Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Mediating Structure (mediating + structure)
Selected AbstractsDie Theorie der Intentionalität MeinongsDIALECTICA, Issue 2 2001Arkadiusz Chrudzimski The most striking feature of Meinong's theory of intentionality is his thesis that every mental act has its reference-object "beyond being and non being". This theory seems, at first, to be a clear example of the so called object-theory of intentionality, as it introduces special "postulated" entities in the target-position of the mental act. Closer examination, however, reveals in Meinong's works important elements of the mediator-theory. Meinong speaks of auxiliary incomplete objects situated "between" the subject and the object of reference and "mediating" the intentional access to the (complete) reference-object. Moreover, even if the object of reference is of the simple nominal form, the mediating structure involves essentially propositional entities (objectives). In the paper we attempt to give a set-theoretical interpretation of Meinong's theory in the frame of which we could eventually do without the incomplete mediating objects. Yet, some general epistemological considerations suggest the indispensability of such incomplete mediating structures. [source] The Analysis of the Borders of the Social World: A Challenge for Sociological TheoryJOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 1 2005GESA LINDEMANN ABSTRACT:In order to delimit the realm of social phenomena, sociologists refer implicitly or explicitly to a distinction between living human beings and other entities, that is, sociologists equate the social world with the world of living humans. This consensus has been questioned by only a few authors, such as Luckmann, and some scholars of science studies. According to these approaches, it would be ethnocentric to treat as self-evident the premise that only living human beings can be social actors. The methodological consequence of such critique is a radical deanthropologization of sociological research. It must be considered an open question whether or not only living human can be social actors. The paper starts with a discussion of the methodological problems posed by such an analysis of the borders of the social world, and presents the results of an empirical analysis of these borders in the fields of intensive care and neurological rehabilitation. Within these fields it must be determined whether a body is a living human body or a symbol using human body. The analysis of these elementary border phenomena challenges basic sociological concepts. The relevant contemporary sociological theories refer to a dyadic constellation as the systematic starting point of their concept of sociality. The complex relationship between at least two entities is understood as the basis of the development of a novel order that functions as a mediating structure between the involved parties. Based upon empirical data, I argue that it is necessary to change this foundational assumption. Not the dyad but the triad must be understood as the foundational constellation. This implies a new understanding of the third actor, which is distinct from the concepts developed by Simmel and Berger and Luckmann. [source] Lessons learned from a small native American communityPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 5 2002Wendy Nelson Espeland The decision not to build Orme Dam was a great political victory for residents of the Fort McDowell Indian Reservation in central Arizona. This article examines the conditions that gave rise to what most considered an unlikely outcome, and the lessons it suggests for understanding the politics of large water projects. These lessons include the importance of understanding that rationality takes multiple forms; that how value is expressed can be as significant as what, and how much, something is valued; that identity politics which elaborates and celebrates cultural differences can be an effective means for challenging even powerful bureaucracies; and that law can be an important mediating structure in the politics of bureaucratic decision-making. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Die Theorie der Intentionalität MeinongsDIALECTICA, Issue 2 2001Arkadiusz Chrudzimski The most striking feature of Meinong's theory of intentionality is his thesis that every mental act has its reference-object "beyond being and non being". This theory seems, at first, to be a clear example of the so called object-theory of intentionality, as it introduces special "postulated" entities in the target-position of the mental act. Closer examination, however, reveals in Meinong's works important elements of the mediator-theory. Meinong speaks of auxiliary incomplete objects situated "between" the subject and the object of reference and "mediating" the intentional access to the (complete) reference-object. Moreover, even if the object of reference is of the simple nominal form, the mediating structure involves essentially propositional entities (objectives). In the paper we attempt to give a set-theoretical interpretation of Meinong's theory in the frame of which we could eventually do without the incomplete mediating objects. Yet, some general epistemological considerations suggest the indispensability of such incomplete mediating structures. [source] | ||||||||||