Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Moral Education (moral + education)
Selected AbstractsA CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF EMPATHY AND A QUESTION IT RAISES FOR MORAL EDUCATIONEDUCATIONAL THEORY, Issue 1 2000Susan Verducci First page of article [source] Moral Education Between Hope and Hopelessness: The Legacy of Janusz KorczakCURRICULUM INQUIRY, Issue 1 2008SARA EFRAT EFRON ABSTRACT The responsibility for addressing morality and moral education in the current moral climate is a daunting task for conscientious educators. What educational response can extricate us from the debilitating feelings of hopelessness and helplessness as we are confronted by horrific terrorist actions, controversial use of military might, displays of corruption and greed and a growing general tension and anxiety? At this demoralizing juncture of uncertainty and doubt, the figure of Janusz Korczak (1878,1942), a Jewish-Polish educator, looms large. For more than 30 years, Korczak devoted his life to educating orphaned Jewish and non-Jewish children. He stayed with the Jewish children to the end as they all perished in a concentration camp. At a time when the surrounding society surrendered to fascism, anti-Semitism, and self-destruction, Korczak encouraged individual autonomy and caring relationships within the context of a community where a vision of justice and trust was an integral part of life. The orphanages he directed were democratic, self-ruled communities, where the children had their own parliament, court, and newspaper. This article describes the principles and the actualization of Korczak's moral education and explores how Korczak reconciled the differences between the ethical world he created in his institutions and the surrounding immoral society. The example set by Korczak's educational praxis serves as an inspiring model of school life across the boundaries of time and place and touches our need to believe in education's responsibility to strive and struggle for a better world, even when it seems an unattainable goal. And the hour shall come when a man will know himself, respect, and love. And the hour shall come in history's clock when man shall know the place of good, the place of evil, the place of pleasure, and the place of pain. (Korczak, 1978, p. 237) [source] Moral Education in an Age of GlobalizationEDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2010Nel Noddings Abstract Care theory is used to describe an approach to global ethics and moral education. After a brief introduction to care ethics, the theory is applied to global ethics. The paper concludes with a discussion of moral education for personal, political, and global domains. [source] Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2009KATE A. MORAN There is an apparent tension between Immanuel Kant's model of moral agency and his often-neglected philosophy of moral education. On the one hand, Kant's account of moral knowledge and decision-making seems to be one that can be self-taught. Kant's famous categorical imperative and related ,fact of reason' argument suggest that we learn the content and application of the moral law on our own. On the other hand, Kant has a sophisticated and detailed account of moral education that goes well beyond the kind of education a person would receive in the course of ordinary childhood experience. The task of this paper will be to reconcile these seemingly conflicting claims. Ultimately, I argue, Kant's philosophy of education makes sense as a part of his moral theory if we look not only at individual moral decisions, but also at the goals or ends that these moral decisions are intended to achieve. In Kant's case, this end is what he calls the highest good, and, I argue, the most coherent account of the highest good is a kind of ethical community and end of history, similar to the Groundwork's realm of ends. Seen as a tool to bring about and sustain such a community, Kant's philosophy of moral education exists as a coherent and important part of his moral philosophy. [source] Moral Education and DevelopmentJOURNAL OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2000Marianna Raulo [source] Latina Mothers and Small-Town Racisms:Creating Narratives of Dignity and Moral Education in North CarolinaANTHROPOLOGY & EDUCATION QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2001Sofia Villenas Within the context of relatively new immigration and settlement in North Carolina, this ethnographic study highlights Latina mothers' narratives and conversations about a moral family education. Their narratives involved the claiming of el hogar (the home space) in the midst of the English-speaking community's attempts to define their families and childrearing practices as "problem." With a race-based feminist perspective, this article examines the role of the mothers' counternarratives in contesting their deficit framing, producing "educated" identities, and creating community in the rural South. [source] Moral Education Between Hope and Hopelessness: The Legacy of Janusz KorczakCURRICULUM INQUIRY, Issue 1 2008SARA EFRAT EFRON ABSTRACT The responsibility for addressing morality and moral education in the current moral climate is a daunting task for conscientious educators. What educational response can extricate us from the debilitating feelings of hopelessness and helplessness as we are confronted by horrific terrorist actions, controversial use of military might, displays of corruption and greed and a growing general tension and anxiety? At this demoralizing juncture of uncertainty and doubt, the figure of Janusz Korczak (1878,1942), a Jewish-Polish educator, looms large. For more than 30 years, Korczak devoted his life to educating orphaned Jewish and non-Jewish children. He stayed with the Jewish children to the end as they all perished in a concentration camp. At a time when the surrounding society surrendered to fascism, anti-Semitism, and self-destruction, Korczak encouraged individual autonomy and caring relationships within the context of a community where a vision of justice and trust was an integral part of life. The orphanages he directed were democratic, self-ruled communities, where the children had their own parliament, court, and newspaper. This article describes the principles and the actualization of Korczak's moral education and explores how Korczak reconciled the differences between the ethical world he created in his institutions and the surrounding immoral society. The example set by Korczak's educational praxis serves as an inspiring model of school life across the boundaries of time and place and touches our need to believe in education's responsibility to strive and struggle for a better world, even when it seems an unattainable goal. And the hour shall come when a man will know himself, respect, and love. And the hour shall come in history's clock when man shall know the place of good, the place of evil, the place of pleasure, and the place of pain. (Korczak, 1978, p. 237) [source] Moral Education in an Age of GlobalizationEDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2010Nel Noddings Abstract Care theory is used to describe an approach to global ethics and moral education. After a brief introduction to care ethics, the theory is applied to global ethics. The paper concludes with a discussion of moral education for personal, political, and global domains. [source] Educating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A false dichotomy?EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2010Kristján Kristjánsson Abstract In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a ,moral gap' has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective. The moral-self solution relies upon an anti-realist conception of the self as ,identity', and I dissect its limitations. In its stead, I propose a Humean conception of the moral self which preserves Aristotelian insights into the difference between self and identity, yet remains closer to modern sensitivities. According to such a conception, the moral-self versus moral-emotions dichotomy turns out to be illusory. Finally, I show some of the practical implications of this conception for moral education. [source] "EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE" IN THE CLASSROOM?EDUCATIONAL THEORY, Issue 1 2006AN ARISTOTELIAN CRITIQUE In making his famous claim that the good life would have to include appropriate emotions, Aristotle obviously considered the schooling of emotions to be an indispensable part of moral education. However, in this essay Kristján Kristjánsson casts doubt on the assumption that Aristotelians should approve of the clarion call for EI, as understood by Daniel Goleman and the proponents of social and emotional learning, in the classroom. Various marked differences between EI and Aristotelian emotional virtue are highlighted and explored. Kristjánsson argues that the claims of EI lack moral ballast and that when this fact is added to an existing heap of educational problems attached to the implementation of EI programs, educators had better rethink their reliance on EI as a model of emotion cultivation, and perhaps revert to the teachings of Aristotle himself. [source] Expressing the Not-Said: Art and Design and the Formation of Sexual IdentitiesINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ART & DESIGN EDUCATION, Issue 1 2005Nicholas Addison Central to this paper is an analysis of the work produced by a year 10 student in response to the ,Expressive Study' of the art and design GCSE (AQA 2001). I begin by examining expressivism within art education and turn to the student's work partly to understand whether the semi-confessional mode she chose to deploy is encouraged within this tradition. The tenets of expressivism presuppose the possibility that through the practice of art young people might develop the expressive means to give ,voice' to their feelings and come to some understanding of self. I therefore look at the way she took ownership of the ,expressive' imperative of the title by choosing to explore her emerging lesbian identity and its position within the normative, binary discourses on sex and sexual identity that predominate in secondary schools. Within schooling there is an absence of formal discussion around sex, sexual identity and sexuality other than in the context of health and moral education and, to some extent, English. This is surprising given the emphasis on self-exploration that an art and design expressive study would seem to invite. In order to consider the student's actions as a situated practice I examine the social and cultural contexts in which she was studying. With reference to visual semiotics and the theoretical work of Judith Butler, I interpret the way she uses visual resources not only to represent her emerging sexual identity but to counter dominant discourses around homosexuality in schools. I claim that through her art practice she enacts the ,name of the law' to refute the binary oppositions that underpin sex education in schools. This act questions the assumptions about the purpose of expressive activities in art education with its psychologically inflected rhetoric of growth and selfhood and offers a mode of expressive practice that is more socially engaged and communicative. [source] Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2009KATE A. MORAN There is an apparent tension between Immanuel Kant's model of moral agency and his often-neglected philosophy of moral education. On the one hand, Kant's account of moral knowledge and decision-making seems to be one that can be self-taught. Kant's famous categorical imperative and related ,fact of reason' argument suggest that we learn the content and application of the moral law on our own. On the other hand, Kant has a sophisticated and detailed account of moral education that goes well beyond the kind of education a person would receive in the course of ordinary childhood experience. The task of this paper will be to reconcile these seemingly conflicting claims. Ultimately, I argue, Kant's philosophy of education makes sense as a part of his moral theory if we look not only at individual moral decisions, but also at the goals or ends that these moral decisions are intended to achieve. In Kant's case, this end is what he calls the highest good, and, I argue, the most coherent account of the highest good is a kind of ethical community and end of history, similar to the Groundwork's realm of ends. Seen as a tool to bring about and sustain such a community, Kant's philosophy of moral education exists as a coherent and important part of his moral philosophy. [source] Cultivating Sentimental Dispositions Through Aristotelian HabituationJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2004Jan Steutel The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the ,hard core' of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. Taking Aristotle's explicit remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child's affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle's view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child's sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child's behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non-cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman's primarily cognitive view. [source] Stereotypes and Moral Oversight in Conflict Resolution: What Are We Teaching?JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2002J. Harvey I examine some common trends in ,conflict management skills', particularly those focused on practical results, and argue that they involve some moral problems, like the reliance on offensive stereotypes, the censorship of moral language, the promotion of distorted relationships, and sometimes the suppression of basic rights and obligations that constitute non,consequentialist moral constraints on human interactions (including dispute resolution). Since these approaches now appear in educational institutions, they are sending dangerous messages to those least able to critically assess them, messages that denigrate the language, reflection, and interactions on which the moral life depends, thus undermining the possibility of moral education in the most fundamental sense of the phrase. [source] Parental Control in Latino Families: An Integrated Review of the LiteratureCHILD DEVELOPMENT, Issue 5 2006Linda C. Halgunseth Using social information processing and cultural change models as explanatory frameworks, this article reviews the literature on Latino parental control and its implications for child development. It is argued that the use of parental control in Latino families may have motivational roots in cultural childrearing goals such as familismo (familism), respeto (respect), and educación (moral education). Consideration of these underpinnings, in conjunction with psychological and methodological issues, helps to explain variability in the use of Latino parental control and its effect on child development. Recommendations for future research include refinement of control and acculturation instruments, and attention to both contextual and individual variables. [source] | |||||||||||||