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Median Voter (median + voter)
Selected AbstractsFrom individual attitudes towards migrants to migration policy outcomes: Theory and evidenceECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 56 2008Giovanni Facchini SUMMARY Attitudes and migration policy We are experiencing a wave of globalization that includes everything but labour. In this paper, we argue that this is the result of restrictive migration policies implemented by destination countries. In democratic societies individual attitudes of voters represent the foundations of policy making. To understand policy outcomes, we analyse the patterns and determinants of voters' opinions on immigration. We find that, across countries of different income levels, only a small minority of voters favour more open policies. Furthermore, our analysis supports the role played by economic channels in shaping public opinion. We next investigate how attitudes translate into policy outcomes, considering two alternative frameworks: the median voter and the interest groups model. On the one hand, the very low percentages of voters favouring immigration are, in light of the existing restrictive policies, consistent with the median voter framework. At the same time, given the extent of opposition to immigration that appears in public opinion, it is somewhat surprising in a median voter framework that immigration takes place at all. We find that interest-groups dynamics have the potential to explain this puzzle. , Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda [source] THE NON-TRADED SECTOR, LOBBYING, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS UNION AND THE COMMON MARKETECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2008CYRILLE SCHWELLNUS This paper models immigration policy as the outcome of political competition between interest groups representing individuals employed in different sectors. In standard positive theory, restrictive immigration policy results from a low-skilled median voter voting against predominantly low-skilled immigration. In the present paper, in contrast, once trade policies are liberalized, restrictive immigration policy results from anti-immigration lobbying by interest groups representing the non-traded sectors. It is shown that this is in line with empirical regularities from recent episodes of restrictive immigration legislation in the European Union. It is further shown that if governments negotiate bilaterally over trade and migration policy regimes, the equilibrium regime depends (i) on the sequencing of the international negotiation process and (ii) on the set of available trade and migration policy regimes. In particular, the most comprehensive and most welfare-beneficial type of liberalization may be rejected only because a less comprehensive type of liberalization is available. [source] IS INEQUALITY HARMFUL FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN A GROWING ECONOMY?ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2007HUBERT KEMPF In this paper, we investigate the relationship between inequality and the environment in a growing economy from a political-economy perspective. We consider an endogenous growth economy, where growth generates pollution and a deterioration of the environment. Public expenditures may either be devoted to supporting growth or abating pollution. The decision over the public programs is made in a direct democracy, with simple majority rule. We prove that the median voter is decisive and show that inequality is harmful for the environment: the poorer the median voter relative to the average individual, the less she will tax and devote resources to the environment, preferring to support growth. [source] From doves to hawks: A spatial analysis of voting in the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of EnglandEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 6 2010SIMON HIX This article examines the making of monetary policy in the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2008 by analysing voting behaviour in the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). It provides a new set of measures for the monetary policy preferences of individual MPC members by estimating a Bayesian item response model. The article demonstrates the usefulness of these measures by comparing the ideal points of outgoing MPC members with their successors and by looking at changes over time in the median ideal point on the MPC. The analysis indicates that the British Government has been able to move the position of the median voter on the MPC through its appointments to the Committee. This highlights the importance of central bank appointments for monetary policy. [source] Centralisation versus Decentralisation of Public Policies: Does the Heterogeneity of Individual Preferences Matter?,FISCAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2008Carlo Mazzaferro This paper explores the role of the heterogeneity of fiscal preferences in the assignment of policy tasks to different levels of government (decentralisation versus centralisation). With reference to a sample of European countries, a median-voter mechanism of collective decision is assumed to work at both a national and a supranational level. Using data from a large international survey (the International Social Survey Programme, ISSP), a series of econometric models are estimated in order to make individual attitudes representative of different categories of public expenditure and of different countries. The dominance of decentralisation over centralisation or vice versa is determined on the basis of the utility loss that each individual suffers in connection with the distance between his or her own most preferred level of public expenditure and that chosen by the national/supranational median voter. The main finding is that, differently from the predictions of Oates's decentralisation theorem, the assignment of responsibilities at the supranational level (centralisation) for a number of public expenditure programmes (healthcare, education, unemployment benefits) dominates (or is close to dominating) decentralisation, even in the absence of economies of scale and interregional spillovers. However, when the possibility of interjurisdictional mobility is explicitly considered, in line with the predictions of Tiebout's model, decentralisation dominance becomes more and more substantial and also prevails in the sectors where, under the nonmobility assumption, the assignment of responsibilities at the supranational level is efficient. [source] Office-seeking politicians, interest groups and split contributions in a campaign finance modelINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2007Shino Takayama D72; D82; M37 The present paper investigates an extended version of Prat's campaign finance models. In this model, interest groups make contributions to politicians to influence policy decisions. Voters are assumed to judge candidates on two aspects: policy promises and nonpolicy personal qualities referred to as valence. There are two types of voters. Among these, uninformed voters only observe campaign contributions that take the role of a signaling medium. We solve the equilibrium of the game between politicians and interest groups. We then specify conditions under which a separating equilibrium exists and study the effect of split contributions on the welfare of the median voter. [source] Voting on Pensions: A SurveyJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 2 2005Grégory De Walque Abstract., The paper presents a nonexhaustive survey of the literature designed to explain emergence, size and political sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems. It proposes a simple framework of analysis (a small, open, two overlapping generation economy model), around which some variants are displayed. Dictatorship of the median voter is assumed. The text is organized to answer the following questions: (i) Do political equilibria with PAYG pension schemes exist? (ii) Why do they emerge? (iii) What are the conditions for the participation constraint of the pension game to be verified?, and finally, (iv) What is the size of the pension system chosen by the median voter and how is this size influenced by an exogenous (e.g. demographic) shock? [source] THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF U.S. CO2 EMISSIONS: THE ROLE OF STATE VS.JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2007AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABSTRACT This paper provides comparisons of a variety of time-series methods for short-run forecasts of the main greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, for the United States, using a recently released state-level data set from 1960,2001. We test the out-of-sample performance of univariate and multivariate forecasting models by aggregating state-level forecasts versus forecasting the aggregate directly. We find evidence that forecasting the disaggregate series and accounting for spatial effects drastically improves forecasting performance under root mean squared forecast error loss. Based on the in-sample observations we attempt to explain the emergence of voluntary efforts by states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We find evidence that states with decreasing per capita emissions and a "greener" median voter are more likely to push toward voluntary cutbacks in emissions. [source] Public Debt, Migration, and Shortsighted PoliticiansJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 5 2004Christian Schultz We analyze a model where local public debt levels are set by politicians who are chosen in local elections. Migration causes an externality across districts, and leads to overaccumulation of local public debt. Since debt is a strategic substitute, the median voters in each district prefer shortsighted political leaders who "borrow and spend," thereby exacerbating the problem of overaccumulation of local public debt. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||