Korean Nuclear Crisis (korean + nuclear_crisis)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2003
Roland Bleiker
Two nuclear crises recently haunted the Korean peninsula, one in 1993/4, the other in 2002/3. In each case the events were strikingly similar: North Korea made public its ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty. Then the situation rapidly deteriorated until the peninsular was literally on the verge of war. The dangers of North Korea's actions, often interpreted as nuclear brinkmanship, are evident and much discussed, but not so the underlying patterns that have shaped the conflict in the first place. This article sheds light on some of them. It examines the role of the United States in the crisis, arguing that Washington's inability to see North Korea as anything but a threatening ,rogue state' seriously hinders both an adequate understanding and possible resolution of the conflict. Particularly significant is the current policy of pre-emptive strikes against rogue states, for it reinforces half a century of American nuclear threats towards North Korea. The problematic role of these threats has been largely obscured, not least because the highly technical discourse of security analysis has managed to present the strategic situation on the peninsula in a manner that attributes responsibility for the crisis solely to North Korea's actions, even if the situation is in reality far more complex and interactive. [source]


How Can the United States Take the Initiative in the Current North Korean Nuclear Crisis?

PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2005
Jin H. Pak
On September 19, 2005, the last day of the fourth round of six-party talks, a deal was announced in which North Korea pledged to end its nuclear program in return for a number of concessions. Within 24 hours of that announcement, North Korea clarified its position by stating that the United States "should not even dream" it would dismantle its nuclear weapons until it receives a light-water nuclear reactor. Despite four rounds of six-party talks over a three year period, it seems that almost no real progress has been made, except for North Korea; US intelligence officials estimate that North Korea could have made as many as 8 or 9 nuclear weapons already. So it seems North Korea has cleverly increased its bargaining position vis--vis the United States. As lengthy negotiations over the provision of a Light Water Reactor (LWR) will undoubtedly ensue, it can use that time to steadily increase its nuclear deterrent. Why did the United States agree to this sub-optimal outcome? Why was it so difficult for the United States to exert more influence on North Korea and the other countries in the six-party talks? The answer to these questions lies in the changing trends affecting Northeast Asian security dynamics. For various reasons that this article will explain, these trends affect the ability of the United States to take the initiative in the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis. As long as the United States fails to account for various changes in Northeast Asian regional dynamics, its strategy will to deter North Korea from continuing its nuclear program will not succeed. [source]


The U.S. Financial Sanctions against North Korea

PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 1 2007
Tae-Hwan Kwak
In September 2005, the U.S. imposed financial restrictions on North Korea after blaming the North for illicit financial activities, including counterfeiting and money-laundering. The U.S. financial sanctions against the North had direct and immediate impact on the ongoing six-party negotiations on North Korea's nuclear issue. North Korea insisted on the lifting of U.S. financial sanctions as the precondition for returning to the negotiating table and consequently the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear issue stalled. The third session of the fifth round of six-party talks in February 2007 produced an important accord on North Korea's nuclear question. This agreement was made possible after the U.S. and the DPRK reached a compromise on the financial sanctions issue. This article discusses the U.S. financial sanctions against North Korea and their implications for North Korea's nuclear question. It begins with an overview of the U.S. financial restrictions. This study then examines the nexus between the financial sanctions and the impasse at the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear issue. This is followed by a discussion of the breakthrough on the financial restrictions issue and the landmark agreement on North Korea's nuclear issue in February 2007. In this study, the authors argue that a mutually satisfactory resolution of the BDA dispute holds the key to a peaceful settlement of the second North Korean nuclear crisis. With the BDA dispute behind, the six-party talks should gain momentum and prepare a road map for implementing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Both the U.S. and North Korea should not miss this golden opportunity and make earnest efforts to build a firm foundation for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. [source]


Nuclear Deterrence and Animosity in Japan-North Korean Relations: Steps to Coexistence

PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 1 2006
Anthony DiFilippo
The relationship between Japan and North Korea continues to be characterized by a considerable amount of animus and distrust, their geographical proximity notwithstanding. While the "history problem" still creates antagonism in the bilateral relationship, several other matters, such as the North Korean nuclear crisis and the missile and abduction issues, have not made the prospects for rapprochement especially good. Also not helping to better this very strained bilateral relationship is Japan's recent willingness to strengthen its security alliance with the United States and Washington's policy toward North Korea, which Pyongyang sees as uncompromising and hubristic. Of particular concern is that both Japan and North Korea reason that a real or claimed nuclear deterrent force is necessary for the purpose of national security. This article argues that Tokyo and Pyongyang need to implement bold measures that palpably demonstrate their commitment to improving bilateral ties, stressing that trust-building actions are important for them to experience peaceful coexistence. [source]


How Can the United States Take the Initiative in the Current North Korean Nuclear Crisis?

PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2005
Jin H. Pak
On September 19, 2005, the last day of the fourth round of six-party talks, a deal was announced in which North Korea pledged to end its nuclear program in return for a number of concessions. Within 24 hours of that announcement, North Korea clarified its position by stating that the United States "should not even dream" it would dismantle its nuclear weapons until it receives a light-water nuclear reactor. Despite four rounds of six-party talks over a three year period, it seems that almost no real progress has been made, except for North Korea; US intelligence officials estimate that North Korea could have made as many as 8 or 9 nuclear weapons already. So it seems North Korea has cleverly increased its bargaining position vis--vis the United States. As lengthy negotiations over the provision of a Light Water Reactor (LWR) will undoubtedly ensue, it can use that time to steadily increase its nuclear deterrent. Why did the United States agree to this sub-optimal outcome? Why was it so difficult for the United States to exert more influence on North Korea and the other countries in the six-party talks? The answer to these questions lies in the changing trends affecting Northeast Asian security dynamics. For various reasons that this article will explain, these trends affect the ability of the United States to take the initiative in the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis. As long as the United States fails to account for various changes in Northeast Asian regional dynamics, its strategy will to deter North Korea from continuing its nuclear program will not succeed. [source]