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Monetary Transfers (monetary + transfer)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	75%

Selected Abstracts

UPSTREAM TRANSFERS AND THE DONOR'S LABOUR SUPPLY: EVIDENCE FROM MIGRANTS LIVING IN FRANCE*

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 2 2009
FRANÇOIS-CHARLES WOLFF
With the use of data on migrants living in France, we study the pattern of transfers of time and money made to parents. Monetary transfers allocate predominantly towards the large number of elderly parents in the country of origin, while the smaller number of migrant parents in France are more likely to receive time transfers. Our econometric results suggest that monetary transfers are more consistent with the altruistic hypothesis. Furthermore, while the donor's labour participation increases the propensity to give money, there is no negative relationship between time transfers and the labour participation of the donor. [source]

Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2001
Szilvia Pápai
We consider the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects without using monetary transfers. Each agent may be assigned more than one object. We show that an allocation rule is strategyproof, nonbossy, and satisfies citizen sovereignty if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. In a sequential dictatorship agents are assigned their favorite objects that are still available, according to a sequentially endogenously determined hierarchy of the agents. We also establish that replacing nonbossiness by a stronger criterion restricts the characterized class of allocation rules to serial dictatorships, in which the hierarchy of the agents is fixed a priori. [source]

Nash bargaining over allocations in inventory pooling contracts

NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 6 2008
Eran Hanany
Abstract When facing uncertain demand, several firms may consider pooling their inventories leading to the emergence of two key contractual issues. How much should each produce or purchase for inventory purposes? How should inventory be allocated when shortages occur to some of the firms? Previously, if the allocations issue was considered, it was undertaken through evaluation of the consequences of an arbitrary priority scheme. We consider both these issues within a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) cooperative framework. The firms may not be risk neutral, hence a nontransferable utility bargaining game is defined. Thus the physical pooling mechanism itself must benefit the firms, even without any monetary transfers. The firms may be asymmetric in the sense of having different unit production costs and unit revenues. Our assumption with respect to shortage allocation is that a firm not suffering from a shortfall, will not be affected by any of the other firms' shortages. For two risk neutral firms, the NBS is shown to award priority on all inventory produced to the firm with higher ratio of unit revenue to unit production cost. Nevertheless, the arrangement is also beneficial for the other firm contributing to the total production. We provide examples of Uniform and Bernoulli demand distributions, for which the problem can be solved analytically. For firms with constant absolute risk aversion, the agreement may not award priority to any firm. Analytically solvable examples allow additional insights, e.g. that higher risk aversion can, for some problem parameters, cause an increase in the sum of quantities produced, which is not the case in a single newsvendor setting. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008 [source]