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Naturalistic Fallacy (naturalistic + fallacy)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences100%

Selected Abstracts

THE RETURN OF THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY: A DIALOGUE ON HUMAN FLOURISHING

THE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 3 2008
FRANCIS MICHAEL WALSH
In response to the proposal justifying the morality of homosexual acts offered by Todd A. Salzman and Michael G. Lawler, this paper seeks to make intelligible the reasoning used by the New Natural Law Theory and others that arrives at the opposite conclusion. This article proposes to explore the weaknesses in the arguments offered in justification. By proposing an expanded notion of human nature so as to include sexual orientation as one of the factors from which to draw moral norms, the authors have adopted the central proposition of the Old Natural Law Theory defended by Francisco Suarez and others, viz., that human nature as such was a fit source from which to draw moral norms. Thus the New Natural Law Theory, formulated by Germain Grisez to answer the charge of the naturalistic fallacy, has curiously found itself being refuted by a reformulation of the Old Natural Law Theory. This article seeks to show how the proportionalistic reasoning used by Salzman and Lawler leads inevitably to a revival of the naturalistic fallacy. [source]

EMPIRICAL ETHICS AND ITS ALLEGED META-ETHICAL FALLACIES

BIOETHICS, Issue 4 2009
ROB DE VRIES
ABSTRACT This paper analyses the concept of empirical ethics as well as three meta-ethical fallacies that empirical ethics is said to face: the is-ought problem, the naturalistic fallacy and violation of the fact-value distinction. Moreover, it answers the question of whether empirical ethics (necessarily) commits these three basic meta-ethical fallacies. [source]

TWO CONCEPTS OF EMPIRICAL ETHICS

BIOETHICS, Issue 4 2009
MALCOLM PARKER
ABSTRACT The turn to empirical ethics answers two calls. The first is for a richer account of morality than that afforded by bioethical principlism, which is cast as excessively abstract and thin on the facts. The second is for the facts in question to be those of human experience and not some other, unworldly realm. Empirical ethics therefore promises a richer naturalistic ethics, but in fulfilling the second call it often fails to heed the metaethical requirements related to the first. Empirical ethics risks losing the normative edge which necessarily characterizes the ethical, by failing to account for the nature and the logic of moral norms. I sketch a naturalistic theory, teleological expressivism (TE), which negotiates the naturalistic fallacy by providing a more satisfactory means of taking into account facts and research data with ethical implications. The examples of informed consent and the euthanasia debate are used to illustrate the superiority of this approach, and the problems consequent on including the facts in the wrong kind of way. [source]