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Managerial Action (managerial + action)
Selected AbstractsThe impact of downsizing on the corporate reputation for social performanceJOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2004Stelios C. Zyglidopoulos Abstract This paper investigates the impact of downsizing on a firm's reputation for corporate social performance (RCSP). Drawing on the downsizing, corporate reputation and social responsibility literatures, a number of hypotheses concerning the impact of downsizing, and particularly the types of downsizing, on a firm's reputation for corporate social performance are developed and empirically tested. The main findings of this study are that, while downsizing seems to have a negative impact on the firm's RCSP, when one takes into account the kind of managerial action that led to downsizing (layoffs and/or divestitures), this impact differs between the two stakeholder groups, industry executives and financial analysts, which were investigated. This study also found that a high financial performance prior to downsizing led to a greater negative impact on the firm's RCSP. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications [source] Business Ethics as PracticeBRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2007Stewart Clegg In this article we develop a conceptualization of business ethics as practice. Starting from the view that the ethics that organizations display in practice will have been forged through an ongoing process of debate and contestation over moral choices, we examine ethics in relation to the ambiguous, unpredictable, and subjective contexts of managerial action. Furthermore, we examine how discursively constituted practice relates to managerial subjectivity and the possibilities of managers being moral agents. The article concludes by discussing how the ,ethics as practice' approach that we expound provides theoretical resources for studying the different ways that ethics manifest themselves in organizations as well as providing a practical application of ethics in organizations that goes beyond moralistic and legalistic approaches. [source] Taking (and Sharing Power): How Boards of Directors Can Bring About Greater Fairness for Dependent StakeholdersBUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW, Issue 2 2010HARRY J. VAN BUREN III ABSTRACT One of the ways in which scholars have sought to broaden the discussion of the social responsibilities of corporations and their managers is through the development of the stakeholder concept. The primacy of shareholder interests in corporate-governance processes and managerial action is, however, a myth that justifies all sorts of managerial self-interest seeking and exploitation of particular stakeholder groups. What makes this myth particularly problematic,from the standpoint of fairness and corporate governance,is that not all nonshareholder stakeholders are equally situated with regard to their ability to secure fair treatment. In this article, I explore the ethical dimensions of board responsibilities to dependent stakeholder groups by first describing the differences between shareholders and nonshareholder stakeholders with regard to risk, examining why dependent stakeholders (stakeholders with legitimate and urgent claims, but no power) are particularly important from the standpoint of stakeholder risk, and discussing how stakeholder consultation might provide a partial fix to such problems. I will conclude with proposals for how boards can more faithfully discharge their ethical responsibilities to dependent stakeholder groups, and in so doing facilitate stakeholder involvement in corporate governance in ways that promote fairness in organization,stakeholder relationships. [source] Private Predecision Information, Performance Measure Congruity, and the Value of Delegation,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2000ROBERT M. BUSHMAN Abstract We use a linear contracting framework to study how the relation between performance measures used in an agent's incentive contract and the agent's private predecision information affects the value of delegating decision rights to the agent. The analysis relies on the idea that available performance measures are often imperfect representations of the economic consequences of managerial actions and decisions, and this, along with gaming possibilities provided to the agent by access to private predecision information, may overwhelm any benefits associated with delegation. Our analytical framework allows us to derive intuitive conditions under which delegation does and does not have value, and to provide new insights into the linkage between imperfections in performance measurement and agency costs. [source] | ||||||||||