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Korean War (korean + war)
Selected AbstractsBeyond No Gun Ri: Refugees and the United States Military in the Korean War*DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 1 2005SAHR CONWAY-LANZ First page of article [source] Divided Korea at SixtyHISTORY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 1 2005Charles K. Armstrong Sixty years after the end of World War II, Korea remains the last country divided by the post-war Allied settlement. Recently new evidence and interpretations have invigorated a number of debates about this history: the question of how Korea became divided into two states between 1945 and 1948; the causes and conduct of the Korean War; and the reasons for Korea's continued division, and in particular the nature and survivability of the North Korean regime. [source] The Korean War and tourism: legacy of the war on the development of the tourism industry in South KoreaINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TOURISM RESEARCH, Issue 3 2006Young-Sook Lee Abstract Although the development of tourism has been dominantly viewed and conceptualised in relation to the economic development of a region or a nation, some studies have argued that tourism fosters world peace. This argument, however, is not without some doubt for at the opposite end of the spectrum is that tourism might have a possible relationship with ,war'; the focus of this paper. This study, using qualitative research methods, traces the causes of the Korean War and its subsequent impacts upon the development of the tourism industry in South Korea. Findings indicate that the war had a significant impact upon the notion of tourism as a ,good' industry for society, which would bring benefits in the post-conflict era. Further, it created some ideas in society that purely consumptive travel is ,unpatriotic' and people should think about the interests of the nation when they travel. This paper concludes with a suggestion that future research should look into the ways in which tourism and tourists have developed where ,accumulation of capitalism' and changes in legislative moves, such as ,paid holidays' were not the initiating elements for a country's tourism development. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] International Relations Theory and the Second Korean WarINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2003David C. Kang Ever since the first Korean war in 1950, scholars and policymakers have been predicting a second one, started by an invasion from the North. Whether seen as arising from preventive, preemptive, desperation, or simple aggressive motivations, the predominant perspective in the west sees North Korea as likely to instigate conflict. Yet for fifty years North Korea has not come close to starting a war. Why were so many scholars so consistently wrong about North Korea's intentions? Social scientists can learn as much from events that did not happen as from those that did. The case of North Korea provides a window with which to examine these theories of conflict initiation, and reveals how the assumptions underlying these theories can become mis-specified. Either scholars misunderstood the initial conditions, or they misunderstood the theory, and I show that scholars have made mistakes in both areas. Social science moves forward from clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. However, just as important is the rigorous assessment of a theory, especially if the predictions fail to materialize. North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.,ROK alliance, and it quickly fell further behind. The real question has not been whether North Korea would preempt as South Korea caught up, but instead why North Korea might fight as it fell further and further behind. The explanation for a half-century of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite simple: deterrence works. [source] Cracking the Code: A Decode Strategy for the International Business Machines Punch Cards of Korean War SoldiersJOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES, Issue 3 2006Erin M. Mitsunaga B.A. ABSTRACT: During the Korean War, International Business Machines (IBM) punch cards were created for every individual involved in military combat. Each card contained all pertinent personal information about the individual and was utilized to keep track of all soldiers involved. However, at present, all of the information known about these punch cards reveals only their format and their significance; there is little to no information on how these cards were created or how to interpret the information contained without the aid of the computer system used during the war. Today, it is believed there is no one available to explain this computerized system, nor do the original computers exist. This decode strategy is the result of an attempt to decipher the information on these cards through the use of all available medical and dental records for each individual examined. By cross-referencing the relevant personal information with the known format of the cards, a basic guess-and-check method was utilized. After examining hundreds of IBM punch cards, however, it has become clear that the punch card method of recording information was not infallible. In some cases, there are gaps of information on cards where there are data recorded on personal records; in others, information is punched incorrectly onto the cards, perhaps as the result of a transcription error. Taken all together, it is clear that the information contained on each individual's card should be taken solely as another form of personal documentation. [source] Text and Context in the 1952 Presidential Campaign: Eisenhower's "I Shall Go to Korea" SpeechPRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2000MARTIN J. MEDHURST This article examines the textual context of Eisenhower's famous "I Shall Go to Korea" speech, delivered during the closing days of the 1952 presidential campaign. Four interlocking contexts of discourse are identified,the discourses of cold war, foreign policy, Korea, and the Eisenhower persona. By rhetorically activating each of these contexts, Eisenhower invited his listeners to understand his speech not merely as a campaign pledge but as a rhetorically, historically, psychologically, and ideologically satisfying means of making sense of the Korean War. Dramatically structured in the form of a courtroom case, with Eisenhower taking on the roles of both prosecuting attorney and witness, the "I Shall Go to Korea" speech was rhetorically tailored to take advantage of the audience's preexisting beliefs, values, and attitudes. [source] International Relations Theory and the Second Korean WarINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2003David C. Kang Ever since the first Korean war in 1950, scholars and policymakers have been predicting a second one, started by an invasion from the North. Whether seen as arising from preventive, preemptive, desperation, or simple aggressive motivations, the predominant perspective in the west sees North Korea as likely to instigate conflict. Yet for fifty years North Korea has not come close to starting a war. Why were so many scholars so consistently wrong about North Korea's intentions? Social scientists can learn as much from events that did not happen as from those that did. The case of North Korea provides a window with which to examine these theories of conflict initiation, and reveals how the assumptions underlying these theories can become mis-specified. Either scholars misunderstood the initial conditions, or they misunderstood the theory, and I show that scholars have made mistakes in both areas. Social science moves forward from clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. However, just as important is the rigorous assessment of a theory, especially if the predictions fail to materialize. North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.,ROK alliance, and it quickly fell further behind. The real question has not been whether North Korea would preempt as South Korea caught up, but instead why North Korea might fight as it fell further and further behind. The explanation for a half-century of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite simple: deterrence works. [source] Time to Keep Going: The Role and Structure of U.S. Forces in a Unified KoreaPACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 1 2003Il-Young Kim This year Korea and the U.S. celebrate 50 years of their alliance, which has seen many ups and downs since it came into existence. Today a very intense debate is going on in the USA and Korea about the future role of the U.S. in both the re-unification process and a post-unified Korea. Anti-Americanism is on the rise in South Korea, and demand for withdrawal of American forces is gaining ground in Korean society. An American withdrawal from Korea, however, would be very destabilizing for Korea and the whole of the East Asian region. Since the Korean war, the factors that have made it possible for South Korea, and other countries in the region, to economically prosper are the combination of sound economic polices and hard work by the peoples of these countries, and of the U.S. policies of reopening international markets to the countries of the region. While the presence of the U.S. forces in a post-unified Korea would be a positive factor, the actual structure of these forces would depend on the ground realities and threat perceptions at that time. It would be determined by complex issues of peace and stability inside Korea, its economic situation, and the external situation outside Korea's borders, including Korea's threat perceptions from China. Despite great improvements in technology in the Naval and Air forces, almost all military contingencies still require the use of ground forces to fight or to deter wars. Thus even if U.S. air and naval forces remained stationed in Korea, the absence of the U.S. ground forces would seriously undermine the deterrent and fighting power of the United States in the country and the region as whole. Given the terrain of the Korean peninsula, any possible future military conflict involving Korea would almost certainly be won or lost on land. Accordingly, infantrymen and tanks must remain an essential component of the American forces in Korea. What is more, dependence on air and naval forces for the protection of Korea would weaken traditional alliances and deterrence as well as American support for the very values and political principles that make other countries respect and trust the United States. [source] | ||||||||||