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Life Insurance Companies (life + insurance_company)
Selected AbstractsForecasting commercial paper ratesJOURNAL OF FORECASTING, Issue 1 2004Conway Lackman Abstract A model previously developed by Lackman (C. L. Lackman, Forecasting commercial paper rates. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting15 (1988) 499,524) for the period 1960 to 1985 is updated to include the 1990s and incorporate statistical techniques relating to tests for stationary conditions not available in 1988. As in the previous model, the demand for commercial paper by each institution (Households (HH), Life Insurance Companies (LIC), Non-Financial Corporations (CRP) and Finance Corporations (FC)) and the total demand is simulated. Simulations of the commercial paper rate are also generated,using just the demand equations (total supply exogenous) and then employing the entire model (supply endogenous) to determine the rate. Simulation periods are from 1960:2 to 2001:4 for all demand simulations. The dynamic simulation of the total demand for commercial paper performs well. The resulting root mean square error, 3.485, compares favourably with the Federal Reserve Boston,Massachusetts Institute of Technology (FRB,MIT) estimate of the commercial paper rate (deLeeuw and Granlich, 1968). Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] To Hedge or Not to Hedge: Managing Demographic Risk in Life Insurance CompaniesJOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 1 2006Helmut Gründl Demographic risk, i.e., the risk that life tables change in a nondeterministic way, is a serious threat to the financial stability of an insurance company having underwritten life insurance and annuity business. The inverse influence of changes in mortality laws on the market value of life insurance and annuity liabilities creates natural hedging opportunities. Within a realistically calibrated shareholder value (SHV) maximization framework, we analyze the implications of demographic risk on the optimal risk management mix (equity capital, asset allocation, and product policy) for a limited liability insurance company operating in a market with insolvency-averse insurance buyers. Our results show that the utilization of natural hedging is optimal only if equity is scarce. Otherwise, hedging can even destroy SHV. A sensitivity analysis shows that a misspecification of demographic risk has severe consequences for both the insurer and the insured. This result highlights the importance of further research in the field of demographic risk. [source] A study to identify the training needs of life insurance sales representatives in Taiwan using the Delphi approachINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT, Issue 3 2006Chiang Ku Fan This article reports a study conducted to identify the needs for continuing professional development for life insurance sales representatives and to examine the competencies needed by those sales representatives. A modified Delphi technique was used. Most life insurance companies in the USA implement an education and training plan advocated by the Life Office Management Association. Insurance companies in Taiwan implement similar education and training plans, but they do not seem to result in the successful performance of their sales representatives. Besides augmenting knowledge of various financial products and marketing approaches, this study also suggests that life insurance companies need to train their sales representatives to an adequate standard in competencies of problem solving, communication, information technology utilization, culture compatibility, emotional intelligence, collective competence and ethics. [source] The Premium,Dividend Competition in the Prewar Japanese Life Insurance Industry: A Game-Theoretic InterpretationTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2000Yoshiro Tsutsui Between 1917 and 1935, Japanese life insurance companies competed with each other on a premium,dividend basis. We propose that such competition took the form of product differentiation, exploiting differences in discount rates or price expectations among policy-holders. Our model shows that under some conditions the introduction of such competition can be beneficial to the competitive companies. It is shown that these conditions were satisfied at that time, and that more detailed factors are also consistent with the model. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D43, G22, N25. [source] Life Insurance for Living Kidney Donors: A Canadian Undercover InvestigationAMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRANSPLANTATION, Issue 7 2009R. C. Yang Some living kidney donors encounter difficulties obtaining life insurance, despite previous surveys of insurance companies reporting otherwise. To better understand the effect of donation on insurability, we contacted offices of life insurance companies in five major cities in Canada to obtain $100 000 of life insurance (20-year term) for 40 fictitious living kidney donors and 40 paired controls. These profiles were matched on age, gender, family history of kidney disease and presence of hypertension. The companies were blinded to data collection. The study protocol was reviewed by the Office of Research Ethics. The main study outcomes were the annual premium quoted and total time spent on the phone with the insurance agent. All donor and control profiles received a quote, with no significant difference in the premium quoted (medians $190 vs. $209, p = 0.89). More time was spent on the phone for donor compared to control profiles, but the absolute difference was small (medians 9.5 vs. 7.0 min, p = 0.046). Age, gender, family history of kidney disease and new-onset hypertension had no further effect on donor insurability in regression analysis. We found no evidence that kidney donors were disadvantaged in the first step of applying for life insurance. The effect donation has on subsequent phases of insurance underwriting remains to be studied. [source] The Impact of Surplus Distribution on the Risk Exposure of With Profit Life Insurance Policies Including Interest Rate GuaranteesJOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 3 2007Alexander Kling This article analyzes the numerical impact of different surplus distribution mechanisms on the risk exposure of a life insurance company selling with profit life insurance policies with a cliquet-style interest rate guarantee. Three representative companies are considered, each using a different type of surplus distribution: a mechanism, where the guaranteed interest rate also applies to surplus that has been credited in the past, a slightly less restrictive type in which a guaranteed rate of interest of 0 percent applies to past surplus, and a third mechanism that allows for the company to use former surplus in order to compensate for underperformance in "bad" years. Although at the outset all contracts offer the same guaranteed benefit at maturity, a distribution mechanism of the third type yields preferable results with respect to the considered risk measure. In particular, throughout the analysis, our representative company 3 faces ceteris paribus a significantly lower shortfall risk than the other two companies. Offering "strong" guarantees puts companies at a significant competitive disadvantage relative to insurers providing only the third type of surplus distribution mechanism. [source] | ||||||||||