Kosovo Conflict (kosovo + conflict)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Racial Nationalism as a Paradigm in International Relations: the Kosovo Conflict as Seen by the Far Right in Germany

PEACE & CHANGE, Issue 1 2004
Fabian Virchow
As the German Federal Armed Forces are becoming more involved in wars since the early 1990s, the far right in Germany strengthens its propaganda on matters of war and peace. Despite its general military-friendly stance and high regard of soldiery, the far right in its majority is very critical toward the deployment of German troops because this use is seen as being in the interests of the United States and Israel. Therefore, anti-Americanism as well as anti-Semitism and racial nationalism dominate the statements of the far right that creates the self-image of being the "real peace movement" at the same time that they favor a new hegemonic position for Germany in Europe. [source]


Surviving the Kosovo Conflict: A Study of Social Identity, Appraisal of Extreme Events, and Mental Well-Being

APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2009
Blerina Kellezi
First page of article [source]


A common European foreign policy after Iraq?

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2003
Brian Crowe
Taking as read the wide range of other instruments that the EU has for international influence (enlargement, aid, trade, association and other arrangements, etc.), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), under pressure from the Kosovo conflict, has been shaped by two important decisions in 1999: the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to give the EU a military capability when NATO as a whole is not engaged, and the appointment as the new High Representative for the CFSP of a high-profile international statesman rather than a senior civil servant. A major European effort will still be needed if Europe is to be effective militarily, whether in the EU/ESDP or NATO framework. The management of the CFSP has been held back by the doctrine of the equality of all member states regardless of their actual contribution. This in turn leads to a disconnect between theory (policy run by committee in Brussels) and practice (policy run by the High Representative working with particular member states and other actors, notably the US). It has been difficult for Javier Solana to develop the authority to do this, not in competition with the Commission as so widely and mistakenly believed, as with member states themselves, and particularly successive rotating presidencies. It is important that misdiagnosis does not lead to politically correct solutions that end up with the cure worse than the disease. Ways need to be found to assure to the High Representative the authority to work with third countries and with the member states making the real contribution, while retaining the support of all. Then, with its own military capability, the EU can have a CFSP that is the highest common factor rather than the lowest common denominator, with member states ready to attach enough priority to the need for common policies to give Europeans a strong influence in the big foreign policy issues of the day. [source]


Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2006
MARK SCHAFER
Do the beliefs of leaders make a significant difference in determining if democracies are peaceful and explaining why democracies (almost) never fight one another? Our comparisons of Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bill Clinton reveal that both leaders view democracies as more friendly than nondemocracies, and they have significantly less cooperative beliefs toward the latter than toward the former, a difference that extends to the behavior of their respective governments during the Kosovo conflict. We also find that individual differences in the operational codes of the two leaders matter in the management of conflict with nondemocracies; the leaders exhibit opposite leadership styles and behavior associated with the domestic political culture of the two states. Overall, these results support the dyadic version of the democratic peace and suggest that the conflict behavior of democratic states depends upon the beliefs and calculations of their leaders in dealing with nondemocracies. [source]