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Negotiated Settlement (negotiated + settlement)
Selected AbstractsA Test of Wills: Jimmy Carter, South Africa, and the Independence of NamibiaDIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 5 2010Piero Gleijeses Until 1975, Washington paid little attention to southern Africa, a backwater in the Cold War where weak insurgencies posed little threat to white rule in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Namibia. The collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship in April 1974 meant the end of white rule in Angola and Mozambique. The Cuban victory in Angola the following year propelled southern Africa into the vortex of the Cold War. Between 1977 and 1981, the Carter administration engaged in a complicated minuet with South Africa and the Namibian rebels to craft a negotiated settlement that would grant Namibia its independence. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski clashed over the course the United States should follow, while Cuba and the Soviet Union strongly supported the Namibian insurgents and 20,000 Cuban soldiers were poised in neighboring Angola. I analyze the failure of Carter's Namibia policy based on US, Cuban and South African documents, as well as interviews with Namibian, US, Cuban and South African protagonists. [source] "It's Just Black, White, or Hispanic": An Observational Study of Racializing Moves in California's Segregated Prison Reception CentersLAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, Issue 4 2008Philip Goodman This article takes as its launching point a 2005 U. S. Supreme Court case, Johnson v. California (543 U.S. 499), which ruled that the California Department of Corrections' unwritten practice of racially segregating inmates in prison reception centers is to be reviewed under the highest level of constitutional review, strict scrutiny. Relying on observational data from two California prison reception centers, this research is grounded in an interactionist perspective and influenced by Smith's work on "institutional ethnography." I examine how racialization occurs in carceral settings, arguing that officers and inmates collaborate to arrive at a "negotiated settlement" regarding housing decisions. They do so working together (but not always in agreement) to shape how an inmate is categorized in terms of ,race'/ethnicity and gang/group affiliation, within a framework established by official Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation paperwork and related institutional understandings of housing needs. The findings demonstrate that administrators, officers, and inmates alike have influence over the process by which people are categorized and ,race' is produced, even as they derive their power from different sources and are both enabled and constrained by the relationship between them. I conclude that California prisons are, as Wacquant has put it, "the main machine for ,race making'" (2005:128), and that the fuel for that machine,a series of patterned, negotiated settlements,happens in real time, "on the ground," and with important consequences for inmates, officers, and administrators. [source] No War, No Peace: Northern Ireland after the AgreementPOLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2007Roger Mac Ginty In 1998 a historic agreement, commonly known as the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement, formed the basis of a negotiated settlement for the future of Northern Ireland. Since that time the level of violence in Northern Ireland has reduced but many problematic issues related to governance, sectarianism, and community relations remain on the political agenda and have destabilized the post-peace accord environment. Many of these issues can be viewed as either causes or consequences of the protracted conflict in Northern Ireland. This special issue examines some of these issues from a political psychology perspective. Economic, political, social, and psychological factors that have supported and hindered progress towards peace and stability are considered. While the paramilitary ceasefires have remained intact and certain aspects of life in Northern Ireland have been transformed, the road to peace has been hindered by both political and psychological intransigence. This paper offers an opportunity to reevaluate conceptualisations of conflict and its management in chronic situations, where divisions are deeply embedded within societal structures and relationships, and consider factors that may act as barriers to the development of a lasting peace. [source] Mutual Optimism and WarAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 4 2007Mark Fey Working with the definition of mutual optimism as war due to inconsistent beliefs, we formalize the mutual optimism argument to test the theory's logical validity. We find that in the class of strategic situations where mutual optimism is a necessary condition for war,i.e., where war is known to be inefficient, war only occurs if both sides prefer it to a negotiated settlement, and on the eve of conflict war is self-evident,then there is no Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where wars are fought because of mutual optimism. The fundamental reason that mutual optimism cannot lead to war is that if both sides are willing to fight, each side should infer that they have either underestimated the strength of the opponent or overestimated their own strength. In either case, these inferences lead to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. We also show that this result extends to situations in which there is bounded rationality and/or noncommon priors. [source] The Lansdowne "Peace Letter" of 1917 and the Prospect of Peace by Negotiation with GermanyAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY, Issue 1 2002Douglas Newton In late November 1917, Lord Lansdowne, one of the most senior of British Unionist politicians, wrote a letter to the editor of the Daily Telegraph. The letter asked for the war aims of the Entente and the USA to be "coordinated" and suggested that a moderate revision of war aims might bring a negotiated peace nearer. The letter appeared to ally Lansdowne with the British Radicals, who had been close to President Wilson (until April 1917), and had argued for a negotiated peace to end the war since the autumn of 1916. The letter was ferociously denounced by the Northcliffe press, and by many of Lansdowne's Unionist colleagues. It was supposedly a "plea for surrender" and "a national misfortune". Nevertheless, it touched off a series of new departures in the search for a negotiated settlement: House's visit to the inter Allied Conference in December, the Labour War Aims Memorandum, Lloyd George's Caxton Hall speech, Wilson's Fourteen Points Address, and the beginning of a public parley with the Central Powers in the replies of Hertling and Czernin in January 1918. The paper examines the possibilities for a negotiated peace during the winter of 1917,1918, that is, in the period between the publication of Lansdowne's famous letter and the sudden Versailles "Knockout Blow" Declaration of February 1918 which rejected out of hand any prospect of negotiation. The paper examines Wilson's ambiguous position in this debate, and in particular the evolution of moderate opinion inside Germany in reaction to these events. The paper suggests the unfortunate enfeeblement of moderate opinion in Germany in the face of the apparent triumph of "knockout blow" opinion in the Entente camp. [source] Information, Bias, and Mediation Success,INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2008Burcu Savun Why do some mediation episodes produce successful negotiated settlements between the disputants of international conflict while others fail to achieve success? This article examines how certain characteristics of a mediator, that is, a mediator's information about the disputants and a mediator's bias toward them, affect the success of mediation of international conflicts. By drawing a conceptual distinction between absolute and relative bias and measuring the type of information that is relevant for mediation success, I demonstrate that both the degree of bias a mediator holds toward the disputants and the degree of information a mediator has about the disputants are significant predictors of mediation success. [source] "It's Just Black, White, or Hispanic": An Observational Study of Racializing Moves in California's Segregated Prison Reception CentersLAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, Issue 4 2008Philip Goodman This article takes as its launching point a 2005 U. S. Supreme Court case, Johnson v. California (543 U.S. 499), which ruled that the California Department of Corrections' unwritten practice of racially segregating inmates in prison reception centers is to be reviewed under the highest level of constitutional review, strict scrutiny. Relying on observational data from two California prison reception centers, this research is grounded in an interactionist perspective and influenced by Smith's work on "institutional ethnography." I examine how racialization occurs in carceral settings, arguing that officers and inmates collaborate to arrive at a "negotiated settlement" regarding housing decisions. They do so working together (but not always in agreement) to shape how an inmate is categorized in terms of ,race'/ethnicity and gang/group affiliation, within a framework established by official Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation paperwork and related institutional understandings of housing needs. The findings demonstrate that administrators, officers, and inmates alike have influence over the process by which people are categorized and ,race' is produced, even as they derive their power from different sources and are both enabled and constrained by the relationship between them. I conclude that California prisons are, as Wacquant has put it, "the main machine for ,race making'" (2005:128), and that the fuel for that machine,a series of patterned, negotiated settlements,happens in real time, "on the ground," and with important consequences for inmates, officers, and administrators. [source] | ||||||||||