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Lending Decisions (lending + decision)
Selected AbstractsWhat Do Data Say About Monetary Policy, Bank Liquidity and Bank Risk Taking?ECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 2 2007Marcella Lucchetta This paper tests empirically the linkage between banks' investment and interbank lending decisions in response to interest rate changes. We draw conclusions for the monetary policy, which uses the interest rate as its main tool. Across European countries we find that the risk-free (i.e. monetary policy) interest rate negatively affects the liquidity retained by banks and the decision of a bank to be a lender in the interbank market. Instead, the interbank interest rate has a positive impact on these decisions. We also find that banks who lend show less risk-taking behaviour and tend to be smaller than those who are borrowers. Most importantly, the risk-free interest rate is positively correlated with loans investment and bank risk-taking behaviour. [source] How do changes in monetary policy affect bank lending?JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS, Issue 3 2006An analysis of Austrian bank data Using a panel of Austrian bank data we show that the lending decisions of the smallest banks are more sensitive to interest rate changes, and that for all banks, sensitivity changes over time. We propose to estimate the groups of banks that display similar lending reactions by means of a group indicator which, after estimation, indicates each bank's classification. Additionally, we estimate a state indicator that indicates the periods during which the lending reaction differs from what we normally observe. Bayesian methods are used for estimation; a sensitivity analysis and a forecast evaluation confirm our model choice. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Loan Officer Turnover and Credit Availability for Small FirmsJOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2006Jonathan A. Scott This paper presents empirical evidence on the role loan officers play in facilitating small firm access to commercial bank loans. If loan officers use soft information (for example, assessments of character, information from customers and suppliers) to make lending decisions that would not otherwise be made on the basis of hard information (for example, tax returns or financial statements), then, frequent turnover in loan officers should be associated with an adverse effect on credit availability. This relationship is confirmed empirically using survey data of U.S. small firms in 1995 and 2001, where loan officer turnover is positively related to the turndown rate on the most recent loan application. Although loan officer turnover could be influenced by the turndown rate (for example, an owner changes banks and gets a new loan officer as a result of a recent turndown), its negative effect on credit availability persists under several different tests. [source] Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer RotationTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2010ANDREW HERTZBERG ABSTRACT We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self-reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor. [source] | ||||||||||