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Logical Form (logical + form)
Selected AbstractsSo mechanical or routine: The not original in FeistJOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Issue 4 2010Julian Warner The United States Supreme Court case of 1991, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., continues to be highly significant for property in data and databases, but remains poorly understood. The approach taken in this article contrasts with previous studies. It focuses upon the "not original" rather than the original. The delineation of the absence of a modicum of creativity in selection, coordination, and arrangement of data as a component of the not original forms a pivotal point in the Supreme Court decision. The author also aims at elucidation rather than critique, using close textual exegesis of the Supreme Court decision. The results of the exegesis are translated into a more formal logical form to enhance clarity and rigor. The insufficiently creative is initially characterized as "so mechanical or routine." Mechanical and routine are understood in their ordinary discourse senses, as a conjunction or as connected by AND, and as the central clause. Subsequent clauses amplify the senses of mechanical and routine without disturbing their conjunction. The delineation of the absence of a modicum of creativity can be correlated with classic conceptions of computability. The insufficiently creative can then be understood as a routine selection, coordination, or arrangement produced by an automatic mechanical procedure or algorithm. An understanding of a modicum of creativity and of copyright law is also indicated. The value of the exegesis and interpretation is identified as its final simplicity, clarity, comprehensiveness, and potential practical utility. [source] Free Enrichment or Hidden Indexicals?MIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 4 2008ALISON HALL In this paper, I defend the latter position. The main objection to this view is that free enrichment appears to overgenerate, not predicting where context cannot affect truth conditions, so that a systematic account is unlikely (Stanley, 2002a). I first examine the semantic alternative proposed by Stanley and others, which assumes extensive hidden structure acting as a linguistic trigger for pragmatic processes, so that all truth-conditional effects of context turn out to be instances of saturation. I show that there are cases of optional pragmatic contributions to the proposition expressed that cannot plausibly be accounted for in this way, and that advocates of this approach will therefore also have to appeal to free enrichment. The final section starts to address the question of how free enrichment is constrained: I argue that it involves only local development or adjustment of parts of logical form, any global developments being excluded by the requirement for the proposition expressed to provide an inferential warrant for the intended implications of the utterance. [source] Logical Form andthe VernacularMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 4 2001Reinaldo Elugardo Vernacularism is the view that logical forms are fundamentally assigned to natural language expressions, and are only derivatively assigned to anything else, e.g., propositions, mental representations, expressions of symbolic logic, etc. In this paper, we argue that Vernacularism is not as plausible as it first appears because of non-sentential speech. More specifically, there are argument-premises, meant by speakers of non-sentences, for which no natural language paraphrase is readily available in the language used by the speaker and the hearer. The speaker can intend this proposition and the hearer can recover it (and its logical form). Since they cannot, by hypothesis, be doing this by using a sentence of their shared language, the proposition-meant has its logical form non-derivatively, which falsifies Vernacularism. We conclude the paper with a brief review of the debate on incomplete definite descriptions in which Vernacularism is assumed as a suppressed premise. [source] Scepticism and its SourcesPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2003SAMIR OKASHA A number of recent philosophers, including Michael Williams, Barry Stroud and Donald Davidson, have argued that scepticism about the external world stems from the founda-tionalist assumption that sensory experience supplies the data for our beliefs about the world. In order to assess this thesis, I offer a brief characterisation of the logical form of sceptical arguments. I suggest that sceptical arguments rely on the idea that many of our beliefs about the world are,underdetermined'by the evidence on which they are based. Drawing on this characterisation of scepticism, I argue that Williams, Stroud and Davidson are right to see the foundationalist assumption as essential to the sceptic's argument, but wrong to think that scepticism is inevitable once that assumption is in place. By pursuing an analogy with some recent debates in the philosophy of science, I try to locate the additional assumptions which the sceptic must make, in order to derive her conclusion. [source] I,What is the Normative Role of Logic?ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2009Hartry Field The paper tries to spell out a connection between deductive logic and rationality, against Harman's arguments that there is no such connection, and also against the thought that any such connection would preclude rational change in logic. One might not need to connect logic to rationality if one could view logic as the science of what preserves truth by a certain kind of necessity (or by necessity plus logical form); but the paper points out a serious obstacle to any such view. [source] Logical Form andthe VernacularMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 4 2001Reinaldo Elugardo Vernacularism is the view that logical forms are fundamentally assigned to natural language expressions, and are only derivatively assigned to anything else, e.g., propositions, mental representations, expressions of symbolic logic, etc. In this paper, we argue that Vernacularism is not as plausible as it first appears because of non-sentential speech. More specifically, there are argument-premises, meant by speakers of non-sentences, for which no natural language paraphrase is readily available in the language used by the speaker and the hearer. The speaker can intend this proposition and the hearer can recover it (and its logical form). Since they cannot, by hypothesis, be doing this by using a sentence of their shared language, the proposition-meant has its logical form non-derivatively, which falsifies Vernacularism. We conclude the paper with a brief review of the debate on incomplete definite descriptions in which Vernacularism is assumed as a suppressed premise. [source] A (SELLARSIAN) KANTIAN CRITIQUE OF HUME'S THEORY OF CONCEPTSPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2007DAVID LANDY This explanation includes a complicated attempted reduction of beliefs, or judgments, to single ideas. This paper attempts to demonstrate one of the inadequacies of this approach, and any of its kind (any attempted reduction of judgments to their constituent parts, single or multiple) via an argument concerning the logical forms of judgment found implicitly in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and more explicitly in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. [source] | ||||||||||