Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Monetary Integration (monetary + integration)
Selected AbstractsNational Preferences and International Institutions: Evidence from European Monetary IntegrationINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2001James I. Walsh How do states reach agreement on creating or changing international institutions? The dominant theory of international cooperation,institutional theory,specifies how states with shared interests use institutions to realize joint gains and to minimize the possibility of defection. But institutional theory has little to say about when states will hold the shared interests that lead them to create international institutions in the first place. I evaluate two general explanations of national preferences regarding international institutions against the record of attempts to institutionalize monetary cooperation in the European Union since the 1970s. Drawing on central insights of the constructivist tradition, idea diffusion theory holds that national preferences converged on those of German decision-makers by the late 1980s and that European governments willingly accepted German terms for monetary union. Recognition that German institutions and policies produced superior economic outcomes drove this change in preferences. A domestic-politics explanation holds that preferences varied because of differences in the structure of the domestic political economy and the political costs of achieving price stability, which was one of Germany's conditions for monetary integration. Lower inflation in the late 1980s reduced these costs enough for French and Italian governments to pursue a monetary union that included Germany. The evidence indicates that idea diffusion had little influence on the development of European monetary institutions. Governments held and advocated distinctly different preferences regarding such institutions from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s. The finding that domestic politics rather than idea diffusion drives national preferences challenges some of the claims of recent constructivist literature in international politics about the importance of communication and ideas in promoting cooperation. In the conclusion I discuss how the findings of this article might be squared with constructivism by paying more attention to domestic politics. [source] Monetary Integration in the European Union , By M. ChangJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 2 2010DAVID HOWARTH No abstract is available for this article. [source] German Interests in European Monetary IntegrationJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 1 2002Karl Kaltenthaler This article explores the sources of the German govermnent's position on European monetary integration since the first attempt at monetary union. I argue that German policy on European monetary integration was, until after EMU, driven by German foreign policy elites' perception that integration could be used to achieve their primary geo-political goal, embedding Germany in European institutions to dismantle the security dilemma with its European neighbours, particularly with France. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, this situation was reversed, as domestic economic interests and state financial authorities have taken the lead in shaping Germany's policy on European monetary integration, with foreign policy elites playing a secondary role. Thus German policy has come to resemble more the policies of other European monetary union member states, in that domestic economic concerns have taken precedence over geo-political interests in the making of policy on European monetary integration. [source] The Socioeconomic Implications of Dollarization in El SalvadorLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 3 2004Marcia Towers ABSTRACT This study argues that the costs associated with El Salvador's dollarization clearly outweigh the benefits and that the decision to dollarize was prompted not only by the need to promote economic growth, but also by the impluse to serve the interests of the financial sector and the large entrepreneurs who control the ruling ARENA party. Although the policy facilitates investment and international financial transactions, it has a negative effect on the poor by increasing inequality. To develop this argument, the authors discuss the socioeconomic and political situation in El Salvador at the time of dollarization, examine the Law of Monetary Integration, and analyze die effect of the dollarization policy on the poor. [source] Monetary integration in the ex-Soviet Union: A ,union of four'?*THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 1 2006Vladimir Chaplygin F02; F15; E58 Abstract The governments of four ex-Soviet countries recently discussed forming a currency union. To examine the economic feasibility of this proposition, we use conventional techniques and show that the arrangement is likely to find it difficult to handle the lack of structural symmetry, the asymmetric pattern of shocks, and the lack of market flexibility among the potential participants. Moreover, the union would be a unilateral one. It would require an unusual degree of political commitment to survive. Nonetheless, there are some subtleties in the timing and pattern of mutual dependence between Russia and Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent in Belarus, which may reduce the strain from a currency union in those countries. Otherwise, the black market will have to provide the necessary market flexibility. [source] Relative Price Variability and Inflation in EuropeECONOMICA, Issue 265 2000David Fielding The relationship between inflation and the relative variability of prices has been the subject of careful investigation in the United States using data for product groups at the city level. Yet in Europe, where the relationship could have profound effects on the viability of monetary integration, no attempt has been made to study the relationship. This paper fills the gap by examining data disaggregated to the commodity level across 10 EU countries. Evidence is found for logistic smooth transitions in the relative price variability measures within countries and within product groups. When this deterministic component isremoved, the stochastic element is not persistent and does not always have the positive relationship with inflation commonly found in US city data. [source] National Preferences and International Institutions: Evidence from European Monetary IntegrationINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2001James I. Walsh How do states reach agreement on creating or changing international institutions? The dominant theory of international cooperation,institutional theory,specifies how states with shared interests use institutions to realize joint gains and to minimize the possibility of defection. But institutional theory has little to say about when states will hold the shared interests that lead them to create international institutions in the first place. I evaluate two general explanations of national preferences regarding international institutions against the record of attempts to institutionalize monetary cooperation in the European Union since the 1970s. Drawing on central insights of the constructivist tradition, idea diffusion theory holds that national preferences converged on those of German decision-makers by the late 1980s and that European governments willingly accepted German terms for monetary union. Recognition that German institutions and policies produced superior economic outcomes drove this change in preferences. A domestic-politics explanation holds that preferences varied because of differences in the structure of the domestic political economy and the political costs of achieving price stability, which was one of Germany's conditions for monetary integration. Lower inflation in the late 1980s reduced these costs enough for French and Italian governments to pursue a monetary union that included Germany. The evidence indicates that idea diffusion had little influence on the development of European monetary institutions. Governments held and advocated distinctly different preferences regarding such institutions from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s. The finding that domestic politics rather than idea diffusion drives national preferences challenges some of the claims of recent constructivist literature in international politics about the importance of communication and ideas in promoting cooperation. In the conclusion I discuss how the findings of this article might be squared with constructivism by paying more attention to domestic politics. [source] Optimum Currency Areas and Key Currencies: Mundell I versus Mundell IIJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 4 2004Ronald I. McKinnon The East Asian economies are increasingly integrated in trade and direct investment. More than 50 per cent of their foreign trade is with each other. Both the high growth and level of trade integration is similar to what the western European economies achieved in the 1960s. So, in the new millennium, the inevitable question arises: is East Asia also an optimum currency area (OCA)? Despite the apparent success of EMU, many writers familiar with the East Asian scene think not. Taking the seminal papers of Robert Mundell as the starting point, this article first analyses traditional theorizing on the pros and cons of international monetary integration and then suggests new approaches to the problem of international risk-sharing in OCAs. [source] German Interests in European Monetary IntegrationJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 1 2002Karl Kaltenthaler This article explores the sources of the German govermnent's position on European monetary integration since the first attempt at monetary union. I argue that German policy on European monetary integration was, until after EMU, driven by German foreign policy elites' perception that integration could be used to achieve their primary geo-political goal, embedding Germany in European institutions to dismantle the security dilemma with its European neighbours, particularly with France. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, this situation was reversed, as domestic economic interests and state financial authorities have taken the lead in shaping Germany's policy on European monetary integration, with foreign policy elites playing a secondary role. Thus German policy has come to resemble more the policies of other European monetary union member states, in that domestic economic concerns have taken precedence over geo-political interests in the making of policy on European monetary integration. [source] | |||||||||||||