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Managers' Decisions (managers + decision)
Selected AbstractsThe Role of Executive Stock Options in On-Market Share Buybacks,INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2010ASJEET S. LAMBA ABSTRACT The increasing use of on-market buyback programs in Australia may not be fully explained by the typical motivations of information signaling and free cash flows offered by previous researchers. For some firms at least, management may believe the shares are overvalued. It is in this context that we examine whether managers of firms with high levels of executive stock options have an incentive to initiate buyback programs. It has been argued that managers may be motivated to undertake on-market buyback programs in order to neutralize the dilution of earnings per share caused by their stock options, rather than for signaling purposes. Our findings are consistent with this argument because we find that the higher the proportion of executive stock options outstanding the more likely it is for firms to undertake larger on-market buyback programs. Overall our results indicate that the existence of executive stock options influences managers' decision to implement on-market buyback programs but that it is not the only factor that managers take into consideration. [source] Opportunism in Capital Budget Recommendations: The Effects of Past Performance and Its Attributions,DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 3 2001Joanna L. Ho Abstract This study uses an experiment to examine the separate and combined effects of managers' loss aversion and their causal attributions about their divisions' performance on tendencies to make goal-incongruent capital budget recommendations. We find that managers' recommendations are biased by their loss aversion. In particular, managers of high-performing divisions are more likely than managers of low-performing divisions to propose investments that maximize their division's short-term profits at the expense of the firm's long-term value. We also find that managers' recommendations are biased by their causal attributions. In particular, managers are more likely to propose investments that maximize their division's short-term profits at the expense of the firm's long-term value when they attribute their division's performance to external causes (e.g., task difficulty or luck) rather than to internal causes (e.g., managerial ability or effort). Further, the effects of causal attributions are greater for managers of high-performing divisions than for managers of low-performing divisions. The study's findings are important because loss aversion and causal attributions are often manifested in firms. Thus, they may bias managers' decisions, which in turn may be detrimental to the firms' long-term value. [source] Invited reaction: The effects of alternative reports of human resource development results on managerial supportHUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2003Wayne F. Cascio Mattson's article is an important contribution to the literature in HRD and program evaluation for a variety of reasons. It addresses an area that sorely needs rigorous research, it uses a theory-based model that is relevant to managers' evaluations of HRD programs, it provides valuable insights on how best to present HRD evaluation results to managers, and it demonstrates that HRD program evaluations that are expressed in terms of results do influence the decisions of operating managers. The ongoing challenge will be to articulate linkages between HRD programs, employees' behavior, and outcomes that are important to managers. Doing so will lead to even greater impact on managers' decisions about the future uses of HRD interventions. [source] Implicit Theories of Organizational Power and Priming Effects on Managerial Power-Sharing Decisions: An Experimental Study,JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 2 2004Peter T. Coleman Over 60 years of research on participative leadership has documented the many benefits of power sharing in organizations. However, a common obstacle to power sharing is the unwillingness of those with power to share it. An experimental study is presented that investigated the effects of managers' implicit theories of power in organizations on their willingness to share power with subordinates. The study proposed that chronic differences in implicit power theories (the degree of competitive vs. cooperative beliefs and ideals regarding organizational power relations) would affect managers' decisions to share or withhold power. Subliminal priming was predicted to temporarily enhance the accessibility of these differences in implicit power theories, thereby fostering or inhibiting spontaneous decisions to share power. Results indicate that the subliminal priming of competitive theories of organizational power negatively influenced managers' immediate, spontaneous decisions to share power, whereas chronic differences in their implicit theories similarly affected their more systematic decisions to share power. The theoretical and applied contributions of the study are discussed. [source] The Decision to Persist with Underperforming Alliances: The Role of Trust and ControlJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 7 2008Holger Patzelt abstract We draw on theories of persistence to develop a model of alliance managers' decisions towards persisting in underperforming alliances based on their concomitant consideration of the control and trust in those alliances. We test the model using experimental data based on 2,816 decisions nested within 88 alliance managers. We find that output, behavioural and social control, competence and goodwill trust, and interactions between trust and control variables significantly explain alliance managers' decisions to persist in underperforming alliances. We discuss the implications of these findings for the control, trust and strategic alliance literatures. [source] | ||||||||||