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Labour Contract (labour + contract)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Optimal At-will Labour Contracts

ECONOMICA, Issue 270 2001
Ed Nosal
An at-will employment rule allows parties to sever their employment relationship for ,a good reason, a bad reason or no reason at all'[Schawb, S. (1993) Life-cycle justice: accommodating just cause and employment at will. Michigan Law Review, 92, 8--62]. A specific performance employment rule allows any party to force the other party to perform as specified in the contract. Although the theory of labour contracting generally assumes enforcement by specific performance, in practice, the vast majority of non-union employment relationships are mediated by an at-will rule. When employment contracts are enforced by an at-will rule, I show that the ,standard' counter-intuitive predictions generated by standard labour contracting models disappear. [source]

Collectivism versus individualism in Dutch employment relations

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, Issue 1 2004
Jan De Leede
From a very centralistic and collectivistic tradition after World War Two, Dutch employment relations now show a trend towards radical decentralisation and individualisation. What might be the consequences of this trend for labour relations? Do developments still fit within a movement towards ,organised decentralisation' or will the existing system of labour relations be hollowed out and destroyed? And what will be the consequences for ER management at company level? We present empirical data on how companies deal with their decentralised and individualised employment relations. It appears that, in the main areas such as labour contracts, working time arrangements, reward systems and development plans, decentralisation and individualisation are taking place. It has also become clear that management as well as workers support this and that a new form of negotiation between them is developing at workplace level, resulting in what we call ,third contracts' that are additional to the initial labour contract and the collective agreement. Our results also highlight the pragmatic way in which companies deal with these decentralised and individualised employment relations, which, nevertheless, remain linked to the national and collective levels of bargaining. Within the multilevel system of Dutch employment relations a new balance between collectivism and individualism is emerging. [source]

A Note on Efficiency Wage Theory and Principal,Agent Theory

BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 3 2006
Uwe Jirjahn
J41; J33; D82 Abstract Why are principal,agent models used in some circumstances and efficiency wage models in others? In this note, it is argued that efficiency wages provide incentives based on an evaluation of the agent's input, while the incentives analysed in principal,agent models rely on the agent's output. The choice between the two incentive schemes depends on the probability that the agent is caught shirking. Moreover, we demonstrate that a combination of input- and output-related elements provides stronger incentives than payment schemes based on merely one of these elements. However, the combination requires a more complex labour contract involving an increased cost of writing the contract. The interaction between this transaction cost and a hiring cost is analysed. [source]

Collectivism versus individualism in Dutch employment relations

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, Issue 1 2004
Jan De Leede
From a very centralistic and collectivistic tradition after World War Two, Dutch employment relations now show a trend towards radical decentralisation and individualisation. What might be the consequences of this trend for labour relations? Do developments still fit within a movement towards ,organised decentralisation' or will the existing system of labour relations be hollowed out and destroyed? And what will be the consequences for ER management at company level? We present empirical data on how companies deal with their decentralised and individualised employment relations. It appears that, in the main areas such as labour contracts, working time arrangements, reward systems and development plans, decentralisation and individualisation are taking place. It has also become clear that management as well as workers support this and that a new form of negotiation between them is developing at workplace level, resulting in what we call ,third contracts' that are additional to the initial labour contract and the collective agreement. Our results also highlight the pragmatic way in which companies deal with these decentralised and individualised employment relations, which, nevertheless, remain linked to the national and collective levels of bargaining. Within the multilevel system of Dutch employment relations a new balance between collectivism and individualism is emerging. [source]

A Noisy Screening Model of Education

LABOUR, Issue 1 2005
Pedro Landeras
The aim is to explore the effect of noise on the screening equilibrium. By assuming that labour contracts take the form of reward schedules based on inaccurate academic qualifications, one can show that separating equilibrium turns out to be unique but insufficiently revealing, and both high and low ability types become overeducated. Also, even when separation is uncompleted, we show that a firm could still profitably cream-skim the market so that no pooling equilibrium exits. As in the non-noise case, the existence of an equilibrium is assured when the student population is made up mainly of a small proportion of high-ability individuals, but in that case the fraction required is even lower. [source]