Labour Unions (labour + union)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


How Labour Markets affect Trade Policies and Trade: The Case of the Foreign Labour Union

PACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2003
K. C. Fung
This paper highlights the point that the presence of a foreign union affects significantly the characterization of domestic trade policies, and thus, trade. Specifically, both the objective functions of the foreign union and the nature of interactions between the foreign firm and the foreign union are important determinants of the sign and magnitudes of the domestic trade policies. The importance of the foreign union effect holds regardless of whether the domestic trade policies are politically motivated or whether they are set to maximize national welfare. The foreign union effect is also present with or without a domestic producer. [source]


Militant rhetoric and the business cycle: the case of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organization

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL, Issue 2 2006
Barbara Sgouraki Kinsey
ABSTRACT During economic downturns, when the strike becomes less of an option, labour unions may use militant rhetoric to target often electorally vulnerable actors in the political system. I find that labour's rhetorical intensity is largely determined by the business cycle and the partisanship of administrations, and provide evidence of its political effect. [source]


The impact of group incentives on performance of small firms: Hausman,Taylor estimates

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 6 2010
Kshitija Dixit
This paper investigates the impact of group incentives on firms' performance. It shows that group incentive raises firms' performance. This result empirically validates the implication of the theoretical literature that performance-related pay can potentially improve firms' performance, in the context of a developing country, and indicates the importance of group incentives in small firms. It also shows that partnership firms perform better than private limited companies and labour unions have a negative impact on firms' performance. It employs the Hausman,Taylor random effects estimator in order to isolate the effects of time-invariant covariates and also to tackle potential endogeneity problem. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


Organizational Flexibility in Western and Asian Firms: An Examination of Control and Safeguard Rules in Five Countries

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, Issue 1 2001
Ignace Ng
This paper examines the influence of family and government ownerships and of labour unions on the adoption of control and safeguard rules in Asian (Hong Kong, Korea, and Malaysia) and Western (Australia and Canada) organizations. Following Ng and Dastmalchian (1998), control rules are those rules applied to employees and their behaviour at work, whereas safeguard rules are designed to address managerial discretion. Using data from 119 organizations, of which 58 are from Asia and the remaining 61 from the West, the results show that, contrary to general expectations, government organizations from both regions are no more rules-oriented than their non-government counterparts. Another unexpected finding is that unionized Asian organizations have fewer safeguard rules, not only in comparison with nonunion Asian firms but also relative to unionized Western organizations. The results also show that Asian family organizations have fewer safeguard rules in comparison with both other Asian firms and other family firms in the West. Résumé Cette étude évalue l'influence que peuvent avoir les syn-dicats, les sociétés d'état et les grandes firmes familiales sur l'adoption de règies de conduite et de précaution dans un nombre de sociétés en Asie (Hong Hong, Corée du Sud, la Malaisie) et en Occident (au Canada et en Australie). Conformément aux précisions formulées dans Ng and Dastmalchian (1998), nous entendons par règies de conduites celles qui gouvernent le comporte-ment des employés au travail, tandis que par règies de précaution nous désignons celles qui ont pour objet la marge de manoeuvre des gestionnaires. En basant nos données sur 119 sociétés, dont 58 en Asie et 61 au Canada et en Australie, nos résultats démontrent que, con-trairement aux attentes générates, les sociétés d'état dans ces deux aires géographiques ne sont pas plus lourdement réglementées que leurs homologues non-gouvernementaux. Autre surprise: les sociétés en Asie dont la main d'oeuvre n'est pas syndiquée ont moins de régies de précaution, non settlement par rapport avec les organismes non-syndiqués en Asie, mais aussi en com-paraison des sociétés syndiqués au Canada et Australie. Enfin, les résultats démontrent aussi que les grandes firmes familiales en Asie ont moins de règies de précaution que les autres sociétés d'Asie et que les firmes familiales au Canada et en Australie. [source]