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Military Capability (military + capability)
Selected AbstractsGrasping the Commercial Institutional PeaceINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2003David H. Bearce While the commercial institutional peace research program provides empirical evidence that international institutions, especially preferential trade arrangements, help reduce the incidence of militarized inter-state conflict, it fails to delineate clearly how such institutions matter. Building from the logic that low opportunity costs for fighting, private information, and commitment problems constitute important causes of war, this article explores three interrelated causal mechanisms. First, the state leaders' increased expectations about future commerce create an incentive for these actors to consider peaceful bargains as an alternative to costly war. Second, security coordination under the umbrella of a commercial institution provides fuller information about state military capabilities, thus making inter-state bargaining for dispute resolution more efficient. Third, in bringing together high-level state leaders on a regular basis, commercial institutions may create the trust necessary to overcome commitment problems in inter-state bargaining. I explore how these mechanisms have operated within the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Economic Community of West African States. [source] Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War SettlementsAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2010Michaela Mattes Civil war is usually examined from the perspective of commitment problems. This approach provides considerable insight regarding which civil war agreement provisions reduce the chance of renewed fighting. Yet, additional insight can be gained by examining information asymmetries as a potential cause of civil war recurrence. We argue that significant uncertainty regarding military capabilities may persist after fighting ends and that this uncertainty may lead to the breakdown of peace. However, carefully designed peace agreements can guard against renewed civil war by calling for international monitoring, making the belligerents submit military information to third parties, and providing for verification of this information. Our empirical analysis of 51 civil war settlements between 1945 and 2005 shows that these provisions significantly reduce the risk of new civil war. Encouraging the adoption of these provisions may be a useful policy in the international community's effort to establish peace in civil-war-torn societies. [source] Decomposing the Relationship Between Contiguity and Militarized ConflictAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2010William Reed It is well known that the majority of militarized conflicts and wars have been fought by neighbors. Yet, much remains to be learned about the relationship between shared borders and militarized conflict. This article decomposes the effects of territorial contiguity into,ex ante,"observable" and "behavioral" effects. It provides powerful empirical evidence for the claim that although neighbors are more likely to experience conflict because of,ex ante,differences in observable variables such as economic interdependence, alliance membership, joint democracy, and the balance of military capabilities, most conflicts between neighbors occur because of differences in how neighbors and nonneighbors respond to the observable variables. [source] A common European foreign policy after Iraq?INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2003Brian Crowe Taking as read the wide range of other instruments that the EU has for international influence (enlargement, aid, trade, association and other arrangements, etc.), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), under pressure from the Kosovo conflict, has been shaped by two important decisions in 1999: the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to give the EU a military capability when NATO as a whole is not engaged, and the appointment as the new High Representative for the CFSP of a high-profile international statesman rather than a senior civil servant. A major European effort will still be needed if Europe is to be effective militarily, whether in the EU/ESDP or NATO framework. The management of the CFSP has been held back by the doctrine of the equality of all member states regardless of their actual contribution. This in turn leads to a disconnect between theory (policy run by committee in Brussels) and practice (policy run by the High Representative working with particular member states and other actors, notably the US). It has been difficult for Javier Solana to develop the authority to do this, not in competition with the Commission as so widely and mistakenly believed, as with member states themselves, and particularly successive rotating presidencies. It is important that misdiagnosis does not lead to politically correct solutions that end up with the cure worse than the disease. Ways need to be found to assure to the High Representative the authority to work with third countries and with the member states making the real contribution, while retaining the support of all. Then, with its own military capability, the EU can have a CFSP that is the highest common factor rather than the lowest common denominator, with member states ready to attach enough priority to the need for common policies to give Europeans a strong influence in the big foreign policy issues of the day. [source] The arithmetic of defence policyINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2001Michael Alexander The Kosovo campaign of 1999 demonstrated unambiguously the weakness of European military forces. Recognition of the consequences of this lack of capability has put new vigour into the European defence debate. Yet decline in military capability is systemic in every European country. The Helsinki goals will do nothing to address this decline. National defence budgets over the past 15 years have been decreasing in real terms. Even if current aspirations to hold military spending levels were to be achieved, the decline in capabilities would continue. Military equipment and personnel costs rise faster than domestic inflation, and therefore fewer people and weapons systems can be afforded each year. There is no prospect of significant uplifts in defence budgets in Europe, despite the acknowledged need for a range of expensive enabling capabilities for post-Cold War operations. Palliative measures now on trial are unlikely to have a major impact. The only option for European nations is a progressive integration of their forces to realize the economies of scale that would allow effectiveness to be maintained. There are opportunities for initiatives that would produce short-term pay-offs. Despite the severe political difficulties of a long-term plan for integration, the alternative is worse. Trying to maintain sovereignty in defence provision will mean that the nations of Europe will eventually be unable either to meet the requirements of even their most modest security needs or to exercise any influence over US defence and security policies. [source] Ramifications of North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il ,s Declaration of Independence from the International CommunityPACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2006C. Kenneth Quinones The United States and Japanese governments' reactions to North Korea's launching of several ballistic missiles in early July 2006 was either completely misunderstood by North Korea watchers in Washington and Tokyo, are they simply preferred to ignore yongyang's underlying motives. Actually, North Korea has been relatively transparent about its intentions regarding not just its ballistic missile but also nuclear programs. Since February 2005, ranking North Korean officials and Foreign Ministry spokesmen have made it North Korea's intentions clear. It aspires to strengthen its "deterrence capability." In other words, North Korea is striving to counter the US-Japan alliance by matching its military capability not just with conventional but also nuclear weapons. The United States and Japan need to recognize this. Otherwise, their efforts to compel North Korea's submission using economic pressure will back fire. Pyongyang's priority is national defense through deterrence. Economic revitalization is a secondary goal. As the United States concentrates on the Middle East and gradually withdraws from Northeast Asia, Japan would do well to assess its relations with its neighbors China and the two Koreas. If Japan's new prime minister perpetuates Japan's commitment to the US-Japan alliance, it could find itself increasingly estranged from its neighbors. This became evident when Japan clashed with China over the UN resolution that censured North Korea's missile launchings. Japan's stance regarding issues rooted in history, such as prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, if unaltered, will intensify Japan's isolation in Northeast Asia. This will work to North Korea's benefit. [source] The Effects of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict Across Levels of AnalysisAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2009Zeev Maoz This study develops a Social Network Analytic approach to conceptualize and measure interdependence across levels of analysis. This framework contains several innovations. First, it integrates "sensitivity interdependence",the effects of changes in one state on other states,with "vulnerability interdependence",the opportunity costs of breaking a relationship. Second, it measures interdependence at different levels of analysis and across multiple relationships. Third, it integrates multiple dimensions of interdependence into a single measure. I derive hypotheses from the realist and liberal paradigms regarding the effects of strategic and economic interdependence on monadic, dyadic, and systemic conflict. These hypotheses are tested via data on alliances, military capability, and trade. The findings provide robust support to the expectations of the liberal paradigm regarding the effects of strategic and economic interdependence on conflict. On the other hand, the expectations of the realist paradigm are not supported. I discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of this approach. [source] South Korea's Missile Defense Policy: Dilemma and Opportunity for a Medium StateASIAN POLITICS AND POLICY, Issue 3 2009Tae-Hyung Kim Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery systems has made missile defense a key security challenge, but missile defense systems are highly controversial. I closely examine the development of the missile defense system in South Korea. South Korea has steadfastly remained outside the theater missile defense (TMD) structure, but it cooperates on missile defense, in a limited way, with its U.S. ally. South Korea's refusal to participate in TMD even as it quietly acquires air defense systems can be explained by political and diplomatic considerations regarding its neighbors (especially China), military and economic considerations about missile defense, and strategic considerations for the United States-South Korea alliance. The TMD situation demonstrates South Korea's dilemma and opportunity as a medium power in a particularly harsh security environment. South Korea is walking a fine line to diversify security relations, to maintain the alliance structure with the United States (albeit in a changed form), and to build a self-reliant military capability. [source] | ||||||||||