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Normative Principle (normative + principle)
Selected AbstractsApplied Ethics: Naturalism, Normativity and Public PolicyJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2009ONORA O'NEILL abstract,Normative argument is supposed to guide ways in which we might change the world, rather than to fit the world as it is. This poses certain difficulties for the notion of applied ethics. Taken literally the phrase ,applied ethics' suggests that principles or standards with substantial philosophical justification, in particular ethical and political principles with such justification, are applied to particular cases and guide action. However, the ,cases' which applied ethics discusses are themselves indeterminate, and the relation of principles to these ,cases' differs from the relation of principles to cases in naturalistic, truth-oriented inquiry. Writing in ,applied ethics', I shall argue, does not need elaborate case histories or scenarios, since the testing points for normative principles are other normative principles rather than particular cases. Normative principles and contexts to which they are applicable are indeed needed for any reasoning that is practical, but they are not sufficient. Practical ethics needs principles that can not merely be applied in certain cases or situations, but also enacted in certain ways, and requires an account of practical judgement and of the public policies that support that judgement. [source] Richard Whately and the Gospel of TransparencyAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2010David Levy Whately is a difficult thinker, partly because he is competent in so many disciplines. Joseph Schumpeter, who struggled with Whatley's "elusive" greatness, saw a systematic core in Whately: the force behind Nassau Senior's axiomatics. Whately's contemporaries did not talk of axiomatics, but they did point out that his work depended upon an unusually small number of authorities, that is, Aristotle, Bacon, and Smith. In our interpretation, these foundational sources gave Whately three guiding principles to characterize all human activity: innate sociability, innate self-love, and costly mental activity. Self-love includes a desire to know and a desire to share knowledge. These principles, coupled with a normative principle of fairness, constitute the basis for his science of reciprocal exchange, or catallactics. Violations of fairness motivate his multidimensional reform proposals. For Whately, fairness requires transparency, and the demands of transparency for tractions is literally Gospel. [source] Holmes, Langdell and FormalismRATIO JURIS, Issue 1 2002Patrick J. Kelley Both Holmes and Langdell believed that science was the model for all human inquiry and the source of all human progress. Langdell was influenced by an unsophisticated scientism, which led him to attempt to identify the true meaning of legal doctrines. Holmes was influenced by the sophisticated positivism of John Stuart Mill, which led him to attempt to reduce legal rules and doctrines to scientific laws of antecedence and consequence, justified only by their social consequences. Both Holmes and Langdell concluded that judges ought to decide a case by applying the rules established by precedent, without appeal to any special claims of justice and without appeal to any higher-order normative principle. [source] Otto Kahn-Freund and Collective Laissez-Faire: An Edifice without a Keystone?THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 2 2009Article first published online: 20 FEB 200, Ruth Dukes This paper describes Otto Kahn-Freund's advocacy of the British ,collective laissez-faire' system of regulation of industrial relations, in which regulation proceeded autonomously of the state. It suggests that a weakness of collective laissez-faire as a normative principle was its failure to make adequate provision for the furtherance of the public interest. It links this failure to a more general reluctance, on the part of Kahn-Freund, to conceive of the state as representative of the public interest. And it seeks to explain this reluctance with reference to Kahn-Freund's experiences of living and working as a labour court judge in the Weimar Republic, and of moving to the UK as a refugee from Nazism. [source] Applied Ethics: Naturalism, Normativity and Public PolicyJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2009ONORA O'NEILL abstract,Normative argument is supposed to guide ways in which we might change the world, rather than to fit the world as it is. This poses certain difficulties for the notion of applied ethics. Taken literally the phrase ,applied ethics' suggests that principles or standards with substantial philosophical justification, in particular ethical and political principles with such justification, are applied to particular cases and guide action. However, the ,cases' which applied ethics discusses are themselves indeterminate, and the relation of principles to these ,cases' differs from the relation of principles to cases in naturalistic, truth-oriented inquiry. Writing in ,applied ethics', I shall argue, does not need elaborate case histories or scenarios, since the testing points for normative principles are other normative principles rather than particular cases. Normative principles and contexts to which they are applicable are indeed needed for any reasoning that is practical, but they are not sufficient. Practical ethics needs principles that can not merely be applied in certain cases or situations, but also enacted in certain ways, and requires an account of practical judgement and of the public policies that support that judgement. [source] | |||||||||||||