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Metaphysics
Selected AbstractsTHE STATUS OF COSMIC PRINCIPLE (LI) IN NEO-CONFUCIAN METAPHYSICSJOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2005JEELOO LIU [source] METHOD IN METAPHYSICS: LONERGAN AND THE FUTURE OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY by Andrew BeardsNEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 1025 2009JOSEPH FITZPATRICK No abstract is available for this article. [source] INTELLIGENTLY DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE HEALTH CARE FORUMS: DEWEY'S METAPHYSICS, COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND A BRAZILIAN EXAMPLEPOLITICS & POLICY, Issue 6 2008Shane Ralston No abstract is available for this article. [source] A Critique of Schopenhauer's MetaphysicGERMAN LIFE AND LETTERS, Issue 3 2006G.A. Wells Schopenhauer's metaphysic is not more credible than the systems of his contemporaries Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, all of whom he criticised so severely. But as his writings, unlike theirs, are so lucid, they illustrate very clearly the metaphysician's endeavour to reach knowledge that is immediate and indubitable, not mediated by the sense organs and the brain, as is knowledge of the external world. He argues that ,das Einzige wirklich und unbedingt Gegebene ist das Selbstbewußtsein', which alone can yield ,die letzten und wichtigsten Aufschlüsse über das Wesen der Dinge'. He himself was not religious, but this doctrine has appealed to theologians seeking a basis for their belief that is independent of external (historical) testimony. In this connection, Albert Schweitzer expressly urged a return to the German metaphysical tradition, in particular to Schopenhauer's view of the will as the transcendent reality at the basis of self-consciousness. The present article argues, in the British empirical tradition, that there is really no reason to distinguish self-consciousness and experiences attributable to will from other kinds of experience. The practical distinction is that the idea of self depends largely not on the sensations provided by readily observable senses such as sight and hearing, but on muscular, articular and visceral receptors which constitute a less accessible internal sensorium. [source] Defending Contingentism in MetaphysicsDIALECTICA, Issue 1 2009Kristie Miller Metaphysics is supposed to tell us about the metaphysical nature of our world: under what conditions composition occurs; how objects persist through time; whether properties are universals or tropes. It is near orthodoxy that whichever of these sorts of metaphysical claims is true is necessarily true. This paper looks at the debate between that orthodox view and a recently emerging view that claims like these are contingent, by focusing on the metaphysical debate between monists and pluralists about concrete particulars. This paper argues that we should be contingentists about monism and pluralism, and it defends contingentism against some necessitarian objections by offering an epistemology of contingent metaphysical claims. [source] Aesthetic Experience in Schopenhauer's Metaphysics of WillEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 2 2008Alex Neill First page of article [source] Nietzsche's Metaphysics in the Birth of TragedyEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2006Béatrice Han-Pile First page of article [source] Establishing a Democratic Religion: Metaphysics and Democracy in the Debates Over the President's Commission on Higher EducationHISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2007Ethan Schrum First page of article [source] Athens and Jerusalem, Alexandria and Edessa: Is there a Metaphysics of Scripture?INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, Issue 2 2006JANET MARTIN SOSKICE Were the classic divine attributes simply lifted from Greek philosophers? This article does not set out to find a single metaphysic advocated by scripture but instead draws attention to the unique ,unhellenic' doctrine of creatio ex nihilo found in both Jewish and Christian teaching on metaphysics. Creatio ex nihilo marks a decisive break with ancient Greek cosmology. Philo is used as an example of the influence that creatio ex nihilo has upon his language about God. The essay concludes that the church Fathers did not simply baptize Aristotle but rather that their language is deeply rooted in a particular Judeo-Christian understanding of creation. [source] What's Interesting about Karl Barth?INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, Issue 1 2002Barth as Polemical, Descriptive Theologian Much of the interest in Karl Barth's theology has been found in the formal elements of his theology, whether a single thought-form or multiple forms. Most of that interest focuses on Barth's epistemology or his ,actualism'. This article suggests that material theological loci, expounded descriptively, and often with a polemical intent, were at the heart of Barth's work, and are still the richest vein of his theology. Metaphysics and epistemology were subservient to material dogmatic affirmations. The article closes with some observations on the continuing relevance of Barth's theology. [source] Metaphysics in Contemporary Chinese PhilosophyJOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3-4 2003Robert Cummings Neville [source] Environmental Concern and the Metaphysics of EducationJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 4 2000Michael Bonnett We are only beginning to understand the significance of the issues which our environmental situation raises, and their implications for philosophy of education have yet to receive the depth of consideration they merit. This paper argues that certain strands of environmental concern invite us to reconsider the metaphysical basis of education. Having identified some senses in which education is properly construed as metaphysical, it explores questions posed for the conceptions of knowledge, truth, personhood and morality in which education is rooted, and for the versions of reality and the relationship to nature in which it invites pupils to participate. [source] Psychologism Revisited in Logic, Metaphysics, and EpistemologyMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2001Dale Jacquette Psychologism is a philosophical ideology that seeks to explain the principles of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology as psychological phenomena. Psychologism has been the storm center of concerted criticisms since the nineteenth century, and is thought by many to have been refuted once and for all by Kant, Frege, Husserl, and others. The project of accounting for objective philosophical or mathematical truths in terms of subjective psychological states has been largely discredited in mainstream analytic thought. Ironically, psychologism has resurfaced in unexpected guises in the form of intuitionistic logic and mathematics, cognitivism, and naturalized epistemology. I examine some of the principal objections to psychologism , distinguishing roughly between good and bad or philosophically acceptable versus unacceptable psychologism , and consider the extent to which a new wave of psychologism may be gaining prominence in contemporary philosophy, and the light its successes and failures may shed on the original concept and underlying perspective of classical psychologism. [source] The Non-Puritan Ethics, Metaphysics, and Aesthetics of Milton's Spenserian MasqueMILTON QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2003Catherine Gimelli Martin First page of article [source] Schelling versus Hegel: From German Idealism to Christian Metaphysics , By John LaughlandMODERN THEOLOGY, Issue 3 2010John R. Betz First page of article [source] Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe , By Mary,Jane RubensteinMODERN THEOLOGY, Issue 2 2010Catherine Keller First page of article [source] Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion: Metaphysics and Practice , By Thomas HibbsMODERN THEOLOGY, Issue 2 2009David Burrell C.S.C. First page of article [source] Participation Metaphysics, The Imago Dei, and the Natural Law in Aquinas' EthicsNEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 1015 2007Professor Craig A. Boyd First page of article [source] The Dialogue of Metaphysics and Religion with Natural Science: Some Continental ExamplesNEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 974 2002Edward Booth OP First page of article [source] Renewed, Dissolved, Remembered: MacKinnon and MetaphysicsNEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 969 2001Nicholas Lash First page of article [source] Incognito Ergo Sum: Political Theology and the Metaphysics of ExistenceNEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 961 2001Paul Fletcher First page of article [source] The Recovery of MetaphysicsNEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 956 2000Francis J. Selman First page of article [source] Passing, Traveling and Reality: Social Constructionism and the Metaphysics of RaceNOUS, Issue 4 2004Ron Mallon First page of article [source] Spinoza's Metaphysics of Substance: The Substance-Mode Relation as a Relation of Inherence and PredicationPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2009YITZHAK Y. MELAMED First page of article [source] Vague Singulars, Semantic Indecision, and the Metaphysics of Persons,PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2007DONALD P. SMITH Composite materialism, as I will understand it, is the view that human persons are composite material objects. This paper develops and investigates an argument, The Vague Singulars Argument, for the falsity of composite materialism. We shall see that cogent or not, the Vague Singulars Argument has philosophically significant ramifications. [source] Newton's Empiricism and MetaphysicsPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 7 2010Mary Domski Commentators attempting to understand the empirical method that Isaac Newton applies in his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1687) are forced to grapple with the thorny issue of how to reconcile Newton's rejection of hypotheses with his appeal to absolute space. On the one hand, Newton claims that his experimental philosophy does not rely on claims that are assumed without empirical evidence, and on the other hand, Newton appeals to an absolute space that, by his own characterization, does not make any impressions on our senses. Howard Stein (1967, 2002) has offered an insightful strategy for reconciling this apparent contradiction and suggested a way to enhance our understanding of Newton's ,empiricism' such that absolute space can be preserved as a legitimate part of Newton's experimental project. Recently, Andrew Janiak (2008) has posed a worthy challenge to Stein's empirical reading of Newton and directed our attention to the metaphysical commitments that underlie the experimental philosophy of Newton's Principia. Although Stein and Janiak disagree on the degree to which Newton's empiricism influences his natural philosophy, both agree and clearly show that an adequate treatment of Newton's empiricism cannot be divorced from consideration of Newton's views on God and God's relationship to nature. [source] Teaching & Learning Guide for: Moral Realism and Moral NonnaturalismPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 3 2008Stephen Finlay Authors' Introduction Metaethics is a perennially popular subject, but one that can be challenging to study and teach. As it consists in an array of questions about ethics, it is really a mix of (at least) applied metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and mind. The seminal texts therefore arise out of, and often assume competence with, a variety of different literatures. It can be taught thematically, but this sample syllabus offers a dialectical approach, focused on metaphysical debate over moral realism, which spans the century of debate launched and framed by G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica. The territory and literature are, however, vast. So, this syllabus is highly selective. A thorough metaethics course might also include more topical examination of moral supervenience, moral motivation, moral epistemology, and the rational authority of morality. Authors Recommend: Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). This is one of the few clear, accessible, and comprehensive surveys of the subject, written by someone sympathetic with moral naturalism. David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Brink rehabilitates naturalism about moral facts by employing a causal semantics and natural kinds model of moral thought and discourse. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's book frames the debate as driven by a tension between the objectivity of morality and its practical role, offering a solution in terms of a response-dependent account of practical rationality. Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism & Moral Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996). Harman argues against the objectivity of moral value, while Thomson defends it. Each then responds to the other. Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). Jackson argues that reductive conceptual analysis is possible in ethics, offering a unique naturalistic account of moral properties and facts. Mark Timmons, Morality without Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Timmons distinguishes moral cognitivism from moral realism, interpreting moral judgments as beliefs that have cognitive content but do not describe moral reality. He also provides a particularly illuminating discussion of nonanalytic naturalism. Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001). A Neo-Aristotelian perspective: moral facts are natural facts about the proper functioning of human beings. Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003). In this recent defense of a Moorean, nonnaturalist position, Shafer-Landau engages rival positions in a remarkably thorough manner. Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). Cuneo argues for a robust version of moral realism, developing a parity argument based on the similarities between epistemic and moral facts. Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). Schroeder defends a reductive form of naturalism in the tradition of Hume, identifying moral and normative facts with natural facts about agents' desires. Online Materials: PEA Soup: http://peasoup.typepad.com A blog devoted to philosophy, ethics, and academia. Its contributors include many active and prominent metaethicists, who regularly post about the moral realism and naturalism debates. Metaethics Bibliography: http://www.lenmanethicsbibliography.group.shef.ac.uk/Bib.htm Maintained by James Lenman, professor of philosophy at the University of Sheffield, this online resource provides a selective list of published research in metaethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu See especially the entries under ,metaethics'. Sample Syllabus: Topics for Lecture & Discussion Note: unless indicated otherwise, all the readings are found in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology (Malden: Blackwell, 2007). (FE) Week 1: Realism I (Classic Nonnaturalism) G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 2nd ed. (FE ch. 35). W. K. Frankena, ,The Naturalistic Fallacy,'Mind 48 (1939): 464,77. S. Finlay, ,Four Faces of Moral Realism', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 820,49 [DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00100.x]. Week 2: Antirealism I (Classic Expressivism) A. J. Ayer, ,Critique of Ethics and Theology' (1952) (FE ch. 3). C. Stevenson, ,The Nature of Ethical Disagreement' (1963) (FE ch. 28). Week 3: Antirealism II (Error Theory) J. L. Mackie, ,The Subjectivity of Values' (1977) (FE ch. 1). R. Joyce, Excerpt from The Myth of Morality (2001) (FE ch. 2). Week 4: Realism II (Nonanalytic Naturalism) R. Boyd, ,How to be a Moral Realist' (1988) (FE ch. 13). P. Railton, ,Moral Realism' (1986) (FE ch. 14). T. Horgan and M. Timmons, ,New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth' (1991) (FE ch. 38). Week 5: Antirealism III (Contemporary Expressivism) A. Gibbard, ,The Reasons of a Living Being' (2002) (FE ch. 6). S. Blackburn, ,How To Be an Ethical Anti-Realist' (1993) (FE ch. 4). T. Horgan and M. Timmons, ,Nondescriptivist Cognitivism' (2000) (FE ch. 5). W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ,Expressivism and Embedding' (2000) (FE ch. 37). Week 6: Realism III (Sensibility Theory) J. McDowell, ,Values and Secondary Qualities' (1985) (FE ch. 11). D. Wiggins, ,A Sensible Subjectivism' (1991) (FE ch. 12). Week 7: Realism IV (Subjectivism) & Antirealism IV (Constructivism) R. Firth, ,Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer' (1952) (FE ch. 9). G. Harman, ,Moral Relativism Defended' (1975) (FE ch. 7). C. Korsgaard, ,The Authority of Reflection' (1996) (FE ch. 8). Week 8: Realism V (Contemporary Nonnaturalism) R. Shafer-Landau, ,Ethics as Philosophy' (2006) (FE ch. 16). T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), ch. 1. T, Cuneo, ,Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 850,79 [DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00102.x]. [source] Schelling Versus Hegel: from German Idealism to Christian Metaphysics , By John LaughlandRELIGIOUS STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 3 2008Forrest Clingerman No abstract is available for this article. [source] Henry of Ghent: Metaphysics and the Trinity (with a Critical Edition of Question Six of Article Fifty-Five of the Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum) , By Juan Carlos FloresRELIGIOUS STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 3 2008John T. Slotemaker No abstract is available for this article. [source] Myth, Metaphysics and Dialectic in Plato's Statesman.THE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 4 2010By David A. White No abstract is available for this article. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||