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Marginal Utility (marginal + utility)
Selected AbstractsThe Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: Estimates for 20 OECD Countries,FISCAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2005David J. Evans Abstract In social project appraisal, the policy profile of both distributional welfare weights and the social discount rate has risen considerably in recent years. This fact has important implications for the allocation of funds to social projects and policies in countries, and in unions of countries such as the EU. A key component in the formulae for both welfare weights and the social discount rate is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, e. A critical review of existing evidence on e suggests that the UK Treasury's preferred value of unity is too low. New evidence presented in this paper, based on the structure of personal income tax rates, suggests that, on average, for developed countries e is close to 1.4. This particular approach to the estimation of e has previously been under-utilised by researchers. [source] WHY ARE AMERICANS ADDICTED TO BASEBALL?CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 1 2008AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FANDOM IN KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES Theories of rational addiction posit that certain habit-forming goods,characterized by an increasing marginal utility of consumption,generate predictable dynamic patterns of consumer behavior. It has been suggested that attendance at sporting events represents an example of such a good, as evidenced by the pricing strategies of commercial sports interests. In this essay, we provide new evidence in support of rational addiction for the case of Major League Baseball but fail to find such support in data from the Korean Professional Baseball League. We then review the scientific literature on sports fans from the perspective of human behavioral ecology and propose a theory of endogenous habit formation among sports fans that could explain our findings. (JEL C32, D83, D87, D91, L83) [source] Precautionary Bidding in AuctionsECONOMETRICA, Issue 1 2004Péter Esö We analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk-averse buyers bid for a good whose value is risky. We show that when the risk in the valuations increases, DARA bidders will reduce their bids by more than the appropriate increase in the risk premium. Ceteris paribus, buyers will be better off bidding for a more risky object in first price, second price, and English auctions with affiliated common (interdependent) values. This "precautionary bidding" effect arises because the expected marginal utility of income increases with risk, so buyers are reluctant to bid so highly. We also show that precautionary bidding behavior can make DARA bidders prefer bidding in a common values setting to bidding in a private values one when risk-neutral or CARA bidders would be indifferent. Thus the potential for a "winner's curse" can be a blessing for rational DARA bidders. [source] The Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: Estimates for 20 OECD Countries,FISCAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2005David J. Evans Abstract In social project appraisal, the policy profile of both distributional welfare weights and the social discount rate has risen considerably in recent years. This fact has important implications for the allocation of funds to social projects and policies in countries, and in unions of countries such as the EU. A key component in the formulae for both welfare weights and the social discount rate is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, e. A critical review of existing evidence on e suggests that the UK Treasury's preferred value of unity is too low. New evidence presented in this paper, based on the structure of personal income tax rates, suggests that, on average, for developed countries e is close to 1.4. This particular approach to the estimation of e has previously been under-utilised by researchers. [source] The spirit of capitalism, stock market bubbles and output fluctuationsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2008Takashi Kamihigashi E20; E32 This paper presents a representative agent model in which stock market bubbles cause output fluctuations. Assuming that utility depends directly on wealth, we show that stock market bubbles arise if the marginal utility of wealth does not decline to zero as wealth goes to infinity. Bubbles can affect output positively or negative depending on whether the production function exhibits increasing or decreasing returns to scale. In sunspot equilibria, the bursting of a bubble is followed by a sharp decline in output one period later. Various numerical examples are given to illustrate the behavior of stochastic bubbles and the relationship between bubbles and output. [source] Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed CareJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 1 2002Ching-To Albert Ma If an illness is not contractible, then even partially insured consumers demand treatment for it when the benefit is less than the cost, a condition known as moral hazard. Traditional health insurance, which controls moral hazard with copayments (demand management), can result in either a deficient or an excessive provision of treatment relative to ideal insurance. In particular, treatment for a low-probability illness is deficient if illness per se has little effect on the consumer's marginal utility of income and if the consumer's price elasticity of expected demand for treatment is large relative to the risk-spreading distortion when these are evaluated at a copayment that brings forth the ideal provision of treatment. Managed care, which controls moral hazard with physician incentives, can either increase or decrease treatment delivery relative to traditional insurance, depending on whether demand management results in deficient or excessive treatment. [source] International Pricing in a Generalized Model of Ideal VarietyJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 2009DAVID HUMMELS Lancaster ideal variety; price to market We examine international markups and pricing in a generalized version of an "ideal variety" model. In this model, entry causes crowding in variety space, so that the marginal utility of new varieties falls as market size grows. Crowding is partially offset by income effects, as richer consumers will pay more for varieties closer matched to their ideal types. We show theoretically and confirm empirically that declining marginal utility of new varieties results in: a higher own-price elasticity of demand (and lower prices) in large countries and a lower own-price elasticity of demand (and higher prices) in rich countries. The model is also useful for generating facts from the literature regarding cross-country differences in the rate of variety expansion. [source] Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral HazardJOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 4 2004M. Martin Boyer In a Costly State Verification world, an agent who has private information regarding the state of the world must report what state occurred to a principal, who can verify the state at a cost. An agent then has what is called ex post moral hazard: he has an incentive to misreport the true state to extract rents from the principal. Assuming the principal cannot commit to an auditing strategy, the optimal contract is such that: (1) the agent's expected marginal utility when there is an accident (high- and low-loss states) is equal to his marginal utility when there is no accident; (2) the lower loss is undercompensated, while the higher loss is overcompensated; and (3) the welfare of the agent is greater under commitment than under no-commitment. Result 2 is contrary to the results obtained if the principal can commit to an auditing strategy (higher losses underpaid and lower losses overpaid). The reason is that by increasing the difference between the high and the low indemnity payments, the probability of fraud is reduced. [source] MODELING LIQUIDITY EFFECTS IN DISCRETE TIMEMATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 1 2007Umut Çetin We study optimal portfolio choices for an agent with the aim of maximizing utility from terminal wealth within a market with liquidity costs. Under some mild conditions, we show the existence of optimal portfolios and that the marginal utility of the optimal terminal wealth serves as a change of measure to turn the marginal price process of the optimal strategy into a martingale. Finally, we illustrate our results numerically in a Cox,Ross,Rubinstein binomial model with liquidity costs and find the reservation ask prices for simple European put options. [source] Optimality of greedy and sustainable policies in the management of renewable resourcesOPTIMAL CONTROL APPLICATIONS AND METHODS, Issue 1 2003A. Rapaport Abstract We consider a discrete-time modelling of renewable resources, which regenerate after a delay once harvested. We study the qualitative behaviour of harvesting policies, which are optimal with respect to a discounted utility function over infinite horizon. Using Bellman's equation, we derive analytically conditions under which two types of policies (greedy and sustainable) are optimal, depending on the discount rate and the marginal utility. For this particular class of problems, we show also that the greedy policy is attractive in a certain sense. The techniques of proof lie on concavity, comparison of value functions and Lyapunov-like functions. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Monopolistic Competition, Growth and Public Good Provision,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 534 2009Paul Pecorino In the standard model, provision of a pure public good is increasing in group size if it is a normal good. I develop a model of public good provision in which private goods are supplied in a monopolistically competitive market. In this model, group size corresponds to population. I find that increases in population lead to reduced public good provision. The reason is quite simple: as population increases, the number of private goods available for consumption also increases. This raises the marginal utility of income and increases the opportunity cost of contributing to the public good. [source] INFLATION AND THE PUBLIC DEFICIT WHEN THE UTILITY OF MONEY IS INSATIABLE,THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2007ALEJANDRO RODRÍGUEZ-ARANA When the marginal utility of money is positive even at very high levels of the asset (Yoshiyasu Ono's, 1994, assumption), the relationship between inflation and the public deficit at full employment may result in a unique perverse equilibrium where higher deficits reduce inflation. If there are two equilibria, the low inflation equilibrium is one where the perverse effect between inflation and the public deficit prevails; while in the high inflation equilibrium higher public deficits increase inflation. These results contrast sharply with traditional results found in the literature. 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