			Home About us Contact

Moral Theory (moral + theory)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	52%
Medical Sciences	13%

Selected Abstracts

The Final Ends of Higher Education in Light of an African Moral Theory

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 2 2009
THADDEUS METZ
From the perspective of an African ethic, analytically interpreted as a philosophical principle of right action, what are the proper final ends of a publicly funded university and how should they be ranked? To answer this question, I first provide a brief but inclusive review of the literature on Africanising higher education from the past 50 years, and contend that the prominent final ends suggested in it can be reduced to five major categories. Then, I spell out an intuitively attractive African moral theory and apply it to these five final ends, arguing that three of them are appropriate but that two of them are not. After that, I maintain that the African moral theory prescribes two additional final ends for a public university that are not salient in the literature. Next, I argue that employing the African moral theory as I do enables one to rebut several criticisms of Africanising higher education that have recently been made from a liberal perspective. I conclude by posing questions suitable for future research. [source]

Three Conceptions of Action in Moral Theory

NOUS, Issue 1 2001
Tamar Schapiro
First page of article [source]

Ethics Beyond Moral Theory

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Issue 3 2009
Timothy Chappell
I develop an anti-theory view of ethics. Moral theory (Kantian, utilitarian, virtue ethical, etc.) is the dominant approach to ethics among academic philosophers. But moral theory's hunt for a single Master Factor (utility, universalisability, virtue . . .) is implausibly systematising and reductionist. Perhaps scientism drives the approach? But good science always insists on respect for the data, even messy data: I criticise Singer's remarks on infanticide as a clear instance of moral theory failing to respect the data of moral perceptions and moral intuitions. Moral theory also fails to provide a coherent basis for real-world motivation, justification, explanation, and prediction of good and bad, right and wrong. Consider for instance the marginal place of love in moral theory, compared with its central place in people's actual ethical outlooks and decision making. Hence, moral theory typically fails to ground any adequate ethical outlook. I propose that it is the notion of an ethical outlook that philosophical ethicists should pursue, not the unfruitful and distorting notion of a moral theory. [source]

Toward an African Moral Theory*

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2007
Thaddeus Metz
First page of article [source]

Ethics Beyond Moral Theory

Feminist Bioethics: Where We've Been, Where We's Going

METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 5 2000
Hilde Lindemann Nelson
The primary contribution of feminism to bioethics is to note how imbalances of power in the sex-gender system play themselves out in medical practice and in the theory surrounding that practice. I trace the ten-year history of feminist approaches to bioethics, arguing that while feminists have usefully critiqued medicine's biases in favor of men, they have unmasked sexism primarily in the arena of women's reproductive health, leaving other areas of health care sorely in need of feminist scrutiny. I note as well that feminist bioethicists have contributed very little to bioethical theory. In the second part of the paper I suggest two future directions for feminist bioethics. The first is to expand its critique of gender bias beyond reproductive medicine, devoting attention to the same issues raised by advances in biomedical technology as are taken up by mainstream bioethicists. The second is to develop bioethical theory that is more responsive than are mainstream moral theories to the social practices that subordinate women and minority groups. [source]

Towards a strong virtue ethics for nursing practice

NURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2006
Alan E. Armstrong rn(g) ba(hons) ma phd
Abstract, Illness creates a range of negative emotions in patients including anxiety, fear, powerlessness, and vulnerability. There is much debate on the ,therapeutic' or ,helping' nurse,patient relationship. However, despite the current agenda regarding patient-centred care, the literature concerning the development of good interpersonal responses and the view that a satisfactory nursing ethics should focus on persons and character traits rather than actions, nursing ethics is dominated by the traditional obligation, act-centred theories such as consequentialism and deontology. I critically examine these theories and the role of duty-based notions in both general ethics and nursing practice. Because of well-established flaws, I conclude that obligation-based moral theories are incomplete and inadequate for nursing practice. I examine the work of Hursthouse on virtue ethics' action guidance and the v-rules. I argue that the moral virtues and a strong (action-guiding) version of virtue ethics provide a plausible and viable alternative for nursing practice. I develop an account of a virtue-based helping relationship and a virtue-based approach to nursing. The latter is characterized by three features: (1) exercising the moral virtues such as compassion; (2) using judgement; and (3) using moral wisdom, understood to include at least moral perception, moral sensitivity, and moral imagination. Merits and problems of the virtue-based approach are examined. I relate the work of MacIntyre to nursing and I conceive nursing as a practice: nurses who exercise the virtues and seek the internal goods help to sustain the practice of nursing and thus prevent the marginalization of the virtues. The strong practice-based version of virtue ethics proposed is context-dependent, particularist, and relational. Several areas for future philosophical inquiry and empirical nursing research are suggested to develop this account yet further. [source]

Moral Objectivity and Reasonable Agreement: Can Realism Be Reconciled with Kantian Constructivism?

RATIO JURIS, Issue 1 2004
Cristina Lafont
In this paper I analyze the tension between realism and antirealism at the basis of Kantian constructivism. This tension generates a conflictive account of the source of the validity of social norms. On the one hand, the claim to moral objectivity characteristic of Kantian moral theories makes the validity of norms depend on realist assumptions concerning the existence of shared fundamental interests among all rational human beings. I illustrate this claim through a comparison of the approaches of Rawls, Habermas and Scanlon. On the other hand, however, objections to moral realism motivate many Kantian constructivists to endorse the antirealist claim that reasonable agreement is the source of the validity of social norms. After analyzing the difficulties in the latter strategy, I try to show how a balance between the realist and antirealist elements of Kantian constructivism can be reached by drawing a sharper distinction between the justice and the legitimacy of social norms. [source]

UTILITARIANISM, CONTRACTUALISM AND DEMANDINGNESS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 239 2010
Alison Hills
One familiar criticism of utilitarianism is that it is too demanding. It requires us to promote the happiness of others, even at the expense of our own projects, our integrity, or the welfare of our friends and family. Recently Ashford has defended utilitarianism, arguing that it provides compelling reasons for demanding duties to help the needy, and that other moral theories, notably contractualism, are committed to comparably stringent duties. In response, I argue that utilitarianism is even more demanding than is commonly realized: both act- and rule-utilitarianism are committed to extremely stringent duties to wild animals. In this regard, utilitarianism is more demanding (and more counter-intuitive) than contractualism. [source]

From moral theory to penal attitudes and back: a theoretically integrated modeling approach,

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW, Issue 4 2002
Jan W. de Keijser Ph.D.
From a moral standpoint, we would expect the practice of punishment to reflect a solid and commonly shared legitimizing framework. Several moral legal theories explicitly aim to provide such frameworks. Based on the theories of Retributivism, Utilitarianism, and Restorative Justice, this article first sets out to develop a theoretically integrated model of penal attitudes and then explores the extent to which Dutch judges' attitudes to punishment fit the model. Results indicate that penal attitudes can be measured in a meaningful way that is consistent with an integrated approach to moral theory. The general structure of penal attitudes among Dutch judges suggests a streamlined and pragmatic approach to legal punishment that is identifiably founded on the separate concepts central to moral theories of punishment. While Restorative Justice is frequently presented as an alternative paradigm, results show it to be smoothly incorporated within the streamlined approach. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality

HYPATIA, Issue 4 2004
Charles WrightArticle first published online: 16 DEC 200
Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay "Playfulness,,World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception" reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy. [source]

The Tasks of Embodied Love: Moral Problems in Caring for Children with Disabilities

HYPATIA, Issue 3 2002
ROGER S. GOTTLIEB
Neither secular moral theory nor religious ethics have had much place for persons in need of constant physical help and cognitive support, nor for those who provide care for them. Writing as the father of a fourteen-year-old daughter with multiple disabilities, I will explore some of moral issues that arise here, both from the point of view of the disabled child and from that of the child's caretaker(s). [source]

Reconciling situational social psychology with virtue ethics

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT REVIEWS, Issue 3 2008
Surendra Arjoon
For the past four decades, debate has occurred in respect of situational social psychology and virtue ethics. This paper attempts to reconcile this debate. Situationists propose a fragmentation theory of character (each person has a whole range of dispositions, each of which has a restricted situational application) and do not subscribe to a regularity theory of character (behaviour is regulated by long-term dispositions). In order to support this view, they cite a number of experiments. It is proposed that the substantive claims made by situationist social psychologists, for the most part, do not undermine or disagree with an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, but stem from a misunderstanding of concepts of moral character, faulty conclusions and generalizations in respect of experimental results. Situationists take a narrow view of character and morality. Evidence from organizational behaviour and managerial research literature supports the view that both situational (organizational) features and inner characteristics (including virtues) are powerful influences and determinants of morally upright and morally deviant behaviour. The role of practical judgement in bridging these views is discussed. As a way forward in reconciling situational social psychology with virtue ethics, the paper proposes an Aristotelian,Thomistic framework to overcome some of the problems associated with inadequate regulative ideals in building a normative moral theory. [source]

Truth-telling, honesty and compassion: A virtue-based exploration of a dilemma in practice

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NURSING PRACTICE, Issue 5 2008
Ann M Begley
In this paper a discussion of the strengths of a virtue-based approach to ethics in nursing is discussed. Virtue ethics is often depicted as vague and lacking in any convincing application to the reality of practice. It is argued that exploring issues from a virtue perspective offers the possibility of a sensitive moral response which is grounded in the context of the client and his family. Far from being vague, virtue ethics offers guidance in practice, but this guidance acknowledges the complexity of individual lives as opposed to the impartiality and abstract nature of traditional moral theory, rules and principles. The vehicle for discussion is a case in practice. The position presented here is that in taking account of the salient features of each individual case, withholding the truth from adults with a life threatening illness can be justified for compassionate reasons. [source]

Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2009
KATE A. MORAN
There is an apparent tension between Immanuel Kant's model of moral agency and his often-neglected philosophy of moral education. On the one hand, Kant's account of moral knowledge and decision-making seems to be one that can be self-taught. Kant's famous categorical imperative and related ,fact of reason' argument suggest that we learn the content and application of the moral law on our own. On the other hand, Kant has a sophisticated and detailed account of moral education that goes well beyond the kind of education a person would receive in the course of ordinary childhood experience. The task of this paper will be to reconcile these seemingly conflicting claims. Ultimately, I argue, Kant's philosophy of education makes sense as a part of his moral theory if we look not only at individual moral decisions, but also at the goals or ends that these moral decisions are intended to achieve. In Kant's case, this end is what he calls the highest good, and, I argue, the most coherent account of the highest good is a kind of ethical community and end of history, similar to the Groundwork's realm of ends. Seen as a tool to bring about and sustain such a community, Kant's philosophy of moral education exists as a coherent and important part of his moral philosophy. [source]

The Final Ends of Higher Education in Light of an African Moral Theory

What do we Want from a Theory of Happiness?

METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2003
Daniel M. Haybron
Abstract: I defend a methodology for theorizing about happiness. I reject three methods: conceptual analysis; scientific naturalism; and the "pure normative adequacy" approach, where the best conception of happiness is the one that best fills a role in moral theory. The concept of happiness is a folk notion employed by laypersons who have various practical interests in the matter, and theories of happiness should respect this fact. I identify four such interests in broad terms and then argue for a set of desiderata that theories of happiness ought to satisfy. The theory of happiness falls within the province of ethics. It should, however, be viewed as autonomous and not merely secondary to moral theory. [source]

Ethics Beyond Moral Theory

Moral reasoning among physical therapists: results of the defining issues test

PHYSIOTHERAPY RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL, Issue 2 2010
Laura Lee Swisher
Abstract Background and Purpose.,Although there is extensive literature in other health care fields about the ability to make ethical judgements (moral reasoning), there is a paucity of research addressing the moral reasoning of practising physical therapists. The purposes of this research were to 1) identify the types of moral reasoning used by practising physical therapists as measured by the Defining Issues Test; 2) identify differences in moral reasoning among physical therapists based on educational background, demographic variables, clinical experience, practice setting or expertise in ethics; and 3) compare the moral reasoning of physical therapists with that of other professional groups.,Methods.,The Defining Issues Test of James Rest was used to evaluate moral reasoning. Five hundred thirty-seven physical therapists responded to a mail survey sent to a random sample of 2,000 American Physical Therapy Association members. Twelve physical therapists with expertise in ethics or professionalism completed the same survey.,Results.,The mean postconventional score for the random sample was 41.93. This score was lower than the mean scores of physicians, nurses, medical students, nursing students and dental students established in previous research. Females, ethics experts and those in academic settings had higher postconventional scores.,Conclusions.,Physical therapists scored lower in postconventional moral reasoning than some other professional groups with similar educational background. Factors that may inhibit or enhance the development of moral reasoning among physical therapists and possible consequences of high or low moral reasoning scores in physical therapy require further research. These findings may raise concerns about the entry-level educational curriculum and professional development opportunities in the area of ethics and moral reasoning. Results of this research may also highlight the challenges of evaluation, scholarship and research in physical therapy ethics. Further research and theory development is needed to address the relationships between moral theory and descriptive or empirical research within physical therapy. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

From moral theory to penal attitudes and back: a theoretically integrated modeling approach,

Green's Rights Recognition Thesis and Moral Internalism*

BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 1 2005
Gerald F. Gaus
T. H. Green claimed that ,rights are made by recognition. There is no right but thinking makes it so'. This ,rights recognition thesis' is widely rejected. I argue in this article that, so far from being an idiosyncratic doctrine of 19th -century British Idealism, the rights recognition thesis implies a compelling conception of rights, and one that, surprisingly, is more in tune with contemporary meta-ethics than are many contemporary rights theories. Green's moral theory, I argue, is a form of the widely embraced doctrine of ,moral internalism'. Such internalism, conjoined with a generally embraced analysis of rights, leads to some version of the rights recognition thesis. [source]