haunted the Korean peninsula, one in 1993/4, the other in 2002/3. In each case the events were strikingly similar: North Korea made public its ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty. Then the situation rapidly deteriorated until the peninsular was literally on the verge of war. The dangers of North Korea's actions, often interpreted as nuclear brinkmanship, are evident and much discussed, but not so the underlying patterns that have shaped the conflict in the first place. This article sheds light on some of them. It examines the role of the United States in the crisis, arguing that Washington's inability to see North Korea as anything but a threatening ,rogue state' seriously hinders both an adequate understanding and possible resolution of the conflict. Particularly significant is the current policy of pre-emptive strikes against rogue states, for it reinforces half a century of American nuclear threats towards North Korea. The problematic role of these threats has been largely obscured, not least because the highly technical discourse of security analysis has managed to present the strategic situation on the peninsula in a manner that attributes responsibility for the crisis solely to North Korea's actions, even if the situation is in reality far more complex and interactive. [source] Russia's non-strategic nuclear forcesINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2001David S. Yost Several factors explain the high level of support for non-strategic nuclear forces(NSNF) in Russia and the correspondingly limited interest in NSNF arms control. These include Russia's conventional military weakness, NATO's conventional military superiority, political assessments that portray NATO as threatening to Russia, and the several important functions assigned to Russia's nuclear weapons and to NSNF in particular by Russian military doctrine and policy. The Russians have made it clear that they attach great importance to NSNF in a number of ways: in their preoccupations during the NATO-Russia Founding Act negotiations in 1996-7; in their recent military exercises; in their decisions regarding NSNF modernization; in their lack of transparency in implementing their 1991-2 commitments to reduce and eliminate certain types of NSNF; and in their discussions about possibly abandoning certain nuclear arms control commitments. Russian interests in using NSNF to deter powers other than NATO (such as China), to substitute for advanced non-nuclear precision-strike systems, and to ,de-escalate' regional conflicts (among other functions attributed to NSNF) would not be modified by the course of action some observers have advocated,a unilateral withdrawal of US NSNF from Europe. Such a withdrawal would, however, damage the Western alliance's security interests. NATO has adopted the most practical objective currently available: pursuing greater transparency regarding NSNF in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. [source] Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of IranINTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 2 2006GAWDAT BAHGAT Since the early 2000s considerable attention has been focused on Iran's nuclear ambition. Several Western powers accuse the Islamic Republic of developing nuclear weapons capability. Iran categorically denies these accusations and insists that it seeks nuclear power for peaceful purposes. This essay examines Iran's nuclear program. In the first part the lessons learned from other countries' experiences are analyzed. The literature on nuclear proliferation suggests that countries seek nuclear weapons for security reasons and political leverage and prestige. On the other hand, leaders are persuaded to give up their nuclear ambition as a result of domestic changes, the impact of nonproliferation regime, and U.S. policy. In the second part of this essay these theoretical models are applied to the Iranian case. The study discusses the argument for and against Iran's nuclear ambition. It advocates a multilateral and multi-dimensional approach to deal with the nuclear impasse. [source] Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime EffectivenessINTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 3 2008Maria Rost Rublee Since the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force almost 40 years ago, only four states have acquired nuclear weapons. What accounts for such near-universal compliance? This paper argues that social psychology can help us understand the puzzle of nuclear restraint in two ways. First, nuclear forbearance should be unpacked into three outcomes: persuasion (behavior resulting from genuine transformation of preferences), social conformity (behavior resulting from the desire to maximize social benefits and/or minimize social costs, without a change in underlying preferences), and identification (behavior resulting from the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other). Second, through social psychology, we can specify the mechanisms by which the norm of nonproliferation has influenced policymakers. Indeed, the case of Japan shows that both these contributions help us better understand nuclear decision-making and offer larger insights into regime compliance more generally. [source] International Nonregimes: A Research Agenda,INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 2 2007Radoslav S. Dimitrov Why are multilateral institutions absent from some areas of international relations? Governments have not concluded regulatory policy agreements on tactical nuclear weapons and small arms control, deforestation, information privacy, and other transnational issues. The absence of regimes in such policy arenas is an empirical phenomenon with considerable theoretical and policy implications. Yet, existing scholarship on global governance largely ignores the instances in which such institutions do not emerge. This essay develops a research agenda to extend and strengthen regime theory through analysis of nonregimes. We articulate the concept, draw a typology of nonregimes, discuss the contributions that nonregime studies can make to IR theory, outline methodological approaches to pursue the proposed agenda, and highlight a priori theoretical considerations to guide such research. Six illustrative cases in the realms of arms control, environmental management, and international political economy are described and used to make preliminary observations of factors that impede regime formation. [source] 6.,No More Hiroshimas and Sharp WeaponsAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2009Keping Wang When it comes to rethinking the Hiroshima A-bombing and its historical impact, there arise a number of approaches to be exercised from different perspectives related to the human condition and the current situation today. This essay presents two of them: a poetical reflection and a philosophical pondering that are characterized by either factual inquiry or empirical wisdom. The former is deplorably sentimental and unforgettable with regard to the deadliest mode of warfare that has ever occurred in human history. The philosophical pondering from a Taoist viewpoint is thought-provoking and instructive with ongoing relevance to the problematic globe. Hence when the poet calls out "No More Hiroshimas," we shall go ahead and appeal for "No More Wars,""No More Sharp Weapons," or "No More Excessive Forces." However, what haunts the world all the time is constant warfare at varied scales here and there; and what worries us right now is the hard fact that some nations are presumably taking the risk of developing nuclear weapons on a starvation budget, for they think that they are under the threat and pressure of other countries armed with plenty of such mass-destructive devices. They all seem to have neglected or obliterated the historical memory of Hiroshima as a symbol of the worst violence ever known to humankind. [source] The Six-Party Talks and North Korea's Denuclearization: Evaluation and ProspectsPACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2010Tae-Hwan Kwak The six-party process for North Korea's denuclearization has long been stalled since the Six-Party Talks (SPT) failed to agree on a verification protocol in early December 2008. The DPRK officially stated on 10 February 2005 that it already possessed nuclear weapons. It now wants to be recognized as a nuclear power. The North Korean nuclear issue, a key obstacle to the Korean peace process, needs to be resolved peacefully through the six-party process. The author has argued over the years that while the six-party process is the best means to resolve the North's nuclear issue, bilateral US,DPRK talks are equally important to a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the DPRK's issue. The peaceful resolution of the North's nuclear issue is prerequisite to building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and regional peace in Northeast Asia. The author has two specific goals: (i) to evaluate the stalled SPT for denuclearizing the Korean peninsula since December 2008; and (ii) to make policy recommendations for continued denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in the framework of the SPT. The first part of this article examines DPRK's denuclearization process up to the point when the SPT failed to adopt a written verification protocol in December 2008. Since then, the six-party process has been stalled. The second part discusses the impact of the DPRK's rocket launch in April 2009 and its second nuclear test in May on the SPT. The third part evaluates the DPRK's new proposal for peace treaty talks and its new conditions for returning to the SPT. Finally, this article proposes key issues on agenda to be negotiated at the next SPT and some policy recommendations for achieving denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. [source] Ramifications of North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il ,s Declaration of Independence from the International CommunityPACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2006C. Kenneth Quinones The United States and Japanese governments' reactions to North Korea's launching of several ballistic missiles in early July 2006 was either completely misunderstood by North Korea watchers in Washington and Tokyo, are they simply preferred to ignore yongyang's underlying motives. Actually, North Korea has been relatively transparent about its intentions regarding not just its ballistic missile but also nuclear programs. Since February 2005, ranking North Korean officials and Foreign Ministry spokesmen have made it North Korea's intentions clear. It aspires to strengthen its "deterrence capability." In other words, North Korea is striving to counter the US-Japan alliance by matching its military capability not just with conventional but also nuclear weapons. The United States and Japan need to recognize this. Otherwise, their efforts to compel North Korea's submission using economic pressure will back fire. Pyongyang's priority is national defense through deterrence. Economic revitalization is a secondary goal. As the United States concentrates on the Middle East and gradually withdraws from Northeast Asia, Japan would do well to assess its relations with its neighbors China and the two Koreas. If Japan's new prime minister perpetuates Japan's commitment to the US-Japan alliance, it could find itself increasingly estranged from its neighbors. This became evident when Japan clashed with China over the UN resolution that censured North Korea's missile launchings. Japan's stance regarding issues rooted in history, such as prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, if unaltered, will intensify Japan's isolation in Northeast Asia. This will work to North Korea's benefit. [source] How Can the United States Take the Initiative in the Current North Korean Nuclear Crisis?PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2005Jin H. Pak On September 19, 2005, the last day of the fourth round of six-party talks, a deal was announced in which North Korea pledged to end its nuclear program in return for a number of concessions. Within 24 hours of that announcement, North Korea clarified its position by stating that the United States "should not even dream" it would dismantle its nuclear weapons until it receives a light-water nuclear reactor. Despite four rounds of six-party talks over a three year period, it seems that almost no real progress has been made, except for North Korea; US intelligence officials estimate that North Korea could have made as many as 8 or 9 nuclear weapons already. So it seems North Korea has cleverly increased its bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States. As lengthy negotiations over the provision of a Light Water Reactor (LWR) will undoubtedly ensue, it can use that time to steadily increase its nuclear deterrent. Why did the United States agree to this sub-optimal outcome? Why was it so difficult for the United States to exert more influence on North Korea and the other countries in the six-party talks? The answer to these questions lies in the changing trends affecting Northeast Asian security dynamics. For various reasons that this article will explain, these trends affect the ability of the United States to take the initiative in the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis. As long as the United States fails to account for various changes in Northeast Asian regional dynamics, its strategy will to deter North Korea from continuing its nuclear program will not succeed. [source] A Comparative Analysis of President Clinton and Bush's Handling of the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: Power and Strategy,PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 1 2004Ilsu Kim The purposes of this paper are: 1) to examine and analyze how the two presidents' policy goals in dealing with North Korea actually materialized; 2) to illustrate how these two Presidents implement their policy goals toward North Korea; 3) to discuss the Congressional responses to the president's policy goals toward North Korea; and 4) to provide comparative analysis of the two presidents' handling of North Korea. This study shows that different Presidents have dealt with North Korean issues in different ways. Two such presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, tried at the beginning of their terms as president to ignore the brewing problems in North Korea. However, both were forced to solve the North's nuclear issues early on in their respective administrations. Their decisions in dealing with North Korean nuclear capabilities help to define their early reputations as foreign policy makers. Yet, the domestic as well as international contexts that President Clinton and Bush faced were somewhat different. President Clinton maintains that the North's nuclear crisis arose from North Korea's security fears: Abandoned by its two Cold War patrons, economically bankrupt, and internationally isolated, the North Korean government saw the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as the only path to survival and security for their regime. In this regard, Clinton's actual efforts to resolve the issues surrounding the North's nuclear program appeared ambiguous and inconsistent. This led to the temporary suspension of the North's nuclear ambitions through an Agreed Framework. However, President Bush stuck to more of a hardnosed approach. He continues to demand a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of the nuclear program first, before any provision of economic or humanitarian assistance is extended toward North Korea. Bush favors multilateral negotiations, which leads the DPRK to feel more isolated than before. Although the second six-party talks ended without a major breakthrough, it seems that all parties except the North think the meeting was successful in terms of lowering tensions in Korea. This case study demonstrates several observable features that characterize the president's role in shaping North Korean policy. A president who wants to take a new approach to some element of U.S. policy can be caught between the diplomat's desire for flexibility and the power of domestic political forces. The president can achieve success, but only if the new direction in policy finds acceptance on Capitol Hill. [source] Curing the Atomic Bomb Within: The Relationship of American Social Scientists to Nuclear Weapons in the Early Cold WarPEACE & CHANGE, Issue 3 2010Robert A. Jacobs This article looks at the initial response of the social science community to the advent of nuclear weapons and their use on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The idea that human society as a whole was not sophisticated enough to responsibly steward nuclear weapons was widespread among American sociologists and psychologists: if society needed to change, many social scientists felt compelled to engineer that transformation. Fundamental to this effort was an analysis of the roots of human violence. I argue that this was a fundamental misdiagnosis that placed the blame in individuated human violence rather than in the organized social violence of militarism. The final section of the article explores the role of social scientists in planning for nuclear war and in creating and assessing the indoctrination of U.S. troops participating in nuclear weapons testing. This indoctrination would form the model for later indoctrinations aimed at easing general public distress over nuclear weapons testing. [source] Attempts to Reduce and Eliminate Nuclear Weapons through the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty and the Creation of Nuclear -Weapon -Free ZonesPEACE & CHANGE, Issue 4 2008Paul J. Magnarella Nuclear weapons remain the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction threatening our lives and planet. To date, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most comprehensive international agreement aimed at limiting these weapons. In response to some of NPT's shortcomings, a large number of nonnuclear weapon states have joined together to create nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). By doing so, they emphatically rejected nuclear weapons on their soil, in their territorial waters, and in their air space. In addition, they ask nuclear weapon states to solemnly promise not to use nuclear weapons against zone members and to do nothing to promote nuclear weapons in their zones. Currently, much of the Southern Hemisphere is covered by NWFZs. An NWFZ has been newly created in Central Asia, and the League of Arab States is considering one in the Middle East. [source] The Durability of Managed Rivalry: Iran's Relations with Russia and the Saudi DimensionASIAN POLITICS AND POLICY, Issue 1 2009Mahjoob Zweiri Russia's Middle East policy faces a dilemma. On the one hand, Moscow maintains close, although frequently terse, ties with Iran, playing an important role in Iran's nuclear program and even using its position in the United Nations to shield Iran from harsh sanctions. In return, Moscow profits from the sales of arms and nuclear expertise, participates in Iran's energy sector, and may establish valuable cooperation on gas exports, both being obvious suppliers to the lucrative Western European market. On the other hand, Russia is also seeking to strengthen ties with Iran's neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, many of whom see Tehran as the major threat to any nonproliferation regime in the region and recognize that Russian cooperation has increased the likelihood that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons. The impact on Russia's relationship with Saudi Arabia may be especially important to planners in Moscow. Saudi Arabia appears to be an increasingly willing client for Russian arms (and possibly also nuclear expertise), and Russia may value close relations with the next biggest oil exporter in the world. In the present study, we examine Russia's recent relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia and assess Russia's strategic position regarding the two countries. At the current time, Russia, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and the primary source of technical cooperation with Tehran on the nuclear issue, is at the center of developments in the Middle East. How Moscow assesses its position in the Middle East, and whether it ultimately wishes to prioritize Riyadh or Tehran, could be central to the future stability of the region. [source] Australia's Quest to Enrich Uranium and the Whitlam Government's Loans AffairAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY, Issue 4 2008Wayne Reynolds The renewed debate about Australia enriching uranium raises issues associated with a previous attempt thirty-five years ago. The Atomic Energy Commission hatched plans in the mid-1960s to position Australia as a supplier of enriched fuel, especially to the Japanese market. This would be done using centrifuge technology, a cheaper and more efficient method than that used by the United States. That fact, along with concerns in Washington to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons, led to opposition to rival enrichment programs. Whitlam and Connor miscalculated here. Ratifying the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was not enough to stay opposition to raising a loan designed mainly to give Australia an enrichment program. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||