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Non-cooperative Game (non-cooperative + game)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	75%

Selected Abstracts

A Model of Inequality and Interest Group Politics

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2001
Inderjit Kohli
In this paper we examine inequality of process and inequality of outcomes in interest group politics. The model has interest groups that compete for rents in a non-cooperative game. It allows for a self-interested rent-setting political decision-maker, and democratic or popular pressure as a check on that self-interest. We consider differences in the effectiveness and pre-commitment abilities of interest groups. We show that: (i) the costs of influence activities may be highest when groups are relatively equal in their effectiveness; (ii) if social welfare incorporates enough concern for equity of outcomes, that ranking is reversed; (iii) depending on voter responsiveness to rent-setting, the political decision-maker may set rents to be higher or lower, when increases in inequality of effectiveness lower the unit costs of rent-seeking. [source]

A dynamic common property resource problem with amenity value and extraction costs

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2005
Gerhard Sorger
C73; Q20; Q28 An analytically tractable differential game is presented that describes the exploitation of a common-property resource by finitely many competing players. The resource stock has an amenity value and there are positive extraction costs. We derive both the cooperative solution and Markov-perfect Nash equilibria of the non-cooperative game. After a comparative analysis of the equilibrium strategies and payoffs with respect to all model parameters, we study the effect of a unilateral extraction restriction and discuss the design of a revenue-neutral tax/transfer scheme that supports the cooperative solution. [source]

A game-theoretic model for capacity-constrained fair bandwidth allocation

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NETWORK MANAGEMENT, Issue 6 2008
Yonghe Yan
Data stream providers face a hard decision to satisfy the requirements of their subscribers. Each user has a minimum and a maximum required bandwidth. The server should be able to decide which requests can be satisfied and how much bandwidth will be allocated to each. We present a theoretical framework in a distributed mechanism for fair bandwidth allocation on a network with various bottleneck links. In our model, a user is guaranteed a minimum bandwidth and charged a price for the bandwidth allocated. A utility function is defined over the allocated bandwidth for a specific maximum requested bandwidth. We then present a non-cooperative game with social welfare function to resolve users' conflicting bandwidth capacity requests at bottleneck links. We also show that our proposed game-theoretic solution guarantees fair bandwidth allocation as defined in our residual capacity fairness. In order to guarantee the minimum bandwidth requirement, we integrate an admission control mechanism in our solution. However, global optimal admission conditions are not easy to implement for large networks. Therefore, we propose a distributed admission scheme. As a result, the paper presents fair and practical distributed algorithms for bandwidth allocation and admission control in enterprise networks. Our simulation and evaluation study shows that the distributed approach is sufficiently close to the global optimal solution. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Divide and conquer: multiple leasing in common pool oil fields

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2002
Lasheng Yuan
A theoretic model is developed to analyse strategic leasing behaviours of U.S. landowners in a non-exclusively owned common oil pool. Oil field development is modelled as a simultaneous-move two-stage non-cooperative game. The landowners choose leasing strategies in the first stage; independent lease operators choose extraction strategies in the second. Ownership structure is distinguished from operation structure and their relationship analyzed. It is shown that, in a non-exclusively owned oil field, it is individually rational for a landowner to subdivide his landholding and delegate production rights to multiple independent firms, although more dispersed production control leads to heavier common pool losses. JEL classification numbers: L23, D23, Q24 Diviser pour régner : baux multiples dans des champs pétroliers construits sur une même nappe. Ce mémoire construit un modèle théorique pour analyser les comportements stratégiques des propriétaires terriens dans le cas de baux de forage quand le fond pétrolier à exploiter est en propriété commune. On modélise le processus de développement du champs pétrolier comme un jeu sans coopération à deux étapes avec décisions simultanées. Les propriétaires terriens choisissent des stratégies de baux dans une première étape et des opérateurs locataires indépendants choisissent des stratégies d'extraction dans un second temps. Ce faisant, on est capable de distinguer la structure de propriété de la structure des opérations, et d'analyser les relations entre elles. On montre que pour une nappe pétrolière qui est en propriété commune, il est rationnel pour un propriétaire terrien individuel de subdiviser sa propriété et de louer des droits de production à plusieurs entreprises indépendantes, même si cette dispersion du contrôle de la production entraîne des pertes beaucoup plus lourdes dans l'exploitation de la nappe pétrolière en propriété commune. [source]