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Low-performing Schools (low-performing + school)
Selected AbstractsDifferences in principals' leadership behavior in high- and low-performing schoolsJOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES, Issue 4 2010Ronald A. Lindahl This study was based on data from the 2008 Take20: Alabama Teaching and Learning Conditions Survey and focused on a comparison of teachers' perceptions of how school principals exercise their role in both high- and low-performing elementary and middle schools that serve high-poverty student populations. Teachers in the high-performing schools consistently viewed their principals' behavior more positively than did their counterparts in the lower-performing schools. Teachers reported less difference in regard to engaging the community to create shared responsibility for student and school success. Very little difference existed in the principal's involvement of teachers in key school decisions; neither population of principals scored high in this area. [source] Do financial incentives help low-performing schools attract and keep academically talented teachers?JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2010Evidence from California This study capitalizes on a natural experiment that occurred in California between 2000 and 2002. In those years, the state offered a competitively allocated $20,000 incentive called the Governor's Teaching Fellowship (GTF) aimed at attracting academically talented, novice teachers to low-performing schools and retaining them in those schools for at least four years. Taking advantage of data on the career histories of 27,106 individuals who pursued California teaching licenses between 1998 and 2003, we use an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the unbiased impact of the GTF on the decisions of recipients to begin working in low-performing schools within 2 years after licensure program enrollment. We estimate that GTF recipients would have been less likely to teach in low-performing schools than observably similar counterparts had the GTF not existed, but that acquiring a GTF increased their probability of doing so by 28 percentage points. Examining retention patterns, we find that 75 percent of both GTF recipients and nonrecipients who began working in low-performing schools remained in such schools for at least four years. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. [source] Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low-performing schools to attract and retain high-quality teachers?JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2004Charles T. Clotfelter Administrative data from North Carolina are used to explore the extent to which that state's relatively sophisticated school-based accountability system has exacerbated the challenges that schools serving low-performing students face in retaining and attracting high-quality teachers. Most clear are the adverse effects on retention rates, and hence on teacher turnover, in such schools. Less clear is the extent to which that higher turnover has translated into a decline in the average qualifications of the teachers in the low-performing schools. Other states with more primitive accountability systems can expect even greater adverse effects on teacher turnover in low-performing schools. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. [source] | ||||||||||