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Moral Action (moral + action)
Selected AbstractsTeaching for the Test: Validity, Fairness, and Moral ActionEDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT: ISSUES AND PRACTICE, Issue 3 2003Linda Crocker In response to heightened levels of assessment activity at the K-12 level to meet requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, measurement professionals are called to focus greater attention on four fundamental areas of measurement research and practice: (a) improving the research infrastructure for validation methods involving judgments of test content; (b) expanding the psychometric definition of fairness in achievement testing; (c) developing guidelines for validation studies of test use consequences; and (d) preparing teachers for new roles in instruction and assessment practice. Illustrative strategies for accomplishing these goals are outlined. [source] Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International PoliticsINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2007JOSHUA WILLIAM BUSBY Do states and decision-makers ever act for moral reasons? And if they do, is it only when it is convenient or relatively costless for them to do so? A number of advocacy movements,on developing country debt relief, climate change, landmines, and other issues,emerged in the 1990s to ask decision-makers to make foreign policy decisions on that basis. The primary advocates were motivated not by their own material interests but broader notions of right and wrong. What contributes to the domestic acceptance of these moral commitments? Why do some advocacy efforts succeed where others fail? Through a case study of the Jubilee 2000 campaign for developing country debt relief, this article offers an account of persuasion based on strategic framing by advocates to get the attention of decision-makers. Such strategic but not narrowly self-interested activity allows weak actors to leverage existing value and/or ideational traditions to build broader political coalitions. This article, through case studies of debt relief in the United States and Japan, also links the emerging literature on strategic framing to the domestic institutional context and the ways veto players or "policy gatekeepers" evaluate trade-offs between costs and values. [source] Reflection and moral maturity in a nurse's caring practice: a critical perspectiveNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2010Jane Sumner PhD Abstract The likelihood of nurse reflection is examined from the theoretical perspectives of Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action and Moral Action and Sumner's Moral Construct of Caring in Nursing as Communicative Action, through a critical social theory lens. The argument is made that until the nurse reaches the developmental level of post-conventional moral maturity and/or Benner's Stage 5: expert, he or she is not capable of being inwardly directed reflective on self. The three developmental levels of moral maturity and Benner's stages are presented with discussion on whether or not there can be self-reflection because of an innate vulnerability that leads to self-protective behaviours. It is only when the confidence from mastery of practice has been achieved can the nurse be comfortable with reflection that enables him or her to become enlightened, emancipated, and empowered. The influences and constraints of the knowledge power between nurse and patient are acknowledged. The power hierarchy of the institution is recognized as constraining. [source] Educating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A false dichotomy?EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2010Kristján Kristjánsson Abstract In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a ,moral gap' has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian perspective. The moral-self solution relies upon an anti-realist conception of the self as ,identity', and I dissect its limitations. In its stead, I propose a Humean conception of the moral self which preserves Aristotelian insights into the difference between self and identity, yet remains closer to modern sensitivities. According to such a conception, the moral-self versus moral-emotions dichotomy turns out to be illusory. Finally, I show some of the practical implications of this conception for moral education. [source] The role of mental state understanding in the development of moral cognition and moral actionNEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD & ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT, Issue 103 2004Jodie A. Baird The authors explore children's use of intention information in evaluating the moral quality of others' actions. They also address links among mental state understanding, motives-based moral reasoning, and children's own moral behavior. [source] Internalism and Externalism in Ethics Applied to the Liberal-Communitarian DebateBRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 1 2005Maria Dimova-Cookson This article addresses the question of whether we can explain moral action in terms of an attraction to a moral ideal. It defends T. H. Green's internalist ethics against John Skorupski's externalist claim that moral ideals are optional whereas moral duties are not. A parallel is drawn between the Internalism and Externalism debate in ethics and the liberal-communitarian debate in political theory. My defence of Internalism offers new arguments in support of communitarian approaches to the nature of moral action. Green's internalist ethics provides the communitarian discourse with the universalist moral dimension it traditionally lacks. [source] | |||||||||||||