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Legal Categories (legal + category)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Law and Criminology	80%

Selected Abstracts

Mothers, Extraordinary Labor, and Amacasual: Law and Politics of Nonstandard Employment in the South African Retail Sector

LAW & POLICY, Issue 3 2009
BRIDGET KENNY
This article examines changing social meaning embodying legal categories of nonstandard employment within South African retailing between the 1950s and the postapartheid period. Using archival and interview material, the article shows how trade unions constructed part-time and casual employment through gendered, class, and racial meanings to produce two very different legal categories. Black workers' rights claims in the 1980s developed within these changing socio-legal parameters. The image of the full-time permanent worker became political agent, and in the postapartheid period, increasing numbers of casual workers became marginalized from the union. The relationship between rights and regulation gives us a more complex way of understanding worker politics. [source]

Dealing with Diversity in the Construction of Indigenous Autonomy in the Sierra Norte of Oaxaca

BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH, Issue 3 2008
ROSA GUADALUPE MENDOZA ZUANY
Building autonomy in the Sierra Norte of Oaxaca has not depended on the development of Zapotec ethnic identities, isolation or rejection of the integration of outsiders into the communities. The communities of Ixtlán and Guelatao have developed strong local identities and strategies related to the appropriation of external legal categories, and the combination of these with their own customary practices to integrate newcomers into their social, political and economic organisation. Dialogue has been one of the main tools for building autonomy and achieve the integration of outsiders, while continuing the dynamic reproduction of their internal organisation and way of life. [source]

Property and contract in contemporary corporate theory

LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2003
Paddy Ireland
This paper critically evaluates the contractual theories of companies and company law which have risen to prominence in recent years. It argues that history reveals as misguided the attempt to depict public companies as essentially contractual in nature, one of the most striking features of the development in nineteenth century Britain of the first body of (joint stock) company law having been its gradual move away from the principles of agency and contract underlying the law of partnership from which it emerged. Against this backdrop, the paper moves on to explore the ways in which theorists have tried, against the odds, to characterise public Companies as contractual and the reasons for their attempting to do so. While it might be apposite to view many private or closely held companies through the prism of contract, the paper argues, public companies and much of company law itself can only properly be understood when viewed through the prism of financial property. Indeed, it suggests, this is implicitly confirmed by the Company Law Review and (paradoxically) by the recent work of corporate governance specialists and financial economists in the US, with its focus on investor protection and the preservation of financial property's integrity, and its emphasis on the crucial role of (public) regulation in these processes. The paper concludes that these property forms are not merely the objects, but the products of regulation and that this has important implications for our understanding of both company law and corporate governance. In making these arguments, it seeks to cast some light on the nature of intangible property, on the differences between contract-based and property-based rights, on the neo-liberal idea of ,deregulation', and on the unity and scope of company law as a legal category. [source]

Hans Kelsen's Doctrine of Imputation

RATIO JURIS, Issue 1 2001
Stanley L. Paulson
First, the author examines the traditional doctrine of imputation. A look at the traditional doctrine is useful for establishing a point of departure in comparing Kelsen's doctrines of central and peripheral imputation. Second, the author turns to central imputation. Here Kelsen's doctrine follows the traditional doctrine in attributing liability or responsibility to the subject. Kelsen's legal subject, however, has been depersonalized and thus requires radical qualification. Third, the author takes up peripheral imputation, which is the main focus of the paper. It is argued that with respect to the basic form of the law, exhibited by the linking of legal condition with legal consequence, peripheral imputation counts as an austere doctrine, shorn as it is of all references to legal personality or the legal subject. If Kelsen's reconstructed legal norms are empowerments, then the austere doctrine of peripheral imputation captures the rudiments of their form, exactly what would be expected if peripheral imputation does indeed serve as the category of legal cognition. Finally, the author develops the puzzle surrounding the legal "ought" in this context. Although Kelsen talks at one point as though the legal "ought" were the peculiarly legal category, the author submits that this is not the best reading of Kelsen's texts. [source]