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Managers' Use (managers + use)
Selected AbstractsUS Managers' Use of ,Pro Forma' Adjustments to Meet Strategic Earnings TargetsJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3-4 2009Dirk E. Black Abstract:, The practice of reporting manager-adjusted ,pro forma' earnings numbers in quarterly earnings press releases has attracted considerable attention in recent years in the United States. Prior research suggests that while some managers report these adjusted numbers to better reflect core earnings, others may use these earnings adjustments to meet strategic earnings targets on a pro forma basis when they fall short based on GAAP reporting standards. Assuming the latter motivation could potentially mislead investors, the difficulty lies in distinguishing the ,good guys' from the ,bad guys.' Using hand-collected pro forma earnings data, we investigate the extent to which different types of earnings adjustments affect the spread between pro forma earnings and GAAP earnings from continuing operations. Moreover, we investigate which types of adjustments managers use to meet strategic earnings targets. In addition to the exclusion of one-time items like restructuring charges, the results indicate that managers often exclude recurring expenses such as depreciation, research and development, and stock-based compensation to meet these strategic targets. The exclusion of recurring items is especially indicative of aggressive pro forma reporting. Finally, we find that firms that report adjusted earnings numbers only sporadically are more likely than firms that adjust earnings figures on a regular basis to use pro forma reporting to achieve strategic earnings targets by excluding recurring items. [source] Discussion of US Managers' Use of ,Pro Forma' Adjustments to Meet Strategic Earnings TargetsJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3-4 2009Paraskevi Vicky Kiosse First page of article [source] The Usefulness of Measures of Consistency of Discretionary Components of Accruals in the Detection of Earnings ManagementJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 9-10 2009Salma S. IbrahimArticle first published online: 26 OCT 200 Abstract:, Prior research has shown the prevalence of measurement error in models used to estimate aggregate discretionary accruals. In these models, the incremental information content of the various components of accruals is ignored. Limited prior research and data gathered from firms under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) litigation indicate that managers use either one or more than one component of accruals simultaneously, in a consistent way to manipulate bottom-line earnings in a given direction. I propose two measures that capture the consistency between the discretionary components of accruals and test their significance in earnings management (EM) detection in firms that have artificially added accrual manipulation and firms that were targeted by the SEC for accrual manipulation. There is evidence that this information is incrementally useful in detecting EM. This finding paves the way for improvements in the discretionary accruals measure by including consistency information from the components of aggregate accruals. [source] US Managers' Use of ,Pro Forma' Adjustments to Meet Strategic Earnings TargetsJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3-4 2009Dirk E. Black Abstract:, The practice of reporting manager-adjusted ,pro forma' earnings numbers in quarterly earnings press releases has attracted considerable attention in recent years in the United States. Prior research suggests that while some managers report these adjusted numbers to better reflect core earnings, others may use these earnings adjustments to meet strategic earnings targets on a pro forma basis when they fall short based on GAAP reporting standards. Assuming the latter motivation could potentially mislead investors, the difficulty lies in distinguishing the ,good guys' from the ,bad guys.' Using hand-collected pro forma earnings data, we investigate the extent to which different types of earnings adjustments affect the spread between pro forma earnings and GAAP earnings from continuing operations. Moreover, we investigate which types of adjustments managers use to meet strategic earnings targets. In addition to the exclusion of one-time items like restructuring charges, the results indicate that managers often exclude recurring expenses such as depreciation, research and development, and stock-based compensation to meet these strategic targets. The exclusion of recurring items is especially indicative of aggressive pro forma reporting. Finally, we find that firms that report adjusted earnings numbers only sporadically are more likely than firms that adjust earnings figures on a regular basis to use pro forma reporting to achieve strategic earnings targets by excluding recurring items. [source] Ownership Types and Strategic Groups in an Emerging Economy*JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 7 2004Mike W. Peng ABSTRACT Existing strategic group studies have rarely examined ownership type as a variable to classify firms in an industry. Using Chinese firms of different ownership types, we suggest that ownership type can be a parsimonious and important variable that managers use to cognitively classify firms into different strategic groups. While ownership itself is an objective variable, we contend that different ownership types lead to different managerial outlook and mentality due to a number of macro and micro foundations giving rise to various managerial cognitions. Employing the Miles and Snow typology, we find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately-owned enterprises (POEs) tend to adopt defender and prospector strategies, respectively, while collectively-owned enterprises (COEs) and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) exhibit an analyser orientation that falls between defenders and prospectors on the strategy continuum. Three statistical tests suggest that ownership types can be used to successfully predict strategic group memberships in China's emerging economy. [source] Employee Stock Option Fair-Value Estimates: Do Managerial Discretion and Incentives Explain Accuracy?,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2006Leslie Hodder Abstract We examine the determinants of managers' use of discretion over employee stock option (ESO) valuation-model inputs that determine ESO fair values. We also explore the consequences of such discretion. Firms exercise considerable discretion over all model inputs, and this discretion results in material differences in ESO fair-value estimates. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that a large proportion of firms exercise value-increasing discretion. Importantly, we find that using discretion improves predictive accuracy for about half of our sample firms. Moreover, we find that both opportunistic and informational managerial incentives together explain the accuracy of firms' ESO fair-value estimates. Partitioning on the direction of discretion improves our understanding of managerial incentives. Our analysis confirms that financial statement readers can use mandated contextual disclosures to construct powerful ex ante predictions of ex post accuracy. [source] Accounting Discretion in Fair Value Estimates: An Examination of SFAS 142 Goodwill ImpairmentsJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2006ANNE BEATTY ABSTRACT This study examines Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 142 adoption decisions, focusing on the trade-off between recording certain current goodwill impairment charges below the line and uncertain future impairment charges included in income from continuing operations. We examine several potentially important economic incentives that firms face when making this accounting choice. We find evidence suggesting that firms' equity market concerns affect their preference for above-the-line vs. below-the-line accounting treatment, and firms' debt contracting, bonus, turnover, and exchange delisting incentives affect their decisions to accelerate or delay expense recognition. Our study contributes to the accounting choice literature by examining managers' use of discretion when adopting a mandatory accounting change and by developing and testing explicit cross-sectional hypotheses of the determinants of firms' preferences for immediate below-the-line versus delayed above-the-line expense recognition. [source] Transition to self-directed work teams: implications of transition time and self-monitoring for managers' use of influence tacticsJOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, Issue 1 2004Ceasar Douglas In the face of heightened competitive pressures, elevated quality expectations, and calls for worker empowerment, more and more organizations have turned to self-directed work teams (SDWTs). A review of the literature devoted to SDWTs suggests that managers often struggle with the transition to SDWTs because of the required shift in control to SDWT members. To promote the development of work teams, managers must modify their use of influence tactics in direct response to the control shift. In this study, we explore changes in managers' usage of influence tactics during the transition to SDWTs within a large aluminum manufacturing plant. Analyses of longitudinal data show that despite the new team environment, managers' use of influence tactics was focused at the individual level. We also found that transition time accounts for variance in managers' choices of influence tactics. Finally, an exploratory analysis suggests that high as opposed to low self-monitoring managers may be more prone to increase their usage of soft influence tactics and decrease their usage of hard influence tactics over the course of the transition; the influence behavior of low self-monitoring managers remained unchanged. Implications for future research are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] | ||||||||||