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Moral Reasons (moral + reason)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	83%

Selected Abstracts

Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2007
JOSHUA WILLIAM BUSBY
Do states and decision-makers ever act for moral reasons? And if they do, is it only when it is convenient or relatively costless for them to do so? A number of advocacy movements,on developing country debt relief, climate change, landmines, and other issues,emerged in the 1990s to ask decision-makers to make foreign policy decisions on that basis. The primary advocates were motivated not by their own material interests but broader notions of right and wrong. What contributes to the domestic acceptance of these moral commitments? Why do some advocacy efforts succeed where others fail? Through a case study of the Jubilee 2000 campaign for developing country debt relief, this article offers an account of persuasion based on strategic framing by advocates to get the attention of decision-makers. Such strategic but not narrowly self-interested activity allows weak actors to leverage existing value and/or ideational traditions to build broader political coalitions. This article, through case studies of debt relief in the United States and Japan, also links the emerging literature on strategic framing to the domestic institutional context and the ways veto players or "policy gatekeepers" evaluate trade-offs between costs and values. [source]

MORAL PARTICULARISM AND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE

METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 4-5 2008
BRENDAN LARVOR
Abstract: Particularism is usually understood as a position in moral philosophy. In fact, it is a view about all reasons, not only moral reasons. Here, I show that particularism is a familiar and controversial position in the philosophy of science and mathematics. I then argue for particularism with respect to scientific and mathematical reasoning. This has a bearing on moral particularism, because if particularism about moral reasons is true, then particularism must be true with respect to reasons of any sort, including mathematical and scientific reasons. [source]

What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2007
ROBERT HOPKINS
Is it legitimate to acquire one's moral beliefs on the testimony of others? The pessimist about moral testimony says not. But what is the source of the difficulty? Here pessimists have a choice. On the Unavailability view, moral testimony never makes knowledge available to the recipient. On Unusability accounts, although moral testimony can make knowledge available, some further norm renders it illegitimate to make use of the knowledge thus offered. I suggest that Unusability accounts provide the strongest form of pessimist view. I consider and reject five Unavailability accounts. I then argue that any such view will fail. But what is the norm rendering moral testimonial knowledge unusable? I suggest it lies in the requirement that we grasp for ourselves the moral reasons behind a moral view. This demand is one testimony cannot meet, and that claim holds whatever account we offer of the epistemology of testimony. However, while appeal to this requirement forms the most plausible pessimist view, it is another question whether pessimism is correct. [source]

Green Constitutionalism: The Constitutional Protection of Future Generations

RATIO JURIS, Issue 3 2007
KRISTIAN SKAGEN EKELI
The proposal I wish to elaborate can be termed the posterity provision, and it has both substantive and procedural elements. The aim of this constitutional provision is twofold. The first is to encourage state authorities to make more future-oriented deliberations and decisions. The second is to create more public awareness and improve the process of public deliberation about issues affecting near and remote future generations. It is argued that a good case can be made for the proposed reforms compared with alternative substantive constitutional environmental provisions found in existing constitutions and in the literature on legal and political theory. The main reason for this is that the proposed law constitutes a better and more adequate basis for judicial enforcement than the alternatives, which tend to be very vague or unclear. In this connection, I contend that there are both epistemological and moral reasons for introducing constitutional provisions that focus on the protection of critical natural resources essential for meeting the basic physiological needs of future people. It is also argued that the posterity provision can be defended on the basis of central ideas and ideals in recent theory of deliberative democracy. [source]

NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH?

BIOETHICS, Issue 1 2007
ON TRUTH AND DECEPTION IN DEMENTIA CARE
ABSTRACT Lies and deception are often used in the care for demented elderly and often with the best intentions. However, there is a strong moral presumption against all forms of lying and deceiving. The goal of this article is to examine and evaluate concrete examples of deception and lies in dementia care, while addressing some fundamental issues in the process. It is argued that because dementia slowly diminishes the capacities one needs to distinguish between truths and falsehoods, the ability to be lied to also disappears. When the moral reasons to reject lying are explored, it becomes clear that most of them also hold where demented patients are concerned, though this also depends on the capacities of the patient. Lying, though prima facie wrong, can sometimes be justified with an appeal to well-being. The relationship between well-being and the truth is further explored. Two examples of deceiving demented patients for reasons of beneficence are discussed, from which it can be concluded that although in some cases beneficent lies or deception will not enhance patients' well-being, there are circumstances in which they do. In general, methods that enhance the well-being of the patient without deception or lies should be favored above options that use deceit, and methods of getting the truth across without hurting the patient should be favored above blunt honesty. Finally, it is important to note that not only the patient but also the nursing and medical staff can be affected by the use of lies and deception. [source]