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Market Orders (market + order)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting75%

Selected Abstracts

The Global Marketplace and the Privatisation of Security

IDS BULLETIN, Issue 2 2009
Jeffrey Isima
The privatisation of security in the age of globalisation raises crucial concerns for global governance and development. Key among these are the impacts on the structures of poverty and inequality, and how these twin development issues shape global security privatisation. Equally important are the structural limits on public policy imposed by the promotion of the market as a powerful alternative mechanism for security provisioning. These concerns have become more urgent as the dominant neoliberal security governance paradigm has tended to avoid questions relating to poverty, social inequality and the dire condition of those who live on the margins of state protection. This calls for innovative policy changes for transforming security institutions and practices in a way that promotes security, not just for state officials and the wealthy, but most importantly, for the poor. This article attempts to explore these core development concerns in relation to the increasing outsourcing of security to non-state actors and how state actors, as leading agents of development, can protect and promote the wellbeing of vulnerable populations within the global market order. [source]

Correlated Trading and Returns

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 2 2008
DANIEL DORN
ABSTRACT A German broker's clients place similar speculative trades and therefore tend to be on the same side of the market in a given stock during a given day, week, month, and quarter. Aggregate liquidity effects, short sale constraints, the systematic execution of limit orders (coordinated through price movements) or the correlated trading of other investors who pick off retail limit orders do not fully explain why retail investors trade similarly. Correlated market orders lead returns, presumably due to persistent speculative price pressure. Correlated limit orders also predict subsequent returns, consistent with executed limit orders being compensated for accommodating liquidity demands. [source]

Strategic order splitting, order choice, and aggressiveness: Evidence from the Taiwan futures exchange

THE JOURNAL OF FUTURES MARKETS, Issue 12 2009
Robin K. Chou
We investigate the strategic order-splitting behavior and order aggressiveness of different types of traders using a unique dataset on the Taiwan Futures Exchange. By examining the trades and orders for each and every account, we find that, as compared with domestic institutional traders and individual traders, foreign institutional traders and futures proprietary firms are more likely to split their orders and it appears that the price adjustments after their trades are permanent. Foreign institutional traders and futures proprietary firms seem to be better informed, with their orders apparently being split so as to reveal their information on a gradual basis. Furthermore, we find that foreign institutional traders and futures proprietary firms use fewer market orders, choosing instead to submit aggressive limit orders, possibly due to their desire to make the most of their information advantage. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:1102,1129, 2009 [source]

Execution quality in open-outcry futures markets

THE JOURNAL OF FUTURES MARKETS, Issue 11 2005
Alexander Kurov
This study examines the composition of customer order .flow and the execution quality for different types of customer orders in six futures pits of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). It is shown that off-exchange customers frequently provide liquidity to other traders by submitting limit orders. The determinants of customers' choice between limit and market orders are examined, and it is found that higher bid,ask spreads increase the limit-order submission frequency, and increased price volatility makes limit-order submission less likely. Effective spreads, trading revenues, and turnaround times for customer liquidity-demanding and limit orders are also documented. Consistent with evidence from equity markets, the results show that limit-order traders receive better executions than traders using liquidity-demanding orders, but incur adverse selection costs. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 25:1067,1092, 2005 [source]