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Many Philosophers (many + philosophers)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences75%

Selected Abstracts

Problems for Linguistic Solutions to the Paradox of Analysis

METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2001
Jeffrey Cobb
G. E. Moore opined that the paradox of analysis might be avoided if it could be shown that sentences expressing conceptual analyses convey information not only about concepts, but also about the expressions they use. If so, "to be a brother is to be a male sibling" and "to be a brother is to be a brother" might express the same proposition, and yet not be identical in information value as the paradox suggests. How sentences might do this, Moore could not see. Many philosophers have pointed out an obvious way in which sentences might be said to convey information about the expressions they use. Some have suggested this information might be used to develop Moore's intuition and resolve the paradox of analysis. I argue that this approach fails. I present a version of the paradox of analysis that resists this sort of solution. [source]

The Relevance of Coercion: Some Preliminaries*

RATIO JURIS, Issue 3 2009
NICOS STAVROPOULOS
Many philosophers take the view that, while coercion is a prominent and enduring feature of legal practice, its existence does not reflect a deep, constitutive property of law and therefore coercion plays at best a very limited role in the explanation of law's nature. This view has become more or less the orthodoxy in modern jurisprudence. I argue that an interesting and plausible possible role for coercion in the explanation of law is untouched by the arguments in support of the orthodox view. Since my main purpose is to clear the ground for the alternative, I spell out the orthodox view in some detail. I then briefly sketch the alternative. Finally, I turn to Jules Coleman's discussion of the alternative. [source]

WITHOUT CONSENT: PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFIED ACQUISITION AND DUTY-IMPOSING POWERS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 237 2009
Hugh Breakey
A controversy in political philosophy and applied ethics concerns the validity of duty-imposing powers, that is, rights entitling one person to impose new duties on others without their consent. Many philosophers have criticized as unplausible any such moral right, in particular that of appropriating private property unilaterally. Some, finding duty-imposing powers weird, unfamiliar or baseless, have argued that principles of justified acquisition should be rejected; others have required them to satisfy exacting criteria. I investigate the many ways in which we regularly impose duties on one another without prior consent. I show that doing so is not weird, and I offer criteria which demarcate the reasonable from the worrisome aspects of duty-imposing powers. [source]

LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND GETTIER CASES

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 234 2009
Corine Besson
Knowledge of the basic rules of logic is often thought to be distinctive, for it seems to be a case of non-inferential a priori knowledge. Many philosophers take its source to be different from those of other types of knowledge, such as knowledge of empirical facts. The most prominent account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic takes this source to be the understanding of logical expressions or concepts. On this account, what explains why such knowledge is distinctive is that it is grounded in semantic or conceptual understanding. However, I show that this cannot be the correct account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic, because it is open to Gettier-style counter-examples. [source]

Precise entities but irredeemably vague concepts?

DIALECTICA, Issue 3 2002
Enrique Romerales
Various arguments have recently been put forward to support the existence of vague or fuzzy objects. Nevertheless, the only possibly compelling argument would support, not the existence of vague objects, but indeterminately existing objects. I argue for the non-existence of any vague entities,either particulars or properties - in the mind-independent world. Even so, many philosophers have claimed that to reduce vagueness to semantics is of no avail, since linguistic vagueness betrays semantic incoherence and this is no less a problem than is ontological incoherence. After spelling out why there are fewer essentially vague concepts than usually thought. I claim that only the linguistic competence of the whole speaking community for each word can draw the sharp boundaries for its concept, even if these are unknowable in practice and still leave a precise range of indetermination. This could explain both the existence of boundaries and our non-removable ignorance of them, fulfilling the intuitions of the epistemic theory of vagueness with the supervaluationist's indeterminacy. [source]

John Whitehurst (1713,1788): philosopher, geologist, horologist and engineer

GEOLOGY TODAY, Issue 3 2002
Trevor D. Ford
Among the late 18th-century pioneers of geological science was John Whitehurst. He set the scene for the early Derbyshire geologists, White Watson and John Farey, whose books were not published until 1811, long after Whitehurst's death. But Whitehurst's ideas went beyond Derbyshire; he looked at the global situation in his book An Inquiry into the Original State & Formation of the Earth (1778, 1786). Whitehurst was a founder member of the influential Lunar Society and a close friend of many philosophers of the period. [source]

In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience

MIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 3 2009
KATHRIN GLÜER
Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing ,phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience. [source]

1.,Globalization and Violence: The Challenge to Ethics

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2009
Edward Demenchonok
Despite its many benefits, globalization has proven to harbor a good deal of violence. This is not only a matter of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction inaugurated by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, but includes many forms of indirect or "structural violence" resulting from the routine of economic and political institutions on the global scale. In this essay, the multifaceted phenomena of violence are approached from the standpoint of ethics. The prevailing political thinking associated with "realism" fails to address the problems of militarism and of hegemonic unilateralism. In contrast, many philosophers are critically rethinking the problem of global violence from different ethical perspectives. Despite sharing similar concerns, philosophers nevertheless differ over the role of philosophical reflection and the potentials of reason. These differences appear in two contrasting approaches associated with postmodern philosophy and discourse ethics. In the analysis of discourse ethics, attention is paid to Karl-Otto Apel's attempt of philosophically grounding a macroethics of planetary co-responsibility. At the heart of the essay is the analysis of the problem of violence, including terrorism, by Jürgen Habermas, who explains the phenomenon of violence in terms of the theory of communicative action as the breakdown of communication. Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of the notion of "terrorism" also is analyzed. According to the principle of discourse ethics, all conflicts between human beings ought to be settled in a way free of violence, through discourses and negotiations. These philosophers conclude that the reliance on force does not solve social and global problems, including those that are the source of violence. The only viable alternative is the "dialogical" multilateral relations of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among the nations for solving social and global problems. They emphasize the necessity of strengthening the international rule of law and institutions, such as a reformed United Nations. [source]