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Normative Content (normative + content)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences75%

Selected Abstracts

An Argument Against Reduction in Morality and Epistemology

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Issue 3 2006
Jeremy Randel Koons
To avoid Moore's open question objection and similar arguments, reductionist philosophers argue that normative (e.g. moral and epistemic) and natural terms are only coextensive, but not synonymous. These reductionists argue that the normative content of normative terms is not a feature of their extension, but is accounted for in some other way (e.g. as a feature of these terms' meaning). However, reductionist philosophers cannot account for this "normative surplus" while remaining true to their original reductionist motivations. The reductionist's theoretical commitments both require and forbid a reductionist account of the normative content of moral and epistemic concepts. [source]

Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard's Reformation of Kan's Moral Philosophy

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002
CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS
Kant has long been taxed with an inability to explain the detailed normative content of our lives by making universalizability the sole arbiter of our values. Korsgaard addresses one form of this critique by defending a Kantian theory amended by a seemingly attractive conception of practical identities. Identities are dependent on the contingent circumstances of each person's world. Hence, obligations issuing from them differ from Kantian moral obligations in not applying to all persons. Still, Korsgaard takes Kantian autonomy to mean the normativity of all obligations is rooted in universalizability. The wealth of values informing our lives is thus said to be accommodated within a Kantian framework. After briefly explaining Korsgaard's understanding of practical identities and their role in her reformation of Kant's moral philosophy, I argue that she gives an inadequate explanation of how the obligations that arise from a person's practical identities derive their authority from the person's will. I then consider how her position might be developed to meet this objection in accordance with her allegiance to "constructivism" and I argue that the epistemic commitments of people's actual identities makes it unlikely that such a development could preserve Kantian autonomy as she interprets it. [source]

General Comment No. 17 on "Authors' Rights"

THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Issue 1 2007
Hans Morten Haugen
General Comment No. 17 on authors' rights is a comprehensive assessment of the normative content of article 15, paragraph 1(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Covenant). Also, the obligations and violations are spelled out in great detail. It is found that the General Comment makes a clear distinction in principle between standard intellectual property rights and the protection given in accordance with article 15, paragraph 1(c). At the same time, the General Comment does not outline any specific tools for determining when an intellectual effort would result in human rights protection and when it would fall outside of the scope of this protection. Two clarifications have resulted in a positive reception of the General Comment among those who expressed criticism during the drafting. First, General Comment No. 17 acknowledges the need for human rights protection for local and indigenous communities. Second, General Comment No. 17 emphasizes the balance between the private interests of the authors and the other human rights recognized in the Covenant. [source]

Taking Others into Account: Self-Interest and Fairness in Majority Decision Making

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2010
Jan Sauermann
Research on the formal properties of democratic aggregation mechanisms has a long tradition in political science. Recent theoretical developments, however, show that in the discussion of normative contents of democratic decisions, the actual shape of preferences deserves just as much attention. However, our knowledge about the concrete motivations of individual behavior in democratic decisions is incomplete. Using laboratory experiments, this article examines the existence of social preferences in majority decisions. Contrary to earlier experiments of committee decision making, we develop a design that controls for the conditions of communication and the level of information between subjects. This allows us to comparatively test the predictive power of several theories. We find strong evidence that self-interest and fairness motivate human behavior in majority decisions. [source]