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Mutual Funds (mutual + fund)
Kinds of Mutual Funds Selected AbstractsAGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDSTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2007Stephen P. Ferris Abstract Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow. [source] WINDOW DRESSING IN BOND MUTUAL FUNDSTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2006Matthew R. Morey Abstract We examine portfolio credit quality holding and daily return patterns in a large sample of bond mutual funds and document evidence of window dressing. Using portfolio credit quality holdings data, we find that bond funds on average hold significantly more government bonds during disclosure than nondisclosure, presumably to present a safer portfolio to shareholders. Multiple-index market models estimated with daily returns data corroborate these findings. We detect differences in factor loadings on days surrounding disclosure dates that indicate systematic tilting of the portfolio toward higher quality instruments. [source] Tax-induced Dissimilarities Between Domestic and Foreign Mutual Funds in ItalyECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 2 2006Roberto Savona Using data from Italy over the period 1998,2002, this study investigates whether tax effects can account for differences in return patterns between domestic and foreign mutual funds, and if this dissimilarity translates into performance. The paper presents evidence that much of the difference between domestic and foreign funds is explained by the different tax systems. The asymmetry between the two groups, due to the fact that domestic funds are obliged to pay taxes on a daily basis while foreign funds are taxed when capital gains are collected, also affects performance. We prove that comparing pre-tax returns, Italian funds are virtually indistinguishable from their foreign counterparts in terms of risk-adjusted returns, while when comparing after-tax returns, foreign funds outperform. [source] Incentives, Discretion, and Asset Valuation in Closed,End Mutual FundsJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2002Nandini Chandar This paper studies earnings management using 363 closed,end mutual fund firm,years of data. Closed,end fund assets consist of unrestricted and restricted securities, and realized and unrealized income. While unrestricted securities are not subject to earnings management, restricted security values are largely discretionary. Managerial valuation of restricted securities is modeled as contingent on unrestricted returns relative to a performance benchmark. Four unrestricted performance regions are identified. Known multi,period compensation incentives become the basis for hypothesizing earnings management behaviors in the regions in the form of restricted security valuation. Across several benchmarks, the results are consistent with multi,period maximization rather than simpler single,period compensation maximization or income smoothing. Funds with extreme unrestricted performance show relatively larger income,decreasing earnings management, and funds with slightly,below benchmark returns show relatively larger income,increasing earnings management than those slightly above. These results clarify the relationship between complex earnings management behavior and managerial incentives. [source] Arbitrage Bounds and the Time Series Properties of the Discount on UK Closed-End Mutual FundsJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2007Laurence Copeland Abstract:, In a dataset of weekly observations over the period since 1990, the discount on UK closed-end mutual funds is shown to be nonstationary, but reverting to a nonzero long run mean. Although the long run discount could be explained by factors like management expenses etc., its short run fluctuations are harder to reconcile with an arbitrage-free equilibrium. In time series terms, there is evidence of long memory in discounts consistent with a bounded random walk. This conclusion is supported by explicit nonlinearity tests, and by results which suggest the behaviour of the discount is perhaps best represented by one of the class of Smooth-Transition Autoregressive (STAR) models. [source] Relative Performance Evaluation of Mutual Funds: A Non-Parametric ApproachJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 7-8 2001Yoon K. Choi We propose an alternative mutual fund performance index which addresses the benchmark problem and controls for economies of scale in managing mutual funds. We advance a new concept of ,return-cost' efficiency as another important element in evaluating portfolio management, in addition to the mean-variance efficiency concept. Our index based on a non-parametric estimation is shown to be similar to the Sharpe index with multiple slopes (or factors). We have shown that all fund categories, except income funds, have similar average efficiency scores after controlling for economies of scale. Most funds operate in increasing returns to scale and seem to be successful in holding mean-variance efficient portfolios, but unsuccessful in allocating transaction costs efficiently, evidenced by excessive turnovers and loads. [source] Further Evidence on the Performance of Funds of Funds: The Case of Real Estate Mutual FundsREAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2008Kevin C.H. Chiang Funds of funds (FOFs) are created when investment companies invest in other investment companies. Although the additional layer of fees incurred by FOFs has a negative effect on returns, there is empirical evidence that real estate FOFs generate superior performance net of fees and risk adjustments. The evidence is inconsistent with a growing consensus that most actively managed mutual funds do not, on average, generate excess returns after adjusting for fees and risk. This study explains this apparent contradiction and finds that most real estate FOFs do not outperform their benchmarks under alternative risk adjustment specifications. [source] On the Industry Concentration of Actively Managed Equity Mutual FundsTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 4 2005MARCIN KACPERCZYK ABSTRACT Mutual fund managers may decide to deviate from a well-diversified portfolio and concentrate their holdings in industries where they have informational advantages. In this paper, we study the relation between the industry concentration and the performance of actively managed U.S. mutual funds from 1984 to 1999. Our results indicate that, on average, more concentrated funds perform better after controlling for risk and style differences using various performance measures. This finding suggests that investment ability is more evident among managers who hold portfolios concentrated in a few industries. [source] Should Investors Avoid All Actively Managed Mutual Funds?THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 1 2001A Study in Bayesian Performance Evaluation This paper analyzes mutual-fund performance from an investor's perspective. We study the portfolio-choice problem for a mean-variance investor choosing among a risk-free asset, index funds, and actively managed mutual funds. To solve this problem, we employ a Bayesian method of performance evaluation; a key innovation in our approach is the development of a flexible set of prior beliefs about managerial skill. We then apply our methodology to a sample of 1,437 mutual funds. We find that some extremely skeptical prior beliefs nevertheless lead to economically significant allocations to active managers. [source] The Comparative Performance of Load and No-Load Mutual Funds in CanadaCANADIAN JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, Issue 4 2004Richard Deaves This paper investigates, using both single-factor and multi-factor models, the absolute performance of Canadian equity funds and the relative performance of load versus no-load funds. Consistent with a wealth of other studies, I find that the typical fund manager in Canada is unable to surpass his risk-adjusted benchmark. Moreover, the advantage possessed by load funds, in being able to undertake fewer liquidity-motivated trades than most no-load funds, does not translate into their being able to outperform no-load funds, even when loads are ignored. Résumé Le présent article utilise les modèles de facteur unique et les modèles defacteur multiple pour examiner la performance absolue desfonds d'actions canadiens et la performance relative desfonds avec frais d'acquisition, par opposition aux fonds exempts des frais d'acquisition. Comme les nombreuses études antérieures, notre recherche débouche sur la conclusion qu'au Canada, le gestionnaire de fonds type est incapable de surpasser son point de référence ajusté enfonction du risque. Par ailleurs, l'avantage lié aux fonds avec frais d'acquisition, notamment sa capacité à entreprendre moins de transactions nécessitant des liquidités que les fonds exempts des frais d'acquisition, ne se traduit pas en capacité à donner de meilleurs résultats que les fonds sans frais, même si on ne tient pas compte des frais. [source] Determinants of Institutional Responses to Self,Tender OffersFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2002Judith Swisher I examine how institutional investors respond to self,tender offers for common shares. I find that institutions sell more shares in larger offers and with higher proration factors. Institutions also sell more shares when officer and director holdings are not at risk in the offers. Banks, investment advisors, and other managers respond similarly, selling more shares in larger offers. Although institutions as a group do not respond differently by offer type, insurance companies and investment advisors sell more shares in fixed,price offers. Mutual funds, which differ from other types of institutions, sell more shares for firms with greater increases in leverage. [source] A Dynamic Investment Model with Control on the Portfolio's Worst Case OutcomeMATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 4 2003Yonggan Zhao This paper considers a portfolio problem with control on downside losses. Incorporating the worst-case portfolio outcome in the objective function, the optimal policy is equivalent to the hedging portfolio of a European option on a dynamic mutual fund that can be replicated by market primary assets. Applying the Black-Scholes formula, a closed-form solution is obtained when the utility function is HARA and asset prices follow a multivariate geometric Brownian motion. The analysis provides a useful method of converting an investment problem to an option pricing model. [source] Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund ReturnsTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 5 2010EUGENE F. FAMA ABSTRACT The aggregate portfolio of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds is close to the market portfolio, but the high costs of active management show up intact as lower returns to investors. Bootstrap simulations suggest that few funds produce benchmark-adjusted expected returns sufficient to cover their costs. If we add back the costs in fund expense ratios, there is evidence of inferior and superior performance (nonzero true ,) in the extreme tails of the cross-section of mutual fund , estimates. [source] AGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDSTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2007Stephen P. Ferris Abstract Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow. [source] Comparing Mutual Fund Governance and Corporate GovernanceCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2006Robert F. Radin Governance of public corporations in the United States has operated under the agency model with regulatory strengthening since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. With this foundation in place, boards are empowered to utilise their power and influence and can effectively monitor the actions of management, intervening where necessary. In effect, the rules of engagement embodied in the structure and the law guide interactions and empowerment. The governance model of the mutual funds industry, representing over 8 trillion dollars, is often viewed as a mirror of the corporate world, but upon closer analysis is found to have significant structural differences that dilute the authority of directors. The two models are compared and analysed with recommendations made to strengthen the oversight of mutual funds. [source] Tax-induced Dissimilarities Between Domestic and Foreign Mutual Funds in ItalyECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 2 2006Roberto Savona Using data from Italy over the period 1998,2002, this study investigates whether tax effects can account for differences in return patterns between domestic and foreign mutual funds, and if this dissimilarity translates into performance. The paper presents evidence that much of the difference between domestic and foreign funds is explained by the different tax systems. The asymmetry between the two groups, due to the fact that domestic funds are obliged to pay taxes on a daily basis while foreign funds are taxed when capital gains are collected, also affects performance. We prove that comparing pre-tax returns, Italian funds are virtually indistinguishable from their foreign counterparts in terms of risk-adjusted returns, while when comparing after-tax returns, foreign funds outperform. [source] Effects of Market Segmentation and Bank Concentration on Mutual Fund Expenses and Returns: Evidence from FinlandEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2004Timo P. Korkeamaki G15; G18; G20 Abstract A tremendous amount of research examines US mutual funds, but fund markets also thrive in other countries. However, research about these fast growing markets is lacking. This study addresses Finnish funds. Fast growth of the Finnish fund industry, strong bank dominance in the industry and recent EU membership make it an interesting market to examine. The Finnish fund market is also of particular interest since it had the fastest growth among the EU countries during 1996,2000. We find evidence that bank-managed and older funds charge higher expenses but investors are not compensated for paying higher expenses with higher risk-adjusted returns, suggesting a potential agency problem. Overall, Finnish fund expenses have decreased over time, consistent with EU membership reducing market segmentation and generating competition. [source] On the Use of Multifactor Models to Evaluate Mutual Fund PerformanceFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2009Joop Huij We show that multifactor performance estimates for mutual funds suffer from systematic biases and argue that these biases are a result of miscalculating the factor premiums. Because the factor proxies are based on hypothetical stock portfolios and do not incorporate transaction costs, trade impact, and trading restrictions, the factor premiums are either over- or underestimated. We argue that factor proxies based on mutual fund returns rather than on stock returns provide better benchmarks to evaluate professional money managers. [source] Institutional Investors and Shareholder LitigationFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2008Sergey S. Barabanov We examine whether institutional investors are able to avoid future litigation. Our results show that institutions provide a fiduciary role by decreasing or eliminating their positions in sued firms well before litigation begins. We also find that institutional groups with high monitoring ability (independent investment advisors and mutual funds) are more proactive in their trading behavior than are institutions with low monitoring ability (banks, insurance companies, and unclassified institutions such as endowments, foundations, and self-managed pension funds). We find that percentage changes in institutional ownership are correlated with public information available more than two quarters before litigation. [source] The Determinants and Implications of Mutual Fund Cash Holdings: Theory and EvidenceFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2006Xuemin (Sterling) Yan In this article, I examine the determinants and implications of equity mutual fund cash holdings. In cross-sectional tests, I find evidence generally supportive of a static trade-off model developed in the article. In particular, small-cap funds and funds with more-volatile fund flows hold more cash. However, I do not find that fund managers with better stock-picking skills hold less cash. Aggregate cash holdings by equity mutual funds are persistent and positively related to lagged aggregate fund flows. Aggregate cash holdings do not forecast future market returns, suggesting that equity funds as a whole do not have market timing skills. [source] Mutual Fund Performance: Measurement and Evidence1FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 2 2010Keith Cuthbertson C15; G11; C14 The paper provides a critical review of empirical findings on the performance of mutual funds, mainly for the US and UK. Ex-post, there are around 0-5% of top performing UK and US equity mutual funds with truly positive-alpha performance (after fees) and around 20% of funds that have truly poor alpha performance, with about 75% of active funds which are effectively zero-alpha funds. Key drivers of relative performance are, load fees, expenses and turnover. There is little evidence of successful market timing. Evidence suggests past winner funds persist, when rebalancing is frequent (i.e., less than one year) and when using sophisticated sorting rules (e.g., Bayesian approaches) - but transactions costs (load and advisory fees) imply that economic gains to investors from winner funds may be marginal. The US evidence clearly supports the view that past loser funds remain losers. Broadly speaking results for bond mutual funds are similar to those for equity funds. Sensible advice for most investors would be to hold low cost index funds and avoid holding past ,active' loser funds. Only sophisticated investors should pursue an active ex-ante investment strategy of trying to pick winners - and then with much caution. [source] The Asset Management Industry in Asia: Dynamics of Growth, Structure, and PerformanceFINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 1 2007Ingo Walter We examine the industrial organization and institutional development of the asset management industry in Asian developing economies,specifically in China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand. We focus on the size and growth of the buy-side of the respective financial markets, asset allocation, the regulatory environment, and the state of internationalization of the fund management industry in its key components,mutual funds, pension funds, and asset management for high net worth individuals. We link the evolution of professional asset management in these environments to the development of the respective capital markets and to the evolution of corporate governance. We find that the fund management industry occupies a very small niche in domestic financial systems that are dominated by banks. At the same time, we find that its growth has been very rapid in the early 2000s and we suggest that this is likely to persist as the demand for professional management of financial wealth in the region develops and as the pension fund sectors of the respective economies are liberalized to allow larger portions of assets to be invested in collective investment schemes. [source] Selectivity and Market Timing Performance of Fidelity Sector Mutual FundsFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 1 2001Wilfred L. Dellva G14 Abstract In this paper, we test the selectivity and timing performance of the Fidelity sector mutual funds during the 1989,1998 time period. We use the S&P 500, the Dow Jones Industry Group Total Return Indexes, and the Dow Jones Subgroup Total Return Indexes as benchmarks. When we use the Dow Jones Industry benchmarks, our results indicate that many sector fund managers have positive selectivity but negative timing ability. We also find that the results are sensitive to our choice of benchmark and timing model. [source] The Performance Persistence of Closed-End FundsFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2000Martina K. Bers G20/G23 Abstract The purpose of this study is to extend the research on mutual fund performance persistence to net asset value and market price performance of domestic closed-end funds. While research has assessed the performance persistence of open-end mutual funds, it has not assessed the performance persistence of closed-end funds. Yet, the unique characteristics of closed-end funds allow stronger arguments for their persistence than the arguments previously submitted for open-end mutual funds. The results show evidence for risk-adjusted performance persistence. [source] Do aggressive funds reallocate their portfolios aggressively?ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2009Kevin C. H. Chiang D9; G11 Abstract This study examines pairs of asset allocation mutual funds that are controlled for all informational attributes, except for the level of risk aversion. Standard mean-variance models of portfolio choice suggest that the percentage rebalancing of common stocks in aggressive funds would be the same as that in conservative funds. However, this study finds the rebalancing of common stocks in aggressive funds to be disproportionally less intense. [source] Home Bias in Leveraged Buyouts,INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 3 2009Peter Cornelius In this paper, we examine cross-border investments in 2,260 portfolio companies by 102 buyout funds raised between 1995 and 2004. Using proprietary data compiled by AlpInvest Partners, we calculate the aggregate home bias of these funds as well as their home bias at the fund level. We find significant variation across funds. While UK-based funds are on average least home-biased, they show a high degree of intra-European bias. In comparison, US funds are found to be least home-biased in terms of inter-regional acquisitions, with Europe being the most important destination for US buyout capital. Furthermore, we find that buyout funds tend to be less home-biased than portfolio investors and, more specifically, mutual funds. This finding is consistent with the optimal ownership theory of the home bias, which predicts that foreign direct investment , as opposed to portfolio investment , represents the preferred choice of entry in countries where the quality of governance is perceived to be inferior, promoting insider ownership. [source] Is prior performance priced through closed-end fund discounts?INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2010Michael Bleaney Abstract In open-end mutual funds (unit trusts), there is a strong positive cross-sectional relationship between net inflows to individual funds and past performance, as if investors attributed performance to managerial skill. Performance shows only very weak persistence, however, so at first sight investors do not appear to gain anything by responding to past performance information. This behaviour can be explained by the fact that past performance is effectively unpriced in the unit trust market, since management fees are unresponsive to demand. If investors believe that there is a non-zero probability that future performance will turn out to be positively correlated with past performance (i.e. that there is an element of managerial skill in performance), but a zero probability that this correlation will be negative, it is rational to prefer funds with better past performance when performance is not priced. In other words, it costs nothing to insure against the possibility of some managerial skill effect. If this explanation of the flow,performance relationship in unit trusts is correct, one would expect the relationship between investor demand and past fund performance to be much weaker if past performance were to be priced. We test this hypothesis in the market for closed-end funds (investment trusts). Because closed-end funds do not trade at net asset value, but at a price determined in the market, strong demand will raise the ratio of price to net asset value (known as the premium). Since it is well established that premiums are mean-reverting, future shareholder returns on funds currently on high premiums tend to be depressed by the reversion of the premium to the mean. In the closed-end fund market, as for open-end funds, there is little evidence of performance persistence, and therefore, to the extent that funds with good past performance are pushed to higher premiums, the expected return on them is less than on the average fund. This implicit pricing mechanism should mean that demand is a declining function of the premium, so that, even if demand is an increasing function of past performance for a given premium, any effect on the premium itself will be muted. We test this hypothesis for closed-end funds traded in the US and the UK. We find that there is a statistically significant effect of past performance on the premium in both countries. However, consistent with the hypothesis, it has limited economic significance, since it represents only a small component of premium variability. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Home Bias, Foreign Mutual Fund Holdings, and the Voluntary Adoption of International Accounting StandardsJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2007VICENTIU M. COVRIG ABSTRACT We test the assertion that a consequence of voluntarily adopting International Accounting Standards (IAS) is the enhanced ability to attract foreign capital. Using a unique database that reports firm-level holdings of over 25,000 mutual funds from around the world, our multivariate tests find that average foreign mutual fund ownership is significantly higher among IAS adopters. We also find that IAS adopters in poorer information environments and with lower visibility have higher levels of foreign investment, consistent with firms using IAS adoption to provide more information and/or information in a more familiar form to foreign investors. Taken together, our findings are consistent with voluntary IAS adoption reducing home bias among foreign investors and thereby improving capital allocation efficiency. [source] Arbitrage Bounds and the Time Series Properties of the Discount on UK Closed-End Mutual FundsJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2007Laurence Copeland Abstract:, In a dataset of weekly observations over the period since 1990, the discount on UK closed-end mutual funds is shown to be nonstationary, but reverting to a nonzero long run mean. Although the long run discount could be explained by factors like management expenses etc., its short run fluctuations are harder to reconcile with an arbitrage-free equilibrium. In time series terms, there is evidence of long memory in discounts consistent with a bounded random walk. This conclusion is supported by explicit nonlinearity tests, and by results which suggest the behaviour of the discount is perhaps best represented by one of the class of Smooth-Transition Autoregressive (STAR) models. [source] Relative Performance Evaluation of Mutual Funds: A Non-Parametric ApproachJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 7-8 2001Yoon K. Choi We propose an alternative mutual fund performance index which addresses the benchmark problem and controls for economies of scale in managing mutual funds. We advance a new concept of ,return-cost' efficiency as another important element in evaluating portfolio management, in addition to the mean-variance efficiency concept. Our index based on a non-parametric estimation is shown to be similar to the Sharpe index with multiple slopes (or factors). We have shown that all fund categories, except income funds, have similar average efficiency scores after controlling for economies of scale. Most funds operate in increasing returns to scale and seem to be successful in holding mean-variance efficient portfolios, but unsuccessful in allocating transaction costs efficiently, evidenced by excessive turnovers and loads. [source] | |||||||||||||