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Managerial Compensation (managerial + compensation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2002
Kenneth K. Yung
In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments. [source]

Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2000
Elazar Berkovitch
We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions, including the following: (i) The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced; moreover, the expected cash flow affirms that retain their managers exceeds that affirms that replace their managers, (ii) Managers affirms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachutes) than managers affirms that do not have risky debt. (Hi) Controlling for firm's size, the leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated, (iv) Controlling for the firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated, (v) Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows. [source]

The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs: An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2009
Chrisostomos Florackis
G3; G32 Abstract This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs for a large sample of UK firms over the period 1999,2005. To measure managerial entrenchment, we use detailed information on ownership and board structures and managerial compensation. We develop a managerial entrenchment index, which captures the extent to which managers have the ability and incentives to expropriate wealth from shareholders. Our findings, which are based on a dynamic panel data analysis, show that there is a strong negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and our inverse proxy for agency costs, namely asset turnover ratio. There is also evidence that short-term debt and dividend payments work as effective corporate governance devices for UK firms. Finally, our findings reveal that agency costs are persistent over time. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including varying measures of managerial entrenchment and agency costs. [source]

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and evidence

ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 4 2008
Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya
G35; J38 Abstract Bhattacharyya (2007) develops a model in which compensation contracts motivate high-quality managers to retain and invest firm earnings, while low-quality managers are motivated to distribute income to shareholders. In equilibrium, the model shows that there is a positive (negative) relationship between the earnings retention ratio (dividend payout ratio) and managerial compensation. Results of tests of US data show that executive compensation is positively (negatively) associated with earnings retention (dividend payout). Our results indicate that corporate dividend policy is perhaps best understood by considering the payout ratio (dividends divided by earnings), rather than the level of cash dividends alone. [source]

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2002
Kenneth K. Yung
In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments. [source]

Implicit Contracts, Managerial Incentives, and Financial Structure

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 3 2001
Roberta Dessí
This paper examines how managers may be given incentives to exert effort, and to implement efficient implicit contracts with workers. Under certain assumptions, this can be achieved by tying managerial compensation to shareholder value. However, if reputation effects are weak, it is more efficient to adopt an incentive scheme in which the manager is punished by outside investor intervention when performance falls below a critical level, and otherwise retains control, receiving a fixed reward. The required form of outside intervention can be implemented through a financial structure combining hard debt with a dispersed ownership structure. [source]

Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2000
Elazar Berkovitch
We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions, including the following: (i) The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced; moreover, the expected cash flow affirms that retain their managers exceeds that affirms that replace their managers, (ii) Managers affirms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachutes) than managers affirms that do not have risky debt. (Hi) Controlling for firm's size, the leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated, (iv) Controlling for the firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated, (v) Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows. [source]

Outlet ownership in franchising systems: an agency based approach

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 6 2002
Sudhindra Seshadri
Building on prior agency theoretic explanations of the franchisor,franchisee relationship, this paper introduces the franchise system manager in the traditional dyadic channel. This allows us to link the franchisors internal agency problems of providing incentives to managers to their external agency problems of acquiring and extracting rents from franchisees. I find preliminary empirical support for this approach in a structural equations model estimated on a franchise system data set. I then develop and analyze an agency-theoretic model with agency tradeoffs. An explicit rationale for mixed ownership in franchising emerges from the model, where the share of company owned outlets is endogenously determined as the tradeoff between franchisee rents and managerial compensation. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Managers of nonprofit organizations are rewarded for performance

NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 1 2005
Thomas Carroll
We consider the effect of performance on the compensation of nonprofit executives. Performance is measured as the ratio of revenue from a particular activity (such as fundraising or program services) to the expenditures associated with those services, exclusive of managerial compensation. This is consistent with previous works, which use measures of size, spending, or budget percentages as measures of performance. We also consider whether the compensation received by the executives enhances their performance. The empirical results support the hypothesis that compensation and performance are simultaneously determined. [source]