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Legal Scholars (legal + scholar)
Selected AbstractsDo Defendants Pay What Juries Award?JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2007Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases Legal scholars, legislators, policy advocates, and the news media frequently use jury verdicts to draw conclusions about the performance of the tort system. However, actual payouts can differ greatly from verdicts. We report evidence on post-verdict payouts from the most comprehensive longitudinal study of matched jury verdicts and payouts. Using data on all insured medical malpractice claims in Texas from 1988,2003 in which the plaintiff received at least $25,000 (in 1988 dollars) following a jury trial, we find that most jury awards received "haircuts." Seventy-five percent of plaintiffs received a payout less than the adjusted verdict (jury verdict plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest), 20 percent received the adjusted verdict (within ± 2 percent), and 5 percent received more than the adjusted verdict. Overall, plaintiffs received a mean (median) per-case haircut of 29 percent (19 percent), and an aggregate haircut of 56 percent, relative to the adjusted verdict. The larger the verdict, the more likely and larger the haircut. For cases with a positive adjusted verdict under $100,000, 47 percent of plaintiffs received a haircut, with a mean (median) per-case haircut of 8 percent (2 percent). For cases with an adjusted verdict larger than $2.5 million, 98 percent of plaintiffs received a haircut with a mean (median) per-case haircut of 56 percent (61 percent). Insurance policy limits are the most important factor in explaining haircuts. Caps on damages in death cases and caps on punitive damages are also important, but defendants often paid substantially less than the adjusted allowed verdict. Remittitur accounts for a small percentage of the haircuts. Punitive damage awards have only a small effect on payouts. Out-of-pocket payments by physicians are rare, never large, and usually unrelated to punitive damage awards. Most cases settle, presumably in the shadow of the outcome if the case were to be tried. That outcome is not the jury award, but the actual post-verdict payout. Because defendants rarely pay what juries award, jury verdicts alone do not provide a sufficient basis for claims about the performance of the tort system. [source] Definitions of the Family as an Impetus for Legal Change in Custody Decision Making: Suggestions from an Empirical Case StudyLAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, Issue 1 2006Mellisa Holtzman Legal scholars and social scientists are increasingly calling on legislators, lawyers, and judges to recognize and embrace expanding definitions of the family. Implicit in such calls is the expectation that legal recognition of expanding definitions of the family will protect children's attachment relationships with adults, irrespective of their biological ties to those adults. Through a detailed, historical examination of custody decisions in disputes between biological and nonbiological parents in the state of Iowa, this research suggests that judicial recognition of more expansive definitions may not result in decisions that protect children's attachment relationships. This is true because the legal impact of family definitions appears to be contingent upon cultural and political factors that may undermine the expected effects of changing definitions. This research also suggests that judicial recognition of children's rights may be the most apt way to promote legal changes that will protect children's attachment relationships. [source] Energy Security and the Division of Competences between the European Community and its Member StatesEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 4 2008Sanam S. Haghighi However, dealing with energy issues in general and securing energy supply in particular is a new phenomenon within the EU's regulatory framework. One important issue which has not yet been discussed by legal scholars and which has been questioned repeatedly by energy experts, is the question who is actually responsible to guarantee security of energy supply in Europe? Is it the European Community alone? Is it the Member States alone? Or is it both? This question cannot be answered without a detailed legal analysis of the EU law in general, and EU law on division of competences between the Community and the Member States in particular. This article seeks to highlight the complications of this area of law within the EU and expand it to cover the energy sector in order to determine who and under what circumstances is responsible for guaranteeing security of energy supply for the consumers within the EU borders. [source] Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal StudiesJOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2002Roger Cotterrell The promise of sociolegal research varies for different constituencies. For some legal scholars it has been a promise of sustained commitment to moral and political critique of law and to theoretical and empirical analysis of law's social consequences and origins. To continue to deliver on that promise today, sociolegal studies should develop theory in new forms emphasizing the variety of forms of regulation and the moral foundations on which that regulation ultimately depends. It should demonstrate and explore law's roles in the routine structuring of all aspects of social life and its changing character as it faces the challenge of regulating relations of community not bounded solely by the jurisdictional reach of nation states. [source] The Miscegenation/Same-Sex Marriage Analogy: What Can We Learn from Legal History?LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, Issue 2 2008Julie Novkov It has become commonplace among historically inclined legal scholars to look to the history of the United States' elimination of bans on mixed-race sexual relationships for guidance about the recent controversy over same-sex marriage. This article argues that, while the analogy is helpful, it is not perfect because of the particular historical circumstances of the battle over antimiscegenation laws. Because regulations against interracial marriage were at the heart of defining and perpetuating the political and institutional system of white supremacy, they served a different purpose than the bans on same-sex marriage. The analogy can be pursued, however, to promote a critical consideration of the history of marriage as a heteronormative institution, generating a broader agenda for empowering change. Such a use of history takes the experience of the struggle against the antimiscegenation regime as a cautionary tale rather than a guidepost. [source] Is legal biography really legal scholarship?LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2010R Gwynedd Parry This paper examines the recent resurgence of interest in the legal biography among legal scholars. It argues that the legal biography has traditionally been treated with suspicion within the English law school due to ideological and methodological concerns about the intellectual validity and robustness of the form, and because of reservations about its true disciplinary province. Through a literary survey of legal biography, it claims a tension between intellectual and empirical approaches that parody the tension between the internal and external traditions in legal history. More recent biographies, however, have succeeded in bridging these divides and in demonstrating the potential value of legal biography in deepening our understanding of the human context of legal phenomena. [source] Law and the demoralisation of medicineLEGAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2006Jonathan Montgomery In his Dimbleby Lecture in December 2002, the Archbishop of Canterbury examined the effect of the emergence of the market state on the legitimacy of government activity in areas of morality. He suggested that, while this is becoming limited, the continuing need to provide a moral context for social life provided an opportunity for religious communities to play a crucial role. This paper suggests that the increasing significance of market concepts in healthcare law poses a similar challenge to the moral basis of medical practice, threatening to drive moral argument outside the scope of the discipline, with the consequent effect of undermining the values that drive good healthcare. Thus, the de-moralisation of medicine is also demoralising for those within the health professions. To counteract this tendency, a strong sense of a common moral community needs to be maintained amongst those engaged with the discipline of healthcare law. This paper also examines the role of law in this area. Traditionally, legal scholars have attacked the reluctance of legislators and the judiciary to wrestle from the grip of doctors the authority to determine ethical issues. The dominant view has been that this was a failure to recognise the fact that society has a stake in these matters and that legal non-intervention was an abdication of responsibility that undermines the rule of law. However, the integration of medical and moral decision making into a collaborative enterprise can also be seen as a more effective defence against the forces of demoralisation than the separation that the orthodox approach implies. If this is correct, then a key task for healthcare lawyers, as yet undeveloped, is to consider how to establish a legitimate common moral community, and what role the law might have to play in that process. [source] Casaubon's ghosts: the haunting of legal scholarshipLEGAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2001Allan C Hutchinson Much academic work continues to operate within the cramping and pervasive spirit of a black-letter mentality that encourages scholars and jurists to maintain legal study as an inward-looking and self-contained discipline. There is still a marked tendency to treat law as somehow a world of its own that is separate from the society within which it operates and purports to serve. This is a disheartening and disabling state of affairs. Accordingly, this article will offer both a critique of the present situation and suggest an alternative way of proceeding. The writer recommends a shift from philosophy to democracy so that legal academics will be less obsessed with abstraction and formalism and more concerned with relevance and practicality. In contrast to the hubristic and occasionally mystical aspirations of mainstream scholars, it presents a more humble depiction of the worth and efficacy of the jurisprudential and scholarly project in which ,usefulness' is given pride of place. Of course, these fundamental charges are not applicable to all legal scholars. Many scholars are engaged in work that not only challenges the prevailing paradigm of legal scholarship, but also explores exciting new directions for legal study. It will be part of the essay to acknowledge those contributions. [source] Culture and Rights after Culture and RightsAMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Issue 1 2006JANE K. COWAN Building on a critical, theoretical approach outlined in Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives (Cowan et al. 2001a), I posit rights processes as complex and contradictory: Both enabling and constraining, they produce new subjectivities and social relations and entail unintended consequences. To encourage interdisciplinary engagement on these themes, I explore selected texts that consider the relationship between culture and rights, addressing two literatures: (1) debates on culture, rights, and recognition in the context of multiculturalism among political philosophers and (2) an emerging literature by anthropologists, feminists, critical legal scholars, and engaged practitioners analyzing empirical cases. Although political philosophers elucidate ethical implications and clarify political projects, an outmoded arsenal of theoretical concepts of "culture,""society," and "the individual" has hampered their debates. When accounts are both theoretically informed and empirically grounded, contradictions, ambiguities, and impasses of culture and rights are more fully explored and the liberal model of rights and multiculturalism is more open to interrogation. [source] Reflections on Lack of a Patent System throughout China's Long HistoryTHE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Issue 2 2009Deming Liu The accepted wisdom is that the patent system originated in Europe and that China did not have such an indigenous system throughout its history. The reasons for the lack of such a system are not often explored among legal scholars although, for decades, historians have debated on a related matter of why the Industrial Revolution did not start in China after its centuries' lead in science and technology. It appears that legal scholars generally accept that Confucian philosophy precluded an intellectual property system in China including a patent system. The article aims to dispute this belief by showing that socioeconomic and geographical factors underscored the main reasons for the lack of a patent system in ancient China. [source] | ||||||||||