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Aristotelian Tradition (aristotelian + tradition)
Selected AbstractsCritical Realism and Causality: Tracing the Aristotelian LegacyJOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 2 2009STEPHEN PRATTEN Rom Harré's generative account of causality has been drawn on heavily by advocates of critical realism. Yet Harré argues that critical realists often exaggerate the extent to which powerful causal explanations of social phenomena can be developed. Certain proponents of critical realism have responded to Harré's criticisms by suggesting that it is useful to consider the relevant issues in relation to the familiar Aristotelian classification of four causes. In this paper I contribute to this debate and pursue a similar strategy. The paper adds to existing contributions in two ways. Firstly, I outline how Harré sees his generative account of causality as linking up with Aristotelian themes. It emerges that Harré at times conceives of his generative theory as part of an alternative to the Aristotelian system while at other times he draws connections between it and a reformulated account of formal causality. Secondly, I argue that when we consider the positions of Harré and proponents of critical realism on the scope of causal explanation in the social realm in relation to the interpretation of final causes offered by another philosopher profoundly influenced by the Aristotelian tradition, namely Charles Peirce, we can see both as limited in certain respects. [source] Cultivating Sentimental Dispositions Through Aristotelian HabituationJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2004Jan Steutel The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the ,hard core' of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. Taking Aristotle's explicit remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child's affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle's view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child's sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child's behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non-cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman's primarily cognitive view. [source] KURDISH GLOSSES ON ARISTOTELIAN LOGICAL TEXTSTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 241 2010Mustafa Dehqan Some of the outstanding masters of Kurdish historical schools (Medresę) are usually and rightly seen as belonging to the Aristotelian tradition. In this introductory study I briefly present some manuscripts of Kurdish glosses on Aristotelian logical texts, and show that the Aristotelian logical tradition, as inherited from early Islamic philosophers, also formed an important strand in Kurdish schools. Kurdish students' peculiar approach to Aristotelian logic affected the way in which Categories, De Interpretatione and Isagoge were studied in Kurdish schools from the fifteenth century onwards. [source] The Angelic Doctor and the Stagirite: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary ,Aristotelian' EthicsPROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1 2001M. W. F. Stone To what extent, if any, is the moral thought of Thomas Aquinas ,Aristotelian'? This question is not simply of historical interest, since it directs our attention to those areas of contemporary English-speaking moral philosophy where Thomas is discussed. In some quarters there is a tendency to classify Thomas as a thinker in the ,Aristotelian tradition', and his debt to Aristotle is thought to be apparent in his remarks on moral reasoning and virtue. Nowhere is this tendency more evident than in discussions of Thomas by supporters of modern virtue ethics. In this paper, I will argue that the relationship of Thomas's ethics to Aristotle is much more complicated than these discussions assume. Despite the strong and interesting affinities that exist between the practical philosophies of Thomas and Aristotle, the sum total of their common features can never disguise nor dilute the profound differences that separate them. The paper will conclude with some suggestions as to how an appreciation of these differences can enable us to cast Thomas's remarks on virtue in a different light. [source] |