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Market Interactions (market + interaction)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 3 2004
Martin Brown
We provide evidence that long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are initiated with private offers and the parties share the gains from trade equally. Low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship, wielding a powerful effect on contract enforcement. Successful long-term relations exhibit generous rent sharing and high effort (quality) from the very beginning of the relationship. In the absence of third-party enforcement, markets resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. If contracts are third party enforceable, rent sharing and long-term relations are absent and the vast majority of trades are initiated with public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner. [source]

Information, Trading, and Product Market Interactions: Cross-sectional Implications of Informed Trading

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 1 2008
HEATHER E. TOOKES
ABSTRACT I present a simple model of informed trading in which asset values are derived from imperfectly competitive product markets and private information events occur at individual firms. The model predicts that informed traders may have incentives to make information-based trades in the stocks of competitors, especially when events occur at firms with large market shares. In the context of 759 earnings announcements, I use intraday transactions data to test the hypothesis that net order flow and returns in the stocks of nonannouncing competitors have information content for announcing firms. [source]

Land Market Interactions between Heterogeneous Agents in a Heterogeneous Landscape,Tracing the Macro-Scale Effects of Individual Trade-Offs between Environmental Amenities and Disamenities

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2009
Tatiana Filatova
Heterogeneity in both the spatial environment and economic agents is a crucial driver of land market dynamics. We present an agent-based land market model where land from agriculture use is transferred into urban. The model combines the microeconomic demand, supply, and bidding foundations of spatial economics models with the spatial heterogeneity of spatial econometric models in a single methodological platform. Heterogeneous agents exchange heterogeneous spatial goods via simulated bilateral market interactions. We model a coastal city where both coastal amenities and flooding or erosion disamenities drive land market outcomes, facilitating separate analysis of the effects of each driver on land rents and land development patterns. We also analyze the implications of homogeneous versus heterogeneous but unbiased flood risk perceptions. Since buyers with low risk perceptions drive market outcomes, spatial development under heterogeneous risk perceptions differs qualitatively, with more expansion into risky areas. Our results highlight the shortcomings of policy models based on representative agent assumptions and the importance of including agent-level data in empirical modeling. L'hétérogénéité de l'environnement spatial et des agents économiques constitue un élément moteur crucial de la dynamique du marché foncier. Nous présentons un modèle multi-agent du marché foncier dans lequel des terres agricoles ont été transférées pour des fins urbaines. Le modèle combine les fondements microéconomiques de la demande, de l'offre et des enchères de modèles de l'économie spatiale avec l'hétérogénéité spatiale des modèles de l'économétrie spatiale dans une plateforme méthodologique unique. Les agents hétérogènes échangent des biens hétérogènes par le biais du jeu des forces du marché bilatéral simulé. Nous avons modélisé une ville côtière où les agréments côtiers et les désagréments causés par les inondations ou l'érosion influent sur le marché foncier, facilitant l'analyse individuelle des effets de chaque élément moteur sur les loyers fonciers et les modèles d'aménagement de terrain. Nous avons également analysé les répercussions des perceptions homogènes et hétérogènes mais non biaisées à l'égard du risque d'inondation. Étant donné que les acquéreurs qui ont de faibles perceptions du risque motivent les effets du marché, le développement spatial selon des perceptions hétérogènes à l'égard du risque varie qualitativement, avec plus d'expansion dans les zones à risque. Nos résultats ont mis en lumière les lacunes des modèles de politiques fondés sur les hypothèses d'un agent représentatif et l'importance d'inclure des données sur l'hétérogénéité des agents dans la modélisation empirique. [source]

Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 3 2004
Martin Brown
We provide evidence that long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are initiated with private offers and the parties share the gains from trade equally. Low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship, wielding a powerful effect on contract enforcement. Successful long-term relations exhibit generous rent sharing and high effort (quality) from the very beginning of the relationship. In the absence of third-party enforcement, markets resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. If contracts are third party enforceable, rent sharing and long-term relations are absent and the vast majority of trades are initiated with public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner. [source]

The 35-hour workweek in France: Straightjacket or welfare improvement?

ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 55 2008
Marcello Estevão
SUMMARY The 35-hour week Workweek reduction laws may be beneficial if market interactions do not fully take into account the preferences reflected in declining secular trends in working hours. The most recent law in France shortened the workweek from 39 to 35 hours in 2000 for large firms, and in 2002 for small firms. Analysing differences between large and small firm employees before and after the law, we find that aggregate employment was unaffected but labour turnover increased, as firms shed workers who became more expensive. Survey responses indicate that the welfare impact of the law was different across groups of workers: women but not men may have benefited from coordination to a shorter workweek, and there is also evidence of negative welfare effects for managers, possibly due to the law's administrative burden. ,Marcello Estevão and Filipa Sá [source]

Voluntary simplicity: an exploration of market interactions

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSUMER STUDIES, Issue 2 2009
Deirdre Shaw
Abstract Voluntary simplicity is often considered to be a sustainable lifestyle phenomenon buttressed by environment-friendly consumption practices. Voluntary simplicity is shaped by the individual as well as the society, and marketplace interactions often impact voluntarily simplified approaches to consumption. Pertinent, therefore, is a consideration of how voluntary simplifiers negotiate the tensions between marketplace interactions and decisions (not) to consume, as the exploration of interactions between consumption and non-consumption choices has relevant implications for the advancement of sustainable consumption. Specifically, we seek to answer the following question: how have voluntary simplifiers in a rural context negotiated the relationship between voluntary simplicity and market-based (non-) consumption? This paper reports on a study of 28 rural voluntary simplifiers to explore the intersections between voluntary simplicity and rural markets. Findings highlight the convoluted nature and the multiple manifestations of voluntary simplicity, while the rural context allows an exploration of such tensions in relation to individual voluntary simplicity, local economy, supermarkets, fair trade and consumer culture. [source]

On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 536 2009
Ernst Fehr
We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterised by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by increasing contract efficiency substantially. This effect is, however, associated with a considerable bilateralisation of market interactions, suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities. Surprisingly, reputation in fact weakens the wage and price rigidities arising from social preferences. Thus, in markets characterised by moral hazard, reputational incentives unambiguously increase mutually beneficial exchanges, reduce rents, and render markets more responsive to supply and demand shocks. [source]

Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 2 2003
Uri Gneezy
We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change the portfolio influence her risk attitude in markets. In line with the prediction of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)), we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking. Market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced. This result supports the findings from individual decision making, and shows that market interactions do not eliminate such behavior or its consequences for prices. [source]

Land Market Interactions between Heterogeneous Agents in a Heterogeneous Landscape,Tracing the Macro-Scale Effects of Individual Trade-Offs between Environmental Amenities and Disamenities

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2009
Tatiana Filatova
Heterogeneity in both the spatial environment and economic agents is a crucial driver of land market dynamics. We present an agent-based land market model where land from agriculture use is transferred into urban. The model combines the microeconomic demand, supply, and bidding foundations of spatial economics models with the spatial heterogeneity of spatial econometric models in a single methodological platform. Heterogeneous agents exchange heterogeneous spatial goods via simulated bilateral market interactions. We model a coastal city where both coastal amenities and flooding or erosion disamenities drive land market outcomes, facilitating separate analysis of the effects of each driver on land rents and land development patterns. We also analyze the implications of homogeneous versus heterogeneous but unbiased flood risk perceptions. Since buyers with low risk perceptions drive market outcomes, spatial development under heterogeneous risk perceptions differs qualitatively, with more expansion into risky areas. Our results highlight the shortcomings of policy models based on representative agent assumptions and the importance of including agent-level data in empirical modeling. L'hétérogénéité de l'environnement spatial et des agents économiques constitue un élément moteur crucial de la dynamique du marché foncier. Nous présentons un modèle multi-agent du marché foncier dans lequel des terres agricoles ont été transférées pour des fins urbaines. Le modèle combine les fondements microéconomiques de la demande, de l'offre et des enchères de modèles de l'économie spatiale avec l'hétérogénéité spatiale des modèles de l'économétrie spatiale dans une plateforme méthodologique unique. Les agents hétérogènes échangent des biens hétérogènes par le biais du jeu des forces du marché bilatéral simulé. Nous avons modélisé une ville côtière où les agréments côtiers et les désagréments causés par les inondations ou l'érosion influent sur le marché foncier, facilitant l'analyse individuelle des effets de chaque élément moteur sur les loyers fonciers et les modèles d'aménagement de terrain. Nous avons également analysé les répercussions des perceptions homogènes et hétérogènes mais non biaisées à l'égard du risque d'inondation. Étant donné que les acquéreurs qui ont de faibles perceptions du risque motivent les effets du marché, le développement spatial selon des perceptions hétérogènes à l'égard du risque varie qualitativement, avec plus d'expansion dans les zones à risque. Nos résultats ont mis en lumière les lacunes des modèles de politiques fondés sur les hypothèses d'un agent représentatif et l'importance d'inclure des données sur l'hétérogénéité des agents dans la modélisation empirique. [source]